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I 
AN ESSAY ON OPPOSITION 
The structure, role, function and significance of the 
Opposition in political systems constructed on the so-called Westminster 
model has generally been a neglected area of study, both in Britain, where 
the term- 'His Majesty's Opposition' -has been current since the third 
decade of the nineteenth century, and in Australia, where opposition has 
been an accepted part of parliamentary government since its inception in 
the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. 
If the Opposition has been a neglected area of study it was 
not for want of early and perceptive guidance from a student of politics no 
less eminent than the celebrated Walter Bagehot who not only noted the 
existence of Opposition in the living constitution but also some of the 
ambiguities, ironies and subtleties of the institution which later writers 
on politics have for so long ignored. 
The English Constitution, Bagehot wrote, was the first to 
~ 
make 'criticism of administration as much a part of the polify as 
administration itself'. 1 But, at the same time, he noted that the business 
of Opposition is far from straight-forward, for, although its task is to 
oppose the Government, it nevertheless must decide on what to oppose the 
Government: 
The Opposition have the unrestricted selection of the point of 
attack, and they seldom choose a case in which the department, 
upon the surface of the matter, seems to be right.2 
The Opposition's capacity to oppose is limited by other factors than those 
on which the Government is prima facie right. It must also have regard to 
the effect its pronouncements will have next time it is called upon to form 
a government: 
1 
2 
Bagehot, W.: The English Constitution, 2nd ed. (with Introduction by 
R.H.S. Crossman), London, Fontana, 1867, p/b., at p.72. 
Ibid., at p.l87. 
An Opposition, on coming into power, is often like a speculative 
merchant whose bills become due •••• {T]he late Opposition 
cannot, in office, forget those sentences which terrible 
admirers in the country still quote.3 
2 
Nor is opposition always a matter of attacking the Government. 
In some matters the Opposition may forgo the right to oppose: 
And an English minority, inheriting a long experience of 
Parliamentary affairs, would not be exceedingly ready to 
reject a treaty made with a foreign Government. The 
leaders of an English Opposition are very conversant with 
the school-boy maxim, 'Two can play at that fun' • They 
know that the next time they are in office the same sort 
of sharp practice may be used against them, and therefore 
they will not use it. So strong is this predisposition, 
that not long since,a subordinate member of the Opposition 
declared that the 'front benches' of the two sides of the 
House - that is, the leaders of the Government and the 
leaders of the Opposition - were in constant tacit league 
to suppress the objections of independent members.4 
If Bagehot had shown that the interaction between Government 
and Opposition, and the ambivalent relationships between them were a central 
feature of the English system, the writers of the next century did little to 
follow his leads. They remained at the level of the general, the platitudinous 
and the polemical. Consider, for instance, the following extract from a 
famous text on Cabinet government: 
The purpose of the Opposition is to secure a majority against 
the Government at the next general election and thus to replace 
the Government. This does not imply that a Government may not 
be defeated in the House of Commons. Nor does it imply that 
parliamentary criticism may not persuade the Government to 
modify, or even to withdraw, its proposals. These qualifications 
are important; but they do not destroy the truth of the principle 
that the Government governs and the Opposition criticises.S 
Or the words of a former Clerk of the House of Commons: 
3 
4 
5 
The practice of the House of Commons emphasizes the importance 
of the official Opposition in every possible way •••• It has its 
own rights over the time of the House •••• [T]he Opposition has 
Ibid., at p.l60. 
Ibid., at p.290f. 
Jennings, W.I.; Cabinet Government, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1959, at p.472. 
the right to initiate discussion of any branch of administration 
on about thirty-two days in each session. In addition the 
Government is morally bound to grant a day for the discussion of 
any vote of censure which the Opposition wish to move •••• 6 
Statements of this nature fall more readily into a eulogy 
on the nation's constitution than into a consideration of its politics. 
3 
Oppositions have no rights except by the grace of the Government of the day. 
As a former Leader of the House of Commons, Lord Morrison, expressed it: 
'The Leader of the House is the guardian of the legitimate rights of the 
0 . . '7 ppos~t~on •••• The rights of the Opposition vary from time to time 
and have in general been steadily reduced. They are not protected by any 
constitutional or statute law but exist essentially on the sufferance of 
the majority. 
The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of literature 
on opposition in political systems around the world. 8 The detail behind 
the landscapes painted by earlier writers is being progressively documented. 
Australian political literature has likewise turned a blind 
eye to the institution of Opposition. Indeed, what little writing there 
has been has usually been more attentive to the practice than have the 
eulogistic British writings cited above. Professor L.F. Crisp has explored 
the nature of Opposition at some length in his general survey of Australian 
Government9 and from a more particular and personal perspective in his 
biography of Chifley, 10 the Leader of the Opposition from December 1949 until 
April 1951. Paul Hasluck, Bagehot-like, explored the delicate relationships 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Campion, Lord: as cited in Wiseman, H.V. (ed.): ParLiament and the 
Executive, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, at p.l44. 
Morrison, Lord: Government and ParLiament, 3rd ed., London, Oxford 
University Press, 1964, p/b., at p.l33. 
e.g., Dahl, Robert A. (ed.): PoLiticaL Oppositions in Western 
Democracies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966. 
Ionescu, Ghita and de Madariaga, Isabel: Opposition, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1968, p/b. 
Crisp, L.F.: AustraLian NationaL Government, 2nd (rev.) ed., Melbourne, 
Longman, 1971, at p.294ff. 
Crisp, L.F.: Ben ChifLey, London, Longmans, 1960, at p.374ff., in 
particular. 
between Government and Opposition in the Parliament of 1940-43 in his 
11 
official war history. Leslie Haylen, a former Labor member of the 
Federal Parliament, described at some length in his autobiography the 
means by which the Menzies Government was able to ease its way through 
4 
the Parliament of 1961-63 when its majority over the Labor Opposition was 
12 but one. Sir Robert Menzies also devoted a chapter of his second book 
of memoirs, The Measure of the Years, . 13 u to techniques of Oppos1tion. ' 
These are, however, scanty references in the total picture 
and it is therefore necessary to consider some reasons which might account 
for the typical lack of interest in an institution which has attracted 
such glowing praise from eminent authorities such as Jennings and Campion. 
The reasons for the neglect which has characterised the 
institution of opposition in political literature are perhaps not difficult 
to discern. Historical and political study has a marked tendency to 
direct its focus towards those who wield the power, the successful, the 
victorious. The loser, the defeated, is often in the ultimate but a name. 
Similarly in the study of literature, theatre or music the focus is upon 
the novel or poem, the play or the symphony. Attention rarely centres 
upon the literary, theatre or music critic. And so in politics, attention 
is fixed upon the people who act, the people whose words and decisions 
have been or can be translated into policy. 
The plight of an Opposition in a Westminster-style 
parliamentary system is not, however, so importunate as that of the 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Hasluck, Paul: The Government 
Australian War Memorial, 1952, 
Haylen, Leslie: 
at p.l30ff. 
Twenty Years 
and the People 1939-41, Canberra, 
Chapters 6 and 12, in particular. 
Hard Labour, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1969, 
Menzies, Sir Robert: 
1970, at p.l3ff. 
The Measure of the Years, Melbourne, Cassel, 
I have sought to survey Commonwealth politics. Two books on State 
politics contain material on the role of Opposition, viz: 
Morrison, A.A.: 'The Government of Queensland', in Davis, S.R. (ed.): 
The Government of the Australian States, London, Longmans, 1960, at 
p.272ff. 
Hawker, G.N.: The Parliament of New South Wales, 1856-1965, Ultimo 
(N.S.W.), N.S.W. Government Printer, 1971, passim. 
5 
literary, theatre or music critic. For, unlike him, a parliamentary 
Opposition may have been, and is likely to be again, cast in the action 
role. As Bagehot observed, its words and pronouncements may, having 
been used, 'return to plague the inventor'. The Opposition may one day 
be, if not quite the voice that crieth in the wilderness, at least a voice 
without authority: but some time later that same voice may be cloaked in 
the regalia of the State, towards which the ears of the whole government 
structure and many others besides are turned to listen. 
Nor is this position the sole source of strength of an 
Opposition. Its words and reactions can be of deep significance to a 
Government especially if it is clear that the Opposition is supported by 
a body of public opinion. Patrick Gordon Walker has described this 
aspect of Opposition thus: 
The Opposition and Parliament as a whole can influence the 
Cabinet, which is very conscious when the Opposition is doing 
well, winning by-elections, advancing a policy that appears 
to be moving public opinion •••• 
In 1951 the Labour Cabinet agreed to the appointment of 
an American Admiral to command the NATO Fleet in the Atlantic, 
including a number of British ships. It was shaken by the 
intensity with which public opinion seemed to be supporting 
the protests of the Opposition. At this point Australia 
informed us that it wanted with the United States and New 
Zealand to form the ANZUS, from which Britain was excluded, 
and that it would like our consent to this procedure. As 
Commonwealth Secretary I pointed out that this was an act of 
Australian sovereignty and that any delay on our part would 
be against the spirit of the new Commonwealth. However, the 
Cabinet was scared of another 'American Admiral' case and 
there was a very considerable delay, during which Australia 
made some heated protests, before I was authorized to say 
that we had no objections.l5 
Even in the handling of Parliamentary business the responses 
of the Opposition to agenda arranged by the Government may be of considerable 
importance. A former Leader of the House of Commons, Mr Robert Carr, 
reflected on this in a newspaper interview. He had announced that the 
guillotine would be used in putting the Heath Government's Common Market 
legislation through the House. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Harold 
15 Walker, P. Gordon: The Cabinet, Rev. ed., London, Fontana/Collins, 
1972, p/b., at p.63f. 
6 
Wilson, denounced the move as 'an intolerable abrogation of the rights of 
the House'. Recognising that had Mr Wilson been Prime Minister he would 
probably have acted similarly Mr Carr was asked whether or not parliamentary 
politics was a formalised game. He thought that to a considerable extent 
they were but agreed that he had to participate in it. He continued: 
[A]nd I don't despise the formalised game.... If you stop and 
think for a moment that if the Opposition didn't make a hell of 
a fuss when there was a guillotine, even if at any moment it's a 
bit of a sham, I think guillotines would be adopted much more 
readily and easily. Because even though you know you're not 
going to get eaten up, you don't like to stand up at the box as 
Leader of the House and announce a guillotine motion, when you 
know the book's going to be thrown at you •••• In other words 
I think even the formal game, even though it may be a game looked 
at in any one incident, is of itself important •••• 16 
A second and perhaps definitive reason for the lack of 
attention which Opposition has received may be found in its insubstantial 
nature when compared to the Government. The Opposition is basically a 
form without substance of its own. It is given flesh, heart and blood by 
the political party for the time being occupying the form. Political 
writers have understandably been more interested in the dynamic behind the 
Opposition, the party. Hence, although Mr B.M. Snedden is Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives and has functions to perform as 
such, the Press and writers on politics exhibit greater interest in his 
performance as Federal Parliamentary Leader of the Liberal Party of Australia. 
His opposite number, Mr E.G. Whitlam is both the Prime Minister 
and the Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. But by contrast 
with their particular focus on Mr Snedden, commentators watch, if not in 
equal proportions, his performance in both roles. And there is a logic to 
this. For the Prime Minister is the head of government, the executive branch 
of the State. His role as such is manifested in a multiplicity of forms, 
from his active membership of the Federal Executive Council, the Cabinet, his 
administration of at least one major Department of State, his general over-
sight of the whole field of Commonwealth activity involving amongst other 
things deployment of a staff of 400,000 and expenditure of hundreds of 
16 Carr, Robert; as reported in The Guardian, 13.5.1972, at p.l8. 
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millions of dollars. He presides over a huge administrative machine and 
is paramount in the operation of the institution of Parliament, especially 
the Lower House. And he is also a party leader. 
The office of Leader of the Opposition has no such elaboration. 
His office is principally and fundamentally political. He is a party leader. 
His role in Parliament is noteworthy but the central focus in or out of 
Parliament is his performance vis-a-vis the Government in its political 
aspect. Administration and legislation are of significance only inasmuch 
as they are political. 
However, it is a central contention of this essay that although 
the Opposition Leader's party role may be of much greater significance than 
":_., ·"-~JE:.· 
his role in Parliament, it is nevertheless unwise to exclude it from 
consideration in an assessment of his general performance as leader. The 
salary, emoluments and privileges enjoyed by the Opposition Leader will to 
a considerable extent underpin his activity as party leader and provide him, 
and those of his colleagues in leadership who also enjoy similar benefits in 
lesser proportions with a sizable advantage over other contenders for positions 
of party leadership. These factors in themselves may even be powerful 
ingredients in any struggle for the position, especially immediately after a 
party has lost office, with the consequent losses in salary, status and staff 
assistance by most of those who formerly occupied the Treasury benches. 
Furthermore, the Leader of the Opposition as such has certain 
advantages in the House, some of which are even embodied in the Standing 
Orders, which if used shrewdly can facilitate his efforts to promote his 
causes and those of his party in the country. 
I noted above that the Opposition by its criticism can affect, 
according to circumstances, the activity of the Government. It may also be 
advantageous for the Government to secure the support and co-operation of the 
Opposition in the routine transaction of business, especially in the 
parliamentary domain. This area of interaction between Government and 
Opposition is largely undocumented and part of the folk-lore of what goes on 
'behind the Speaker's chair' or through the 'usual channels'. 
8 
There is a parallel in this to the general lack of interest 
in Opposition in the purely parliamentary aspects of Opposition leadership. 
The scribes of Parliament who have reluctantly admitted to the fact of 
Executive control of the Chamber, couched in the diplomatic terms about 
possessing 'the confidence of the House', have yet to explore and document 
the organised nature of those who do not support the Government. The 
relevant literature still tends to write of the non-Executive element in 
the legislature as a group of individuals. The current edition of 
Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament17 has but 14 pages in which the Opposition as an organisation 
is referred to - the volume itself has 1011 pages (apart from the Appendix, 
the Commons Standing Orders, and the Index). J.R. Odger's Australian 
S t n.. t. 18 f 0 . . 14 i 1 f 584 ena e ,L"ac ~ce re ers to pposLtLon on pages n a tota o pages. 
Yet it would be impossible to write a history of Parliament 
without major reference to the Opposition. Convention and tradition have 
buttressed the place of Opposition as a major component of Parliament. 
Parliament itself is the co-ordinated interaction of Government and 
Opposition. Openings for the individual member are in practice slight. 
Yet the force of the concept that Parliament is a collectivity of individuals 
has withheld from the political student a closer understanding of Parliament. 
It is not for mere academic interest that a consideration of 
Parliament in terms of its internal organisation is warranted. Parliament 
has itself accorded recognition to these organisations. The institutional-
isation of the office of Leader of the Opposition is an example of this. 
The offices of Opposition leadership - Leader of the Opposition, Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition, Leader of the Third Party in the House of 
Representatives, Opposition Whips, and comparable positions in the Upper 
i , d · J 
t.t~ rrtvJwu:.. 
House - are the only offices to which tenure is not subject to retaining 
the confidence of the House. Those holding these offices are subject to the 
17 
18 
Cocks, Sir Barnett (ed.): Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 18th ed., London, Butterworths, 1971. 
Odgers, J.R.: Australian Senate Practice, 4th ed., 
A.G.P.S., 1972. 
Canberra, 
will of a minority of the House. By definition and in theory a vote of 
19 no confidence can always be carried against them. The occupants of 
each office draw a statutory salary. The Standing Orders of the House 
accord special speaking rights to the Leader of the Opposition or a 
member nominated by him. 20 Resolutions of the House establishing 
9 
committees delegate certain powers of nomination to him. In characteristic 
Westminster fashion the institution of Opposition has evolved. And there 
is, hence, a case for examining the position of Opposition in toto, and 
not only in its particular aspects. Any discussion of the efficiency of 
Parliament in performing its numerous roles, constitutional, political 
and traditional, must embrace the effect of organised Opposition in its 
relation to the rights of the private (back bench) members. 
The parliamentary Opposition is, as I have outlined above, 
given its substance by the political party. However, the leaders of the 
Opposition are regarded not only as another group contending for power, 
but also as the alternative Government. Some of the implications of this 
are explored in the chapter in the financial emoluments of Opposition 
leaders. But they also receive certain access to the Government not 
available to either private members of Parliament or to the general public. 
When they travel abroad, for instance, they receive treatment from 
Government officials which is not necessarily available to other members of 
Parliament. These practices are, like similar practices in Parliament, 
largely undocumented and are in part dependent on the transitory relations 
between particular Prime Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition and the 
political circumstances of the time. They are supported by the argument 
that a good Opposition is an informed Opposition. But they can also have the 
effect of muffling the criticism which an Opposition can direct at a 
Government. They can be portrayed as devices by which Governments seek to 
19 
20 
As, indeed, it has. See C.P.D. H. of R., N.S., Vol.66, at p.935ff., 
9.4.1970; and C.P.D. H of R., N.S., Vol.76, at p.479ff., 2.3.1972. 
House of Representatives Standing Order No.91. 
10 
control and circumvent opposition. Quite clearly these informal relations 
are of vital import to the operation of the State. And, herein, is another 
reason, as in the case of operation of the Parliament, why a searching 
examination of the role and rationale of Opposition is justified. 
Before concluding this introductory essay it is necessary 
to offer some comments on a fundamental point: the relationship of an 
official Opposition to the democratic nature of the State. It may be held 
that the existence of an official Opposition whose operations are recognised 
and to a degree supported by the State is a proof of democracy. Official 
and State-financed Opposition might be said to be the ultimate in the 
legitimacy of dissent. 
This, of course, opens many vexed questions in the study of 
politics and this is not an appropriate context in which to explore them at 
length. The major question is what is meant by democracy~ If a State is 
said to be democratic, what qualities are being attributed to it? 
A general survey of political systems would reveal that many 
nations have not found it necessary to have an official Opposition of the 
type found in the Westminster system. Yet the general observer would be 
reluctant to say they are not democracies. Most nations in western Europe 
and perhaps the hybrid American system, where although there is no official 
Opposition the structure of the legislature embraces Majority and Minority 
Leaders, would be included in this context. At the same time, the Republic 
of South Africa has an Opposition but few would regard its existence 
as an indicator of a liberal, tolerant State. 
If democracy is considered as a State with universal adult 
suffrage for electing members of the legislature or assembly to which the 
Government is responsible, or, alternatively, for electing both the 
legislature and executive separately, as in the United States, it is perhaps 
pedantic to observe that Opposition in the House of Commons was firmly 
established before the advent of democracy. Perhaps it is more important 
to note that the concept of loyal Opposition within the legislature was 
well established before even Earl Grey's famous if limited Reform Act of 
1832 found its way to the Statute book. Indeed, it was during the 
11 
repressive period of the wars against revolutionary France at the end of the 
eighteenth century that the parliamentarian, Charles James Fox, who possibly 
deserves the honour of being regarded as the first leader of the Opposition 
exhibited the uses of the Parliament as a platform for opposition. Even 
Fox had forerunners in the elder Pitt and Edmund Burke in their opposition 
to the policies of successive British Governments to the American colonies. 
If loyal Opposition with the celebrated capital 'O' long 
preceded democracy in the formal sense it is probably also necessary to 
suggest that a polity comes closer to being a democracy if there are other 
channels of opposition in addition to the official or parliamentary 
institution. An important source of opposition to, or criticism of, a 
Government may be within the ranks of its own supporters in the party room 
and in the extra-parliamentary councils of the governing party. In an 
extraordinary situation this opposition may in aim take the same form as 
that of the official Opposition - removal of the present incumbent(s) from 
office with a view to their own elevation, or the elevation of others whom 
they support. In a single party State intra-party opposition will indeed 
be the principal means of criticism. 
The Opposition may not be the only party opposed to the 
Government in an assembly or legislature. The Australian House of 
Representatives has a long history of secondary opposition parties, the 
'Opposition corner'. The Parliamentary Allowances Act makes special 
provision for the leaders of such parties. In the House of Commons the 
Leader of the miniscule Liberal Party is accorded a certain status 
symbolised by his membership of Her Majesty's Privy Council. Government 
may therefore be the object of opposition from several different sources 
within the legislature itself - from the official Opposition, from its own 
backbench and from an Opposition corner. 
These are not the only sources of opposition and criticism. 
Elections basically produce Governments in an indirect if foreknown manner. 
The social, economic and cultural currents which may influence or determine 
the result are diverse and in many instances imperceptible. The parties 
may fight an election on particular policies, which, in terms of the 
12 
outcome, are not of much interest to anyone but themselves. The concrete 
result of an election is to place people in certain offices for the time 
being. During the term of Parliament, the Government will be called upon 
to adjudicate on a multitude of issues. On some, action will be taken; 
on others, no specific action will result. 
In regard to all these matters opposition and criticism may 
come from outside the Parliament, from the Press, from pressure groups or 
vested interests. 
The parliamentary Opposition, being itself representative of 
particular interests in society, may not agree with the need for or the 
courses of opposition adopted by these other groups. On the other hand a 
group itself may not wish to associate with the parliamentary Opposition. 
It may wish to criticise a specific piece of legislation or policy but may 
not, at the same time, regard itself as being in general opposition to the 
Government. The parliamentary Opposition has to make decisions on how to 
utilise its time and resources and it may in the normal course be unable to 
take up cudgels on an issue of concern only to, say, one small group. The 
appeal will need to be more general. 
Study of the structure and technique of opposition in a 
particular political system is therefore justified for a multiplicity of 
reasons. It is a significant component of the body politic. It is 
important in the operation and functioning of the legislature. Its 
importance extends into the nature of the political system. Official 
opposition may be a device for improving the democratic quality of the 
State. It may equally be a device whereby a particular class confines 
conflict within its own boundaries. 
This essay does not attempt to survey and analyse all the 
manifold aspects of opposition in the Australian polity. Rather, it 
explores the nature of a particular but conspicuous feature of it, the 
office of Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives. In 
so doing it is possible in different ways not only to document the 
development of this particular Australian political institution but also 
to show how conceptions and values in Australian politics have affected the 
growth of one particular feature of it. 
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II 
THE OFFICE OF LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
The office of Leader of the Opposition, like that of Prime 
Minister, is not provided for in the Constitution. Nevertheless when the 
first Commonwealth Parliament assembled in Melbourne in May 1901 there was 
both a Prime Minister, whose official office was Minister for External 
Affairs, and a Leader of the Opposition. 
The first leader of the Opposition in the Commonwealth 
Parliament was George Houston Reid, a former Premier and leader of the 
Opposition in New South Wales and Leader of the Commonwealth Free Trade 
Party in the Federal Parliament. He was recognised as leader of the 
Opposition. When he made his first appearance in the House of 
Representatives and presumably sat in the customary seat of the leader 
of the Opposition, at the Table, on the left hand side of the Speaker, 
opposite the Prime Minister, he was immediately recognised. The 'father 
of the House', W.H. Groom, said: 
I beg also to take the opportunity of congratulating the right 
honourable and learned gentleman the leader of the Opposition 
on his restoration to health, and on being able to take his 
seat in this chamber.l 
But whence his title? It was not constitutional, nor 
statutory nor even parliamentary. The Hansard reporters recorded references 
to him, not as the 'Leader of the Opposition', but only as the 'leader of the 
Opposition'. Reid himself was uncomfortably aware of the apparently shaky 
basis of the title. For, though he had been swift to claim the title, 
presumably on the basis that if the Barton Protectionist Ministry was not 
able to obtain the confidence of the first House, he, as the declared Leader 
of the Commonwealth Free Trade Party, would have considerable and hopefully 
1 Groom, W.H.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.77; 21.5.1901. 
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overwhelming claims to an invitation from the Governor-General to form a 
Ministry, he nonetheless wistfully recorded in his memoirs that he had 
attended the inaugural festivities of the Commonwealth 'without any official 
rank 1 • 2 
His title was one of custom, derived as much from the 
practice of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, of which he had been 
at the time of Federation a member for over twenty years, as from the 
Parliament at Westminster. 
The Parliament at Westminster was and is perhaps still 
regarded as the model for the Australian Parliament. This conception has 
mainly general and not necessarily particular validity. Australian 
parliaments have not inevitably followed Westminster practice. The 
conventions of Westminster derive from the circumstances of British politics 
and are not invariably applicable or appropriate in the Australian situation. 
Nor are Australian parliamentarians always fully versed in the detail of 
arrangements at Westminster. The disparity between Westminster and 
Australian practice is especially apparent in the functioning of Opposition. 
At the turn of the century the office of Leader of the 
Opposition was only beginning to emerge at Westminster. An historian 
writing of the position in 1911 described the situation thus: 
2 
3 
Bonar Law was technically simply leader of the Conservative 
Party in the House of Commons and leader of the opposition 
in the House of Commons. As such he ranked below Lord Lansdowne, 
the Conservative leader in the Lords, and had no automatic claim 
to become Prime Minister when the Conservatives returned to 
power. This was entirely in accordance with precedent: between 
1876 and 1880 Lord Granville in the Lords and Lord Hartington in 
the Commons had led the liberal opposition; between 1881 and 1885 
Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote were joint leaders of 
the conservative opposition; in 1886 and 1892-5 Lord Salisbury led 
the Opposition from the Lords with a front bench spokesman in the 
Commons as his right-hand man; and for a time after 1895 Lord 
Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt led the Liberal opposition. In 
such circumstances there could be no clearly designated leader of 
the whole opposition; although established House of Commons custom 
led the press to write of the leader of the opposition front bench 
in the Commons as leader of the whole opposition.3 
Reid, G.H.: My Reminiscences, London, Cassell, 1917, at p.l97. 
Hanham, H.J.: 
in Barker, R. 
at p.l35. 
'Opposition Techniques in British Politics, 1867-1914', 
(ed.): Studies in Opposition, London, Macmillan, 1971, 
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A cursory reading of the record of House of Commons debates 
in 1900 suggests that Campbell-Bannerman, Leader of the Liberal Party in 
the House of Commons from 1899 until 1908, was not, in fact, addressed as 
leader of the Opposition. 
What then was the source of the title Reid assumed in 1901? 
Curiously it appears that use of the title in Australian politics has a 
history almost as long as that of responsible government. As early as 19 
November 1857, the defeated Premier Donaldson was reported in the Sydney 
Morning Herald as having refused to be considered as 'leader of the 
Opposition'. Further incidental references recorded in the Loveday and 
Martin account of early politics in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly 
indicate that both the concept and the term 'leader of the Opposition' were 
current in New South Wales politics throughout the years between responsible 
government and Federation. 4 Reid's assumption and vigorous assertion of 
the title therefore had more than a formal significance. 
It may likewise be noted that the Opposition in the Senate 
initially resisted any formal organisation. Senator Gregor McGregor of the 
Labour Party described the situation thus: 
.•.• I think the Government may congratulate itself on the 
weakness of the Opposition. Who is the leader? 
When an amendment on the Address in Reply or any amendment that 
conveys in any shape or form a censure on the Government is 
moved, it is generally moved by the leader of the Opposition 
himself, but we have had an amendment of that description 
moved, and the very senator (Millen, N.S.W.) who has moved it 
repudiates the position of leader. It appears to me that all 
the Opposition are leaders. I was going to say that they are 
all suns around which no planet revolves •••• A healthy 
Opposition, I will admit, is very beneficial; and I hope 
therefore, that the Opposition here will come together; and 
will be less independent and more to be relied upon, because 
as long as they cannot depend on themselves they cannot expect 
members of this House to give any adhesion to their opinions.S 
Senator Sir Josiah Symon of South Australia was, however, regarded as 
leader of the Free Trade members of the Senate. 
4 
5 
Loveday, P. & Martin, A.W.: Parliament, Faotions and Parties, 
Melbourne, M.U.P., 1966, at pp.34, 54 and 140. 
McGregor, Senator G.: C.P.D. Senate, (O.S.) Vol.l, at p.l31, 22.5.1901. 
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Hence there were in Australia, despite protestations from 
politicians about following in the footsteps of Westminster, some clear 
departures at an early stage, deriving from the particular circumstances 
of Australian politics. In the Parliament at Westminster at the turn of 
the century both Houses were generally co-ordinate - the Commons had yet 
to assert fully its superiority. One aspect of the equality between the 
Houses was that a Prime Minister could sit in either Chamber. Indeed in 
1901 the Prime Minister was in fact a member of the House of Lords. 
Further, while the shadow cabinet idea was in its infancy the idea of an 
office of Leader of the Opposition had not yet fully emerged. The office 
of Prime Minister was, at the time, still technically primus inter pares, 
and so also was the Leader of the Opposition, to a much greater degree. 
In addition to other factors it would possibly have been felt that for a 
party leader, especially one who had not previously been Prime Minister, 
to entitle himself as Leader of the Opposition would be to usurp one of 
the few remaining prerogatives of the Sovereign. 
In Australia, by contrast, there appears to have been little 
argument that the head of government would be a member of the lower, the 
popular, House of Parliament. Although the Senate's powers are with a few 
exceptions the same as those of the House of Representatives the force of 
the conception that it was the House of Review was such that the original 
opposition group, as has been noted, hung back from formal organisation. 
No head of government has ever sought to operate from the Senate. 
In the circumstances of Australian politics the dilemmas 
present in England existed in much muted form. There was no doubt that the 
Leader of the Opposition, if the office was to exist, would be located in the 
popular House. And considerations of the Royal prerogative, whilst of some 
significance, nonetheless carried much less weight in Australia than in the 
United Kingdom. 
If the impressions recorded in the immediately foregoing 
paragraphs are correct some general observations about Australian politics 
can be drawn. The first is the force of the democratic idea. Whatever may 
17 
be the veto powers or the limited constituencies of Australian Upper Houses 
generally, the head of government has had to be a member of the popular 
House. That in itself is interesting. The conservative interests in 
Australian society were ready, or at least prepared to leave determination 
of the personnel of government to the democratic processes whilst reserving 
unto themselves sufficient powers in the Upper House to restrain what they 
believed to be the excesses of democracy. 
Upper Houses, if they lacked the glory of the Premier's 
presence in their midst,at least ensured that his power and that of his 
Government was circumscribed by theirs. And, second, it would appear 1 
ironically1 that the phenomenon of individual leadership was much more 
conspicuous in Australia at the turn of the century than in the United 
Kindgom where the notion of collective leadership persisted for a long 
period, especially on the Opposition benches - to some extent use of the 
word 'leadership' in the period before World War I perhaps begs the question. 
In 1901 the office of Leader of the Opposition in the House 
of Representatives was a political office. Yet it was an office destined 
to grow, to be recognised by the House in its Standing Orders, by the law, 
and in terms of staff, office accommodation and other privileges. 
In 1901 the title in the eyes of the official reporters was 
dubious. Reid was the 'leader of the Opposition'. And for over eight 
years references to the position were recorded in that manner. 
But on 29 June 1909, Andrew Fisher became the Leader of the 
Opposition. The Opposition with a capital 'O' now had a Leader with a 
capital 'L'. The elevation came during the course of the day. At page 485 
of the relevant volume of Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates the position 
still carried the small '1'. Four pages later it appeared for the first 
time with the capital letter. There were one or two lapses in the course of 
the rest of the day but from that day the new designation was established. 
Extant records do not reveal the reason for this change. 6 
6 See C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.}, Vol.49, at p.485 and p.489; 29.6.1909. 
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The change was symbolic of the new situation in the House. 
It followed the beginnings of a practice of announcing party leadership 
to the House. (This practice is considered more fully below.) It 
followed shortly upon the establishment of a two party 'system' in 
Federal politics. The fusion of the Deakinite and Free Trade Parties 
meant that for the first time in the Commonwealth Parliament there was a 
clear Government/Opposition division in the House of Representatives. 
Furthermore, when Deakin resumed the Prime Ministership on 2 June 1909 he 
became the first Head of Government to hold that office in its own right 
without another portfolio. Previous occupants of that office, including 
himself in his first two terms, had held other ministries concurrently. 
Barton, Reid and Deakin, in his second term, had formally been Minister 
for External Affairs. The two Labour Prime Minister, Watson and Fisher, 
were formally Treasurer. And Deakin, in his first term, had held office 
as Attorney-General. A 'Leader of the Opposition' completed the symmetry 
of the new political situation. 
The emergence of the new form of the title followed, as 
foreshadowed above, more vigorous assertion of the privileges and status 
of the office. Reid's resignation, announced in a speech delivered at Yass, 
New South Wales, on 16 November 1908, brought Joseph Cook to the leadership 
of the Free Trade Party. Cook, in conformity with the practice of the time, 
did not announce his election to the House, but informed Mr Speaker 
7 privately. He was nevertheless quick to protest when he believed that 
he, as Opposition leader, had been overlooked in the organisation of business 
8 in the House. During this interchange Watson, a former Prime Minister and 
leader of the Opposition pointedly observed: 
7 
8 
9 
So far no announcement has been made in the House regarding 
the leadership of the Opposition.9 
Cook, Joseph: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.48, at p.2923; 8.12.1908. 
Ibid., p.2924. 
Watson, J.C.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.48, at p.2924; 8.12.1908. 
Possibly as a consequence of this incident Deakin speci-
fically informed the House that he had become leader of the Opposition 
upon the fusion of the Liberal and Free Trade Parties in May 1909. 10 
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Announcements relating to Opposition and party leadership were made with 
11 increasing frequency thereafter. Matthew Charlton's statement at 
the opening of the Tenth Parliament that he was Leader of the Opposition 
and Frank Anstey was Assistant Leader was the first in a subsequently 
12 
unbroken series of announcements. 
In 1911 Fisher offered Deakin an additional allowance and 
staff in respect of the duties he performed as Leader of the Opposition. 
13 Deakin declined the allowance but accepted the services of a secretary. 
In 1920 the position received simultaneously statutory and salary 
recognition. It was not until 1929 that the Leader of the Opposition 
(and Deputy Leader) were included in the list of office holders of the 
Parliament accompanying the Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates. 14 In 
April 1939, following the death of Lyons, the Parliamentary Reporter 
decided that the designation should appear in the actual text of debate. 
Hence, the Leader of the Opposition now appeared thus: 'Mr Curtin. 
(Fremantle- Leader of the Opposition)r. 15 The observer cannot help but 
note that shortly after the first occasion on which this occurs Mr Curtin 
made a notable speech on the benefits of Opposition in a parliamentary 
16 
system. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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Deakin, A.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vo1.49, at p.114; 27 .5.1909. 
See Tudor, F: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vo1.80, at p.9240; 29.11.1916. 
Charlton, M.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vo1.99, at p.l5; 28.6.1922. 
Charlton, M.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.l12, at p.23; 13.1.1926. 
La Nauze, J .A. : A Zfred Deakin, Vol.II, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1965, at p.609f. 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 
the House of Representatives. 
(O.S.), Vol.l20, List of Members of 
C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vo1.159, at p.20; 20.4.1939. 
See also Weatherston, J.S.: Commonwealth Hansard, 2nd ed., Canberra, 
Government Printer, 1940, at p.34. 
Curtin, J.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.l59, at p.ZO; 20.4.1939. 
20 
It is accurate to observe that in every sense of the word 
the office of Leader of the Opposition evolved. And, indeed, it is also 
true that the organisation of Opposition in the Australian Parliament is 
still evolving. 
However, as is especially evident in the debates about the 
additional salary and allowances which the Leader of the Opposition should 
receive, little thought was or is given in Australia, or elsewhere, to the 
role and function of the Opposition. At this point interest turns on 
non-financial aspects of the problem. The issues relating to the special 
salary and allowances of the office, and associated matters are considered 
at length in the succeeding chapter. 
The office of Prime Minister also evolved. Yet its 
development does not confront the observer with the same problems as those 
which emerge in the related evolution of the office of Leader of the 
Opposition. The Prime Minister is the head of Government. He holds that 
office because he commands a majority in the popular House of Parliament. 
A dispute as to who is Prime Minister can be settled on the floor of the 
House by a vote of confidence. 
No such tests are possible in relation to the office of 
Leader of the Opposition. It is by definition a minority position. The 
ambiguity of the position in relation to the Constitution in general and 
to Parliament in particular was brought out by Deakin even before it was 
a salaried office. On one occasion he was able to speak in virtually the 
same breath of the 'official position which I now hold in this House', 
and assert nonetheless that the leadership of the Opposition was not: 
17 
a matter of any importance to the House or to 
anyone outside the members of our own party. 17 
Deakin, A.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.SS, at p.SOlO; 21.10.1910. 
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The office of Leader of the Opposition is thus a party 
position with the attributes of a public office, a parliamentary office 
whose occupant is responsible not to the House as a whole but to the 
minority portion of it. 18 
The office, I noted,has evolved. Yet even now there are 
no guidelines to determine who, in the event of controversy, should occupy 
the position. Nor is it clear who should adjudicate in the event of 
dispute. Despite this curious situation in theory the practice is quite 
clear. Thus from 5 December 1972, when he resigned as Prime Minister 
until 20 December 1972, when he relinquished the leadership of the Liberal 
Party, William McMahon was treated as Leader of the Opposition and accorded 
the relevant salary and privileges. As is shown in the next chapter the 
basis of these is his parliamentary office. But the new Parliament had not 
been summoned and the election result in McMahon's seat of Lowe had not, 
for some time, been declared. In short, the matter was handled at an 
administrative and not a parliamentary level. 
18 Some new nations whose Constitutions were modelled on that of Westminster 
contain specific provision for the office of Leader of the Opposition. 
This does not, however, remove all the problems associated with its 
curious relationship to the Lower House. As has been observed of the 
provision in the Fijian Constitution: 
The Constitution provides that the Governor-General shall appoint 
a member of the House of Representatives as Leader of the Opposition 
and - of considerable importance - that he shall appoint six members 
of the Senate 'in accordance with the advice of the Leader of the 
Opposition'. Unlike the parallel provisions for the apppointment of 
a Prime Minister and for the appointment of seven Senators on his 
advice, those relating to the Leader of the Opposition could cause 
difficulty. A Prime Minister who was not 'able to command the 
support of the majority of members' of the House would be defeated on 
a vote of no confidence, and a new appointment would, in due course, 
be made. The Leader of the Opposition could not similarly be challenged, 
though such a challenge might be desirable if the Governor-General had 
had to choose between the leaders of several small parties with equal 
representation in the House. More significantly, perhaps, the functions 
of the Leader of the Opposition in relation to the nomination of 
Senators might impede the formation of a coalition in a time of national 
emergency, if such a development would enable the leader of an extremist 
party to change the composition of the upper house. These, it may be 
contended, are minor and wholly hypothetical difficulties. They are, 
however, ones that could easily have been avoided. If it was desired, 
as was apparently the case, that the Senate should contain balanced 
representation of the parties in the House of Representatives, this 
could have been achieved by more unexceptionable means - for example, 
through the election of 13 Senators by members of the House under a 
system of proportional representation. 
Davidson, J.W.: 
Pacific History, 
'Current Developments in the Pacific' , in JournaZ of 
VI (1971), at p.l40. 
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These prognostications could, of course, be dismissed as 
'hypothetical'. However, the office in the Australian Parliament has 
been on a number of occasions a subject of disputed tenure. It remains 
therefore to consider the occasions of these disputes and bases of their 
resolution. 
Reid, as has been noted, declared himself to be leader of the 
Opposition prior to the election of the First Parliament. He is reported 
in the Sydney Morning Herald of 31 December 1900 thus: 
..•. In view of the strong protectionist combination which has 
been brought together under Mr Barton's leadership I fear that 
in the interests of sound fiscal policy for the new Commonwealth 
.... I have made up my mind, therefore, to enter the Federal 
Parliament •••• and, so far as the exigencies of any profession 
will allow will work heart and soul to avert the catastrophe 
which is now inevitable unless the majority of the electors of 
Australia are enlightened enough to demand that they should be 
taxed only for Commonwealth purposes and not in the interest of 
any sort of industrial monopoly.l9 
Reid's stand was therefore on the basis of direct opposition 
on a principal point of policy. He no doubt assumed that his party would, 
if the Government secured a majority or a plurality of seats in the new 
House, be the largest party not supporting the Government. 
Throughout the first Parliament and into the second Reid 
sought to establish himself as leader of the Opposition in classic terms 
so that if and when the Protectionist Ministry was defeated and resigned 
the seals of office he would be called to form a Government. His failure 
to achieve this objective was emphatically demonstrated in April 1904 when 
an important amendment to the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill was 
successfully proposed by Fisher, the deputy leader of the Labor Party in 
the House. 
The Government was defeated and decided to resign. Reid 
himself voted with the Government although a number of his supporters had 
voted with the Labor Party. On Deakin's advice Watson, the Labor leader, 
was invited to form a Ministry. 
19 Sydney Morning Herald, 31.12.1900, at p.8. 
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Reid, who had supported the defeated Government, resented 
the move: 
In the ordinary course of events in Parliaments of the 
British Empire, the retirement of the Ministers means 
simply an exchange of seats with honourable members 
sitting upon the other side of the House.20 
In short, he should have been called. 
However, as he had not, he had no intention of relinquishing 
the title or seat of leader of the Opposition to the defeated Prime 
Minister: 
it has been [he told the House] my melancholy duty to 
insist upon retaining the somewhat forlorn position which 
I have occupied for three years past.21 
Deakin explained the arrangement to members, thus: 
•••• I wish to thank the right honourable member for East 
Sydney for having proposed an arrangement which removes 
the possibility of any personal clash between us in 
addressing the House this afternoon. At his suggestion, 
I shall speak as the head of the late Government, while 
he is to speak as the head of the Opposition which he 
has so long led.22 
The circumstances were not, however, as cordial as Reid and 
Deakin sought to convey. Deakin noted at the time in a letter to the 
Morning Post of 14 June 1904 that: 
The Ministerialists of yesterday assert that they are the 
direct Opposition, and will probably have Mr Deakin as their 
leader. Mr Reid, of course, resents the prospect of being 
sent into the corner as head of a third party. He and his 
supporters have the Opposition benches and rooms and mean to 
retain the title. They can scarcely be dispossessed by 
physical force, and contention of any kind on such a 
question must be unseemly.23 
Reid reviewed the circumstances nearly five years later, 
a few weeks before he retired from leadership of the Opposition. In the 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Reid, G.H.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.l9, at p.l250; 27 .4.1904. 
Ibid. 
Deakin, A.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.l9, at p.l247; 27.4.1904. 
Deakin, A.: Federated Australia- Selections from Letters to the 
"Morning Post" 1900-1910, edited and with an Introduction by 
J.A. La Nauze, London, Melbourne University Press, 1968, at p.l42. 
course of accusing Deakin, once again Prime Minister, of what he 
described as 'promiscuous political intercourse', Reid said: 
•••• But did not honourable members in this House witness an 
extraordinary spectacle when his Government went out of office 
and the members of the Watson Administration took their seats 
on the Treasury bench? They had not occupied them more than 
a few moments before the honourable member for Ballarat and all 
his friends were crowding the Opposition benches. Do not 
honourable members recollect that in the face of this House and 
the country, when I advanced to the chair which I had occupied 
for years fighting the battles of the Opposition, I had to 
scuffle with the present Prime Minister as to who should take 
possession of the seat at the table.24 
Both Reid and Deakin looked to the rules, specified and 
otherwise, to support their claims. Reid used the temporary Standing 
Orders of the House, apparently with success, to sustain his case, 
although prima facie these appeared to refer to individual situations 
24 
and not to changes of Ministry. He would certainly have regarded them as 
inappropriate had he been invited to form the new Ministry. They were: 
49. Whenever a change of a Minister holding office under 
the Crown takes place, the outgoing Minister shall be 
entitled to take the seat vacated by his successor. 
50. Members shall be entitled to retain the seats occupied 
by them at the time of their taking their seats for the 
first time after election, so long as they continue 
members of the House without re-election. 
Deakin looked, probably with justification, to a broader 
constitutional convention. The Age, which was probably in a position 
to do so accurately, reported: 
Mr Deakin ••. apparently expects the Speaker to rule that 
under constitutional Government it is the practice for a 
retiring Ministry to occupy a position of formal opposition 
to its successors.25 
The title, as noted above, was settled in Reid's favour and 
Deakin was to be known as 'the late Prime Minister'. The matter of seating 
was resolved basically in Deakin's favour. Both Reid and Deakin occupied 
24 
25 
Reid, G.H.: 
Cf. The Age, 
C.P.D. H. of R., Vol.47, at p.l403; 21.10.1908. 
28.4.1904, at p.S. 
The Age, 28.4.1904, at p.S. 
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seats at the Table confronting the new Prime Minister. Their principal 
lieutenants shared a crowded Opposition front bench. The Age report is 
clear that the Deakinites arrived first. Deakin, according to the same 
report, did not at first sit at the Table. He did so only after Reid 
occupied his usual seat. The report continues: 
Mr Reid rose, smiled, politely surrendered the chair to the 
ex-Prime Minister, and amidst further cheering took another 
chair immediately beside him.26 
This dispute illuminates several aspects of the behaviour 
of politicians and of Australian politics. The rules and conventions 
were, firstly, unclear. They were based, such as they were, not on the 
situation of Australian politics, but on the conceptions of the 
participants of what politics should be, namely a contest between two 
parties, a Government and an Opposition. This conception is evident in 
Deakin's famous speech on the 'three elevens', delivered at Adelaide early 
in the life of the second Parliament: 
It was [Deakin is reported to have said] absolutely essential 
that as soon as possible the three parties should somehow be 
resolved into two - either as parties or parts of parties in 
order that constitutional government might be carried on.27 
Reid, early in the life of the third Parliament, spoke in 
similar terms about the continued existence of three parties: 
I know that, so far as the Labour Party and the Opposition 
were concerned, there was a very strong desire that that 
state of things should come to an end, and that one should 
re-establish parliamentary government upon sound 
constitutional lines.28 
In the eyes of these politicians there was a clear connection 
between 'constitutional government', 'parliamentary government' and a two 
party, Government and Opposition, system. 
26 Ibid. 
27 The Age, 2.3.1904, cited in La Nauze, J.A.: op. cit. Vol.2, at p.363. 
28 Reid, G.H.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vo1.36, at p.95; 21.2.1907. 
The essence of the dispute between Reid and Deakin was a 
clash between a derived doctrine of 'constitutional government' and the 
particular situation in which the two leaders were struggling for a 
parliamentary position and title which they saw as significant to their 
individual positions. Reid, striving for office, with little hope, 
exalts the role of the Opposition and his position as a major contender 
for the Premiership. Deakin, deprived of office and anxious, despite 
protestations, to regain it, likewise seeks to boost the importance 
of the post. Each supports his case by reference to rules of another 
game within which they seek to place themselves. Reid bases his claim 
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on tenure, numbers and opposition. That is, he was the leader of the 
Opposition and entitled to the traditional seat. The change of Government 
had not affected that. His supporters out-numbered those of Deakin. And 
finally his party was unequivocally opposed to the new Ministry whereas 
Deakin had promised conditional support. Deakin's case hung on the fact 
that he was the head of the defeated Ministry, an argument which was to 
be revived on a subsequent occasion with a different result. 
The next crisis about the significance of Opposition occurred 
in 1916 during the course of the Parliament elected at the General Election 
of 1914. It was a direct consequence of the split in the Labor Party on the 
conscription issue. Prior to the split the House had been divided as 
follows: Labor Party, 42 seats; Liberal Party, 32 seats; Independent, 1. 
Hughes had succeeded Fisher as Prime Minister on 17 October 1915. Joseph 
Cook led the Liberal Opposition throughout. Following the split, the position 
in the House was: National (Hughes) Labor Party, 13; Australian Labor Party, 
29; Liberal Party, 32; Independent, 1. 
An anomalous situation therefore existed. The smallest party 
in the House formed the Government. The Liberal Party was certainly the 
most numerous party no member of which held ministerial office. It was, 
however, with its support - that is, the support of the direct Opposition -
that the Hughes Government was able to retain the confidence of a House in 
which it so patently lacked a majority. 
27 
The Australian Labor Party, led by Tudor, formerly Deputy 
Leader of the Labor Party, was quick to grasp the nettle by declaring 
that it constituted the Opposition and that a Government holding office 
with the support of the so-called Opposition was ludicrous. The Age 
described the situation succinctly: 
One thing is clear, and that is that the Government is in the 
remarkable position of being entirely dependent upon the direct 
Opposition for its very existence •••• With the almost certain 
support of what is now design[at]ed the official Labor party, 
the Opposition will possess the power to remove the Government 
from the Treasury benches practically at any time, and the least 
price which Mr Hughes will have to pay for its assistance is 
consultation •... The relations existing between the two 
sections of the Labor party are not those of ordinary political 
opponents. There, the Opposition, individually and 
collectively, is purely political •••• Mr Hughes and those 
associated with him will not receive any quarter from their 
erstwhile colleagues ...• 29 
Later in the same article The Age noted that, like the 
Deakinites in the incident previously discussed, the A.L.P. members had 
'already begun to "ticket" their seats on the direct Opposition benches'. 
The first meeting of the Parliament following the split brought with it, 
as expected, accommodation difficulties on the left hand side of Mr 
Speaker: 
There was an air of suppressed excitement as members began to 
troop into the Chamber. One after another they took up seats 
on the Opposition side of the House until there was a solid 
phalanx facing the Treasury benches. The ex-Minister of 
Customs (Mr Tudor), the ex-Treasurer (Mr Higgs) and the ex-
Government Whip (Mr Page) sat on the front Opposition bench 
at the end nearest the Speaker, and the ex-Minister for 
External Affairs (Mr Mahon) sat alongside Sir John Forrest a 
little further away. The remaining members of the 'official' 
Labor party were on the benches immediately behind, with the 
exception of Mr Anstey, who found a seat in the Opposition 
corner •••• The direct Opposition benches were so crowded 
that for a time Sir Robert Best was compelled to sit in the 
Ministerial corner until his usual place was vacated.30 
Cook, who unlike Reid before him did not have to fightfbr 
his own seat at the Table, nevertheless rose in the interests of his party 
to ask about the occupancy of seats in the House. Mr Speaker replied that 
29 The Age, 16.11.1916, at p.7. 
30 The Age, 30.11.1916, at p.6. 
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members could sit on the Opposition benches 'so long as there [was] room', 
but he indicated that Tudor, who had just moved an amendment to the motion 
before the House amounting to censure of the Government, would have been 
better advised to have 'delivered his speech from the seat he occupied' -
Tudor had not at this stage advanced a claim to be regarded as Leader of 
31 the Opposition. 
It was to be the Prime Minister Hughes who raised this 
issue. In the course of an incident in the House which served to illustrate 
the Government's inability to control the House he turned to Tudor's 
amendment, indicating that in his view there had to be 'some limitation' 
on the power of parties in the House 'to move motions or amendments which, 
in effect, may be regarded as motions of want of confidence'. He 
concluded: 'I do not propose to regard this amendment as a motion of want 
of confidence•. 32 In effect, he was seeking to exalt, for reasons of 
pressing expediency, the position of Leader of the Opposition for the 
purposes, not of facilitating but of suppressing the exercise of 
parliamentary prerogatives vis-a-vis the Ministry. It appears to have 
been the custom since Federation that amendments would not be regarded as 
33 
confidence matters unless they were supported by the Party leader. 
Hughes was now seeking to confine the right to submit confidence motions 
to the Leader of the Opposition. 
Hughes' tactic failed. The Tudor amendment was voted upon 
and defeated by the Ministry with the support of the Opposition. For the 
time being also the Liberals retained their seats opposite the Ministry and 
remained the official Opposition. 
Yet, in a sense, it was the A.L.P. whose view prevailed. 
Early in 1917 the Liberals joined with Hughes to form the Commonwealth War 
Ministry and, in the terms of the earlier debate on the 'three elevens', 
31 
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See Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.80, at p.9243f. 
Hughes, W .M.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vo1.80, at p.9245; 29.11.1916. 
See Chapter 4, at p. 
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'responsible government' on a 'sound constitutional basis' was restored. 
Even before this second fusion of political parties the A.L.P. had 
successfully irritated the Liberals by referring to Cook as the Leader 
of the Liberal Party, not as Leader of the Opposition. It was also 
proposed that Tudor as a party leader was entitled, like Cook, to 
secretarial assistance. 34 This issue was not pressed at the time but 
in different circumstances it is important to note that it was by this 
means that the Menzies Government was able to bolster the A.L.P. 
schismatics of 1954/55 onwards. 35 
The immediate situation created by the Labor split of 1916 
was in the long term untenable. The unreality of the situation was 
pointed up by the Opposition Leader in the Senate, Senator Millen of New 
South Wales who declared at an early stage in the crisis that: 
There is a vast difference between the past and the 
present, arising from the Government's dependence upon 
the Opposition. If the Opposition, by its support, 
keeps the Government in office, it must be prepared 
to shoulder responsibility for the Government's actions 
both legislative and administrative •••• 36 
Millen did not say it~but it was inevitable that an Opposition which had 
to share responsibility would also want to share office, as in this case 
it eventually did. And it may be concluded that although there had been 
a shadow-line period the A.L.P. had successfully asserted the principle 
that the Opposition should not maintain the Government in office. 
Potential for a similar crisis existed after the 1931 
General Election for the House of Representatives. The political 
relations of the parties were, of course, different, but Leadership of 
the Opposition now carried with it not only a title but also a special 
allowance and staff. 
34 
35 
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See, for example, Higgs, W.G.: C.P.D. H. of R., (O.S.), Vol.80, at 
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was: 
The state of the parties as a result of the elections 
United Australia Party 
Country Party 
Australian Labor Party 
Lang Labour 
Independents 
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16 
13 
5 
3 
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On a numerical basis the Country Party, having been excluded 
from the Government, was entitled to be regarded as the official Opposition. 
Such a position would have been anomalous. Page, the Country Party Leader, 
had co-operated with Lyons, now the Prime Minister, on the terms of the 
policy speech at the 1931 election. And, indeed, coalition had been 
contemplated. That it had not eventuated was a result of, not antipathy 
between the parties, but a certain lack of enthusiasm by both parties for 
some of the policies of the other. Perhaps it was simply that Page 
bargained, in the normal style of Country Party leaders, for high stakes, 
but lacked the usual trump card. On this occasion the U.A.P. had a tail 
(that is, a majority) of its own. At the conclusion of the unsuccessful 
coalition negotiations the Country Party issued a statement which 
effectively renounced any claim it might have activated to be regarded as 
the official Opposition. It stated, inter alia that: 
Dr Page and Mr Paterson assured Mr Lyons and Mr Latham 
that they would be glad to co-operate as far as possible 
with the new Government in a friendly spirit in carrying 
out the policy on which the election was fought.37 
Labor leader and former Prime Minister J.H. Scullin had 
two claims to the leadership of the Opposition in this situation. First, 
he was the leader of the former and defeated Government. Second, he also 
led the largest party in the House in opposition to the Government - that 
is, the largest party prepared to move or support a want of confidence 
motion. These factors in the event prevailed without any apparent 
argument. 
37 Page, E.C.G.: 
p.214. 
Truant Surgeon, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1961, at 
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The incident does not appear to have attracted any public 
notice at the time, perhaps a comment on the extent to which combination 
between the two principal non-Labor parties, after an uncertain beginning, 
was even then regarded as normal. 
A sometime Leader of the Australian Country Party did, 
however, draw a lesson from the incident. In the debate on the first 
Parliamentary Allowances Bill of 1947, A.G. Cameron, by then a Liberal of 
several years' standing said in a speech on the need to provide a special 
allowance for the Leader of the Country Party as well as the Leader of 
the Opposition: 
On one occasion, the Australian Country Party was numerically 
the second largest party in this House, but, by its own 
choice, it did not constitute the official Opposition.38 
Argument over the leadership of the Opposition was not, 
however, at an end. In August 1941 the Menzies Government, a composite 
U.A.P.-Country Party Government, was in grave difficulty. For the 
moment the malaise was attributed to the personality of the Prime Minister, 
Menzies. He resigned and was succeeded by the Leader of the Country 
Party, the minority partner in the coalition, Fadden. Five weeks later 
the Government was defeated on the Budget. A Labor Government under John 
Curtin took office. The question was - who was to be Leader of the 
Opposition? The answer to the question was to bring Menzies to the lowest 
and most humiliating point of his long career. 
Fadden and Menzies each had a claim to lead the Opposition -
Fadden as the head of the defeated Government, Menzies as the leader of 
the largest party not supporting the Government. 
Two recently published accounts of the brief dispute 
illustrate the role of principles in politics. Menzies reports in 
Afternoon Light tbat he had raised (at a meeting of the U.A.P.) the 
question of: 
38 Cameron, A.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.3389; 4.6.1947. 
who was to lead in Opposition; 
smaller party, or the leader of the 
following the usual practice.39 
the leader of the 
larger party, 
Hasluck recorded the event in the following terms: 
Fadden, as the defeated Prime Minister, continued 
as Leader of the Opposition ••.. 40 
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Both Menzies and Hasluck write in a manner which suggests 
that political decisions of this significance are only matters of applying 
principles to particular situations. Yet at the time the two contestants, 
and more particularly their supporters, promoted the principle which 
supported their interest. Menzies' case in this instance was the more 
unusual for its basis in 'the usual practice'. 
Only a few pages earlier in writing of his resignation 
from the Prime Ministership he had observed that the war itself justified 
departure from the normal procedure. As he put it: 'But we were at war, 
41 
and other considerations might apply'. 
Fadden won the argument which Deakin had lost with Reid, 
though it was not without a fight that he did so. Newspaper reports of 
the time indicate that Menzies spent considerable effort trying to persuade 
his party that it should provide the leadership of the Opposition. Indeed, 
he appears to have been willing to forsake his own leadership of the 
party to secure this end. In a statement he issued while the meeting was 
in progress he said: 
39 
40 
41 
42 
The questions to be decided at to-day's meeting of the United 
Australia Party, being of great importance to the future 
activities of the Opposition parties, it seems to me desirable 
that they should be considered absolutely without regard to 
persons. 
At the commencement of the meeting, therefore, I resigned 
from the post of leader ...• 42 
Menzies, R.G.: Afternoon Light, H~ondsworth, Penguin, 1967, at p.56. 
Hasluck, P.M.C.: The Government and the People 1942-1945, Canberra, 
Australian War Memorial, 1970, at p.305. 
Menzies, R.G.: op. cit., at p.53. 
Sydney Morning Herald, 9.10.1941, at p.lO. 
As is now history Menzies failed in his objective and 
Fadden became Leader of the Opposition, a victory in some ways of order 
over chaos. Menzies' later account of his resignation from Party 
leadership, if it conflicts with contemporary reports, nonetheless 
captures the spirit of the crisis of the United Australia Party: 
My party •.• took the view that as Fadden, leader of the 
Country Party, had just been Prime Minister, he should 
become Leader of the Opposition ••.. I said, 'Well, a 
party of our numbers which is not prepared to lead is not 
worth leading.' I thereupon resigned the leadership of my 
party.43 
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This incident was not resolved with finality until after the 
1943 General Election. Menzies resumed the leadership of the United 
Australia Party. In doing so he stipulated: 
that our party, being the majority opposition party, 
should assert its right to the Leadership of the Opposition, 
without which I believed we could not move forward 
effectively.44 
Of this event Fadden comments: 
I retired to the corner to lead my own party in a happier 
atmosphere of mateship and unity.45 
Thus the last dispute over leadership of the Opposition 
came to an end. There have in more recent times been disputes about 
relations between parties in Opposition, but these do not bear on the 
central themes of this essay, but rather on the general rights of 
parties in Opposition. 
This chapter opened by observing that the office of 
Leader of the Opposition initially did not have a constitutional, statutory 
or parliamentary basis. Although the office is now recognised statutorily 
43 
44 
45 
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and in the Standing Orders of the House, the principles according to which 
it is filled remain political. As is noted in the next chapter this 
curious characteristic also carries some implications with regard to the 
statutory salary. 
The inevitable conclusion of this chapter is that the 
principles according to which a member of Parliament is recognised as Leader 
of the Opposition are and remain political. But the close study of the 
occasions when tenure of the office has been in dispute reveals that a 
number of constant factors are present in attempts to resolve crises. A 
party leader will normally base a claim to be regarded as Leader of the 
Opposition on one or more of the following bases: 
First, his party is the largest party in the House, no member 
of which is a member of the Ministry. 
Second, especially if his party does not meet the above 
condition, he may claim that it is the largest of such parties 
prepared to support a motion of want of confidence in the 
Government. 
Third, a claim to the office may be based on tenure of the 
Prime Ministership in the period immediately preceding occupancy 
of the Opposition benches. 
Most Leaders of the Opposition fulfil all three of these 
conditions. Many of those who do not meet the third lead a party which 
constituted the Government prior to the party in Government at the time 
when they become Leader of the Opposition. 
The burden of this chapter has shown that occasions do 
arise in which leaders of different parties fulfil some but not all of the 
stipulated conditions. It is not possible to conclude definitively which 
of the three conditions is most significant. On balance it would appear 
that it is the second condition which ultimately prevails. That is to say, 
the litmus test of real Opposition is the willingness of the party to support 
a want of confidence motion against the Government and, if successful, 
to take up the reins of Government. 
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The Watson Government did not endure sufficiently long for 
there to be a clear resolution of Reid's dispute with Deakin. The Cook-
Tudor clash and the Fadden-Menzies contest were finally resolved along the 
lines of the second condition. And it seems that it was because Scullin 
fulfilled the second condition in 1932 that his claim to the Opposition 
leadership was not disputed. 
III 
SALARY, EMOLUMENTS AND PRIVILEGES OF 
THE OFFICE OF LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe and consider the 
salary payable to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives 
and other emoluments and privileges which he receives by virtue of holding 
that office. It has already been shown that the office existed in the 
constitution as perceived in the minds of men at the time of Federation 
although it, like other offices and bodies such as the Prime Minister, or 
the Cabinet, was not recognised in the written Constitution. 
The early legislation of the Parliament by which the machinery 
of government was established did not, however, recognise the leader of the 
Opposition in terms of a special salary in the way it did the Prime Minister • 
and the members of the Cabinet. 
Pressure certainly existed from the beginning for financial 
recognition of the position. There would seem, however, to have been a 
prima facie problem which needed to be overcome. Section 44 of the 
Constitution stipulated that: 
44. Any person who -
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) •.•••••• 
(iv) Holds any office of profit under the Crown, or any 
pension payable during the pleasure of the Crown 
out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth: ••• 
(v) 
shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a 
senator or a member of the House of Representatives. 
The section went on to qualify sub-section (iv): 
But sub-section iv.does not apply to the office of any of 
the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth •••• 
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In the event the case of salary for the Leader of the Opposition seems, as 
shall be shown, to have been considered on the merits. When the question of 
additional remuneration for the Leader of the Opposition was ultimately 
considered the constitutional problem, like that of defining who he was, 
was ignored or, perhaps, simply not recognised. 
At present, and indeed since Federation, the Presiding 
Officers of both House, Mr President and Mr Speaker, have received an 
additional allowance, which stood at £1,000 in 1901. These offices are 
provided for in the Constitution. The legality of the allowance has been 
raised. The Prime Minister of the time, Mr Menzies, explained the 
allowance thus: 
Mr Speaker receives an appropriate emolument, not as holding 
an office under the Crown but as being an officer of this 
Parliament •••• l 
This statement, referring as it does to an office which is clearly one of 
the Parliament and mentioned in the Constitution, does not entirely answer 
the case of the Leader of the Opposition. The plainly parliamentary basis 
of the position was, however, dramatically asserted by Mr Attlee, the first 
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons to be paid a salary as 
such, in answer to an attempt to censure him in respect of a staament he 
made in Spain during the Civil War. He said: 
[The motion) has specifically referred to me as 'the Leader of 
His Majesty's Official Opposition', and seems to imply that 
this places me in a special category. The Leader of the 
Opposition is a private member. He owes no allegiance to the 
Government. No action of his can in any way implicate the 
Government. He is responsible only to his constituents and 
to the Members from whom he derives his position. He is, I 
think, under a special obligation to defend the rights and 
privileges of private Members, particularly the right of 
every Member to express his opinion freely on all matters of 
public policy.2 
In fact, the Presiding Officers, the leaders of the Opposition and the 
party whips appear to have been deemed officers of the Parliament, not 
1 
2 
Menzies, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol. 18, at p.434; 19.3.1958. 
Attlee, C.R.: House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 13 •. 12.1937 
at cc.821-4. 
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officers of the Crown and it has been in these terms that the payment of 
3 allowances would probably be justified if challenged. 
Payment of salary and allowances to the Leader of the 
Opposition was a development of the Westminster model initiated by the 
Dominions and ultimately followed after the passage of many years by the 
Parliament at Westminster itself. An allowance for the Leader of the 
Opposition was first provided in Canadian provincial legislatures. The 
Canadian Federal Parliament instituted an additional indemnity in 1905. 
Several State legislatures in Australia, including New South Wales in 1912, 
made similar provision before the Commonwealth Parliament acted in 1920. 
The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons at Westminster was not 
financially recognised until 1937, in the same legislation which formally 
established the office of Prime Minister. New Zealand did not follow suit 
until 1951. 
There is a certain vagueness in the derivations of the 
office of leader of the Opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament. This 
vagueness does not, however, persist in tracing the salary history of the 
office. There was pressure for financial recognition of the position from 
the beginning. In a debate on a motion that Ministers should not, whilst in 
receipt of their ministerial salary, receive a member's salary also, Watson, 
the Labour leader pointed up the problems and dilemmas of Opposition 
leaders: 
3 
We may have another Ministry in power in the course of a few 
months for all we know. There is a noticeable absence of 
members from the Opposition benches, and yet we expect men to 
come down from Sydney and other places, who are earning large 
sums in their professions, to look to the business of the 
country. Under present conditions that expectation is in vain, 
and they are not here. 
Mr CAMERON:- Select leaders who will attend. 
Professor J.R. Richardson, Robert Garran Professor of Law, A.N.U., 
provided the following comment on the legal position of the Leader 
of the Opposition in the House of Representatives: 'The Leader of 
the Opposition would not hold an office under the Crown within the 
meaning of s.44 and even if it were the payments to him would not be 
regarded as profits of office but the remuneration which he received 
as a member of Parliament occupying a particular parliamentary 
position'. 
Mr WATSON:- That is all very well, but when the ablest man 
happens to be one who is, comparatively speaking, poor, and 
who must make his living, you must be glad to get his services 
at times rather than do without them altogether •••• [T]he 
39 
leader of the Opposition gets nothing while he is in Opposition 
beyond his allowance, and when he becomes leader of a Government 
some honourable members want to tie him down to a sum that will 
only about keep him. I think that is a mistaken view. 4 
Cook, who had become Reid's deputy, mentioned the matter 
during debate on the Parliamentary Allowances Bill of 1907. He referred 
to the Canadian innovation, both in the Federal House of Commons and in the 
provincial legislatures of Quebec and Ontario, and noted that the Federal 
legislation also provided an annuity for former Ministers. Wilks, member 
for the New South Wales seat of Dalley, indicated by way of interjection 
his support for an allowance for the leader of the Opposition. 5 
Although the matter was not generally aired in Parliament it 
is clear that it was on the minds of successive Opposition leaders. In 
1911 the Estimates for the Parliament contained an appropriation: 'Leader 
of the Opposition- Clerical Assistance•. 6 The staffing assistance of 
the Leader of the Opposition is considered elsewhere. The significance of 
the Estimates entry cited above is that Deakin, Leader of the Opposition 
at the time and in declining health, had also been offered an additional 
allowance. His biographer records: 
[Deakin] knew before six months of his leadership of the 
Opposition had elapsed that his case was more desperate. 
When Fisher offered in 1911 to provide for the payment of 
additional salary, ex officio, to the Leader of the 
Opposition, he declined to accept it for himself; but he 
accepted the related offer of the services of a secretary, 
which came, he remarked, 'just in time'.7 
The appropriation drew a comment in the Senate, based upon 
the absence of a similar provision for the Leader of the Opposition in that 
Chamber: 
4 
5 
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7 
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Senator McCOLL (Victoria):- I have had on my mind for some time 
a matter which I have not mentioned to my colleagues on this side, 
and which I desire to bring forward on my own account and as a 
matter of justice. Honourable senators on each side cannot have 
failed to recognise the very able way in,which the Opposition has 
been led by Senator Millen this session - and the great amount of 
work which he has had to do •.•• I think that the Senate should do 
as has been done in another place. I am not one to endeavour to 
increase expenditure, but I think that, as a matter of bare 
justice, the Leader of the Opposition should have an allowance, 
so that he can get assistance in working up questions which come 
before the Senate. An allowance is made to the Leader of the 
Opposition in another place, and the work here is equally as 
important and weighty as it is there.8 
Fisher, having returned to the Prime Ministership after a 
period in Opposition during the tenure of the Cook Government of 1913-14, 
expounded his attitude in an exchange with Cook, once again Leader of the 
Opposition: 
I offered payment to the honourable member's predecessor. 
He knows that there should be a salary for the Leader of 
the Opposition.9 
This problem was fully described in 1917 when Reid, the first 
leader of the Opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament, published his 
M R • • 10 memoir: y em~n~scences. Reid waxed eloquent on his problems and a 
number of passages are directly relevent to the theme of this chapter: 
8 
9 
10 
My new sphere of activity in Melbourne was nearly 600 miles away 
from the courts of law in Sydney. I had a lucrative practice, 
and I could not give it up altogether. This should have made 
impossible my election by the Opposition members as their leader. 
To have a leader away from the House for comparatively long 
periods was clearly a most undesirable state of affairs. However, 
the party was good enough to insist upon my leadership, 'with all 
f 1 I 11 au ts , .... 
[Watson and Fisher] were both able to devote the whole of their time 
and energy to the duties of leadership. My case was sadly different. 
I could not give up my professional career. I was therefore irregular 
in my attendance, after devoting the whole force of my mind to cases 
in Courts hundreds of miles away from Parliament. That I was able to 
McColl, J. H.: C.P.D. Senate (O.S.), Vol.63, at p.4900f; 20.12.1911. 
Fisher, Andrew: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.75, at p.ll86; 27.11.1914. 
Reid, Sir George: My Reminiscences, London, Cassell, 1917. 
11 Ibid.atp.210. 
remain leader of the Opposition at all was a proof of the 
extraordinary confidence my supporters had in me, and the 
strength of their desire to retain me in that capacity. But, 
obviously, the anomaly of a leadership in Parliament, and a 
leadership at the Common Law Bar, divided by a distance of 
six hundred miles, could not last much longer. Whilst the 
Labour Party solidly supported the Deakin Party in office my 
constant presence could not have altered the position of 
affairs. When the Labour Party began to weaken in their 
support of Mr Deakin the situation changed in such a way that 
a leader who could always attend the House became a necessity. 
The able and devoted services of Mr Joseph Cook, as deputy 
leader of the Opposition, were the main factors in making my 
position tolerable. Had he been less able, or less loyal, 
or less devoted than he was, a leadership so long and so often 
suspended as mine was could not have lasted for a single 
session.l2 
As I have already admitted, to have a leader of the Opposition 
who had to be away so much was an unprecedented thing. From 
the first I made it clear that it was impossible to give up my 
practice entirely, and that I only held the office until the 
Party was able to make a better arrangement. So long as 
Mr Deakin was entrenched behind the Labour Party, as he was 
for six years, it was simply impossible to bring about his 
defeat, if I had been at every sitting. But when the Labour 
Party threw him over a new situation arose, which made an 
absentee leader of the Opposition impossible. I therefore 
retired ••• ,13 
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There were hence several elements in the movement leading to 
payment of an allowance to the Leader of the Opposition. There was, first, 
the experience of the men in the job, who found the private member's 
allowance inadequate for this purpose. In this respect it is not perhaps 
II: 
to be marvelled that the Dominions anticipated Westminster in 
t. 
institutionalisation of the office in terms of financial remuneration. For 
there did not exist in the Dominions a wealthy class able to support a full 
political career from private resources. Labour had already made a vigorous 
impact on the political scene and was a baptised and confirmed party of 
government before its Westminster counterpart had looked on or tasted the 
fruits of office. It might be expected that Labour men could not support 
themselves from private means. But the conservative and middle classes in 
Australian political life, as the extracts from Reid above illustrate, did 
12 Ibid. <1.: p. 254£. 
13 Ibid. at p. 261. 
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not have the private resources of their Westminster counterparts. With 
individual exceptions non-Labour politicians in Australia enjoy substantial 
incomes rather than wealth. The different social backgrounds of Australian 
parliamentarians gave them a gentle nudge along a path not yet trodden by 
Westminster. And that nudge was reinforced, again as demonstrated by the 
passages from Reid, by the impact of geography on the real value of the 
parliamentary allowance. Another important factor was the precedent already 
established in Canada and in a number of the State legislatures. And it is 
instructive for the purposes of this essay to consider briefly the 
introduction of an additional allowance for the Leader of the Opposition in 
Canada and in the Legislative Assembly in New South Wales. 
Salary for the Leader of the Opposition in Canada was 
introduced by resolution of the House of Commons in July 1905. In a short 
14 debate of high quality the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, explained 
the need for the additional allowance: 
[I]n Great Britain it so happens that the men who are engaged 
in the task of legislating for the nation all belong to a class 
which we have not in this country; that is to say they are men 
of leisure or of means; we are all bound to work for the bread 
of every day and we must recognise this, and we are simply 
recognising it. The leader of the opposition under our system 
is just as much a part of the constitutional system of 
government as the Prime Minister himself.l5 
A number of questions about the proposal were raised. One 
member wondered whether 'Parliament might thereby be assuming to itself to 
16 dictate who shall be the man the Crown must send for to form a new cabinet'. 
Laurier contended in reply that the Sovereign was aware of the situation and 
payment of the indemnity was not relevant. Members with associations in 
Quebec, and hence less affected by the force of Westminster logic, likened 
the provision to a similar practice in the Courts. The leader of the 
Opposition was considered analagous to the Legitime Contradicteur, or 
14 
15 
16 
Canadian Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1905 Session, V, at 
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L'Advocat du Diable whose 'duties consist in putting before the court all 
the objections that can possibly be found to any proposal that is made' 17 
The Canadian resolution, like the subsequent Australian 
legislation, but unlike the Ontario provision, did not specify who was 
Leader of the Opposition. The Ontario formula required election as Leader 
of the Opposition, and therefore entitlement to the allowance, to be 
certified by the First Minister and the Leader of the Opposition himself. 
In the federal House, as a contemporary commentator noted: 
The member elected in caucus takes his seat on the bench on 
the opposition side of the house, assigned by custom to the 
leader of the opposition, and his appearance there is the 
warrant for the payment of the salary.l8 
Unlike the comparable Australian debate, the Canadian House 
considered the move in relation to the Westminster model. Laurier denied 
that it was a departure: 
In g~v~ng this day an indemnity to the recognised person who 
occupies the position of leader of the opposition I do not 
admit that we are making a departure from our system of 
constitutional government; I contend on the contrary that we 
are simply coming to a new stage in the development of 
constitutional government.l9 
The commentator cited earlier perceived the departure, however. In the 
first place the new position was an office of the Parliament responsible 
not to the House but to a portion of it, the minority. This was, he 
20 thought, an indication of influence from Washington. 
Financial recognition of the Opposition leader in Australia 
came first in the States and later in the Commonwealth Parliament. The 
17 
18 
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delay in its introduction into the Commonwealth House probably reflects not 
only Deakin's reticence but also the greater persistence of the Labour 
Party in the State legislatures. Although not the first State to do so, 
and although Dr Evatt records the matter in one sentence in his biography 
21 
of W.A. Holman, the Minister who handled the Bill in the Assembly, the 
introduction of the allowance for the Leader of the Opposition in 1912 
requires deeper attention as a rare occasion in Australia on which 
substantial thought was given to the implications of the move as it affected 
the constitution of the polity. 
Suggestions that financial recognition of the office was 
22 desirable was first mooted in Parliament in 1907 by a Labour member. 
The matter was again revived by the McGowen Labour Government in 1912 in 
connection with a general increase in parliamentary allowances. Holman in 
his speech said, with reference to the allowance of £250 to the Leader of 
the Opposition, in addition to the £500 he would receive as a member: 
I hope it will not be suggested that that has been inserted 
with any idea of affecting the attitude of the hon. member 
for Gordon (Mr Wade). However much we differ from the hon. 
member, and have had to criticise him in times gone by, I 
am not one who believes his attitude towards us can be 
affected by anything of that sort. We do not think that; 
we have never thought that. The provision has been inserted 
in the bill with no idea whatever of affecting the hon. 
member for Gordon personally or affecting his personal 
attitude towards this measure; but in pursuance of an attitude 
that was adopted by this party years ago when the Ministers' 
Salaries Bill was before the House. Representations were then 
made by this party to the hon. member for Gordon in this 
direction. The hon. member will recollect that the present 
Colonial Treasurer waited upon him in the interests of the 
Opposition at that time, and urged him that an allowance should 
be made to the leader of the Opposition •••• The House 
generally will realise, whatever the merits of the proposal may 
be, that it is a matter to be judged up to its merits, and that 
it is not in the slightest degree a suggestion that has been put 
forward with the idea of adverting any criticism or of purchasing 
support •... It has no reference to any individual. It simply 
asserts what we believe to be an absolutely sound principle - that 
the leader of the Opposition is the principal critic of the 
Government, that a constitutional duty is cast upon him, and it is 
not right that he should discharge his great duties to the public 
at his own personal expense. The leader of the Opposition may at 
21 Evatt, H.V.: Australian Labour Leader: the Story of W.A. HoLman and the 
Labour Movement, 2nd ed., Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1942, at p.305. 
22 Dacey, J.R.: N.S.W. P.D.L. of A., Second Series, Vol.28, at p.l720ff; 
9.12.1907. 
any moment be called upon to go to any part of the country 
to look into some grievance, or investigate some scandal. 
He may be invited by a constituency to go down and see how 
the Government are abusing their powers in a certain part 
of the state. If he is a conscientious energetic man, 
he may have to abandon his own private business.... He 
receives, as I know personally, having acted as deputy 
leader of the Opposition, correspondence which comes from 
every corner of New South Wales. Every person who is 
discontented, every person who has a grievance against the 
Government, makes representations first to his own member, 
and if that fails, to the leader of the Opposition. And the 
leader of the Opposition has much of his time taken up with 
the investigation of purely barren disputes, in which he can 
do nothing, but none of which, if he is a conscientious 
worker in the position, he can afford to absolutely thrust 
aside without some investigation •.• [T]he position of leader 
of the Opposition is an anomalous one. He is not in power, 
and yet he has an office - the office of the first and 
leading critic of the Government of the day. This is a 
modest proposal •••• which commends itself to my colleagues, 
to give him some small allowance yearly to equip himself 
with clerical assistance.23 
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Holman's contribution to this debate stands as the most 
profound contribution to discussion of the nature of Opposition leadership. 
He recognised the financial pressures on the occupant of the office and of 
the demands made upon him. At the same time he was aware of the 
constitutional significance of the proposal, and aware of possible 
constructions which would be placed upon it. 
Wade responded with an argument on work value, or, more 
accurately, work load. He said: 
23 
24 
If anyone can complain of the extra burden of work and 
responsibility and sacrifice of time and income, as the 
result of carrying out parliamentary duties, it is the 
man who is, for the time being, leading the party in 
Opposition. I speak not only from bitter personal 
experience, but from - perhaps I shall not use any 
other argument than that. Whilst the Ministers carrying 
on the legislation of the country can relieve themselves 
by working in turns with respect to the bills that are 
placed before the House, the leader of the Opposition is 
supposed to be at his post at all occasions; to be 
seized with a proper knowledge of all measures, and to 
have that measure of physical endurance that will enable 
him to sit here night and day and yet still be fit for the 
next afternoon's work. If a man is engaged in this 
physical task, it is almost impossible for him to do his 
duty in the House and expect to earn even a crumb at his 
profession.24 
Holman, W.A.: N.S.W. P.D.L. of A., Second Series, Vol.45, at p.3858ff; 
14.3.1912. 
Wade, e.G.: N.S.W. P.D.L. of A., Second Series, Vol.45, at p.3868; 
14.3.1912. 
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Wade's statement, echoed itself in the debates eight years 
later in the Commonwealth Parliament, itself echoes the problems referred 
to in the passages from Reid. It would appear that even geographical 
proximity of parliamentary and professional life was insufficient to enable 
a conscientious Leader of the Opposition to pursue his profession and to 
supplement, thereby,his parliamentary earnings. The consensus appears to 
be that Opposition and party leadership were by the early twentieth 
century full-time activities and needed to be regarded as such. 
It is with this background that attention may again return 
to the Commonwealth Parliament. A proposal that the allowances of members 
of Parliament should be increased was successfully moved in the House of 
Representatives on 13 May 1920 in a resolution moved by Mr Bamford, the 
'Father of the House'. It was the first time since 1907 that the salary 
payable under section 48 of the Constitution was formally considered. In 
the course of the debate on the resolution Tudor, the Leader of the 
Opposition (and successor to Hughes as Leader of the Parliamentary Labor 
Party), reflected upon his experience in the office: 
In 1917, when we had a Federal general election, a referendum 
on conscription, a by-election in Tasmania, and another in 
Victoria, I travelled about 25,000 miles. I could not have 
done that had I not been a Minister of the Crown in previous 
years. I was out of pocket; but I bore the loss, because I 
believed that I was merely doing my duty ••.. Some honourable 
members, including those who have been in the House for many 
years, are under the impression that I do receive an allowance. 
All I can say is that, if I do, I do not know where it goes; 
it never reaches me.25 
Tudor, whose contribution was to point up electoral as well 
as parliamentary duties of Opposition leadership, was supported by Mr Parker 
Moloney, Labor member for Hume, who claimed, erroneously, I think, that: 
'This is the only Australian Parliament in which the Leader of the 
26 Opposition does not receive a special payment'. 
25 Tudor, F.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.92, at p.2099; 12.5.1920. 
26 Moloney, H.P.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.92, at p.2099; 13.5.1920. 
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A week later Hughes, the Prime Minister, introduced the 
necessary Bill into the House in order to give effect to the resolution. 
The Bill provided a general allowance for senators and members of £1,000 
and contained the following clause: 
7. In addition to any other allowance payable under this 
Act there shall be payable to the Leader of the 
Opposition in the Senate, an allowance at the rate of 
Two hundred pounds a year, and to the Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives~ an allowance 
at the rate of Four hundred pounds a year.L7 
The same Bill, which was passed into law without amendment, retained a 
clause (No.3) first introduced in 1907 that the Ministers of State and 
the Presiding Officers and Chairmen of Committees in both Houses, should 
receive a parliamentary allowance of £800 in addition to the emoluments 
of office. 
Hence, three points may be noted. First, the positions of 
Opposition leadership were treated separately to all other positions which 
received remuneration in addition to the parliamentary allowance. Second, 
of all those in receipt of additional remuneration the Opposition leaders 
received the least. Third, the Parliament, as in 1911, specifically 
authorised differential treatment as between the House of Representatives 
and !he Senate. The Leader of the Opposition in the House was to receive 
an additional allowance twice as large as that of the Opposition leader in 
the Senate. This was perhaps a recognition, and an explicit statement, of 
an assumption that the Opposition leader in the House somehow held a singular 
position in the polity, namely that in the event of a change of Government 
he would be Head of Government. (It will be noted that although the Prime 
Minister's remuneration exceeded that of all other Ministers this did not 
require parliamentary sanction. The sum of money provided for ministerial 
salaries in the Ministers of State Act is voted in toto and distributed in 
such amount as are determined by internal processes.) 
27 See Parliamentary Allowances Act, 1920, s.7. 
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In commending the Bill to the House Hughes said in reference 
to clause 7, cited above: 
The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives has 
a difficult position to fill. While, perhaps, his correspondence 
is not equal in volume to that with which the Leader of the 
Government has to deal, it is most extensive. A very large 
number of the electors look to him, write to him, and express 
their opinions to him, desiring through him, to express them to 
Parliament. He occupies an office which is well recognised. 
He is the Leader of His Majesty's Opposition. Parliamentary 
government has long recognised the necessity for an Opposition, 
and it is about time we gave statutory authority for the office. 
It should have been done long ago. We will do it now.28 
Tudor reiterated his remarks already quoted above and went on 
to observe simply that ' ••• although the Minister for the Navy [Sir Joseph 
Cook] and I disagree on many subjects, he will confirm my statement that the 
work he did as Leader of the Opposition was greater than he would have had 
29 to do as an ordinary private member'. He indicated that though he would 
support the Second Reading of the Bill, he would not, as ' ••• the only 
person affected by it', vote on clause 7. 
Few members expressed interest in clause 7, a lack of 
interest also reflected in the Press. The matter was subsumed in the general 
issue of a rise in the parliamentary allowance. Bruce, the future Prime 
Minister, opposed the legislation in general but said: 
In expressing my opposition to the Bill I should like it to be 
distinctly understood that I am in no way referring to the 
clause dealing with the Leader of the Opposition. In regard to 
that, we are not dealing with our own remuneration ... but with 
an individual position- .••• Having regard to the very heavy 
and onerous duties of the Leader of the Opposition, I have not 
one word to say against the proposal; in fact, I am heartily 
in accord with it.30 
And the member for Darwin, Tasmania, Bell, followed: 
28 
29 
30 
With regard to the proposed allowance to the Leader of the 
Opposition, I am not in a position to say what the work 
Hughes, W.M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.92, at p.2358f; 20.5.1920. 
Tudor, F.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vo1.92, at p.2361; 20.5.1920. 
Bruce, S.M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vo1.92, at p.2365f; 20.5.1920. 
attached to the position is, but I have no objection to the 
payment of such an allowance. The Opposition has become 
recognised, as the Prime Minister says, as a necessary 
institution in Parliament. I am not in the habit of throwing 
bouquets about, but I can say honestly that there is no 
member of this House for whom I have greater respect than 
the Leader of the Opposition. However the honourable member 
and myself may differ on questions of policy, I believe that 
the Opposition is well led. The tone which the honourable 
member adopts when criticising Government proposals might 
well be followed by all members. There is no question about 
his ability, and he has given a great deal of time to his 
duties. I am sure that he has earned every penny he has 
received and will do so in future.31 
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It would appear from the parliamentary record that members 
were unaware of the significance or implications of the move which they 
were making on this occasion. There are some very broad references to the 
position of the Opposition Leader in the body politic, but none of the 
insight evident in Holman's approach, which was itself a far from complete 
statement. Wade rather than Holman set the form of the slight debate. The 
additional allowance was primarily justified in terms of work load. It was 
a monetary compensation for services performed, made palatable by the less 
than dynamic leadership of Tudor. It was in no sense a financial 
recognition of an important position in the Parliament in terms of theory. 
Yet that last remark needs to be tempered. The lack of 
debate, despite the legal problem which seems to be implicit in the 
situation, indicates the extent to which both the Opposition and its Leader 
were established in the minds of the parliamentarians. Even justification 
in terms of work load is of interest. The frequent references to volume of 
correspondence suggests that in the community itself the position was firmly 
established as an institution to which people could look for the redress of 
grievances, a traditional function of Parliament. Even if people d:idnot 
speak at length about constitutional factors it may possibly be suggested 
that some theory about the Leader of the Opposition was present in the 
public mind (and in the parliamentary mind so far as his role in the 
31 Bell, G.J.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.92, at p.2373; 20.5.1920. 
It is interesting to speculate upon what Bell's view might have been 
if Tudor's tone when criticising Government proposals had not been 
one which might have been followed by all members. 
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ordering of parliamentary business was concerned), albeit incomplete, 
unformed and largely inarticulate. 
The significance of these considerations on the largely 
pragmatic response by the Commonwealth Parliament to a problem which had 
arisen is further drawn out by comparison to the debate on the same 
subject in the Westminster Parliament in 1937. 32 
The first point of comparison is perhaps that the position 
in the United Kingdom was statutorily created in the Ministers of the Crown 
Act 1937, not by resolution, as in Canada, or in company with parliamentary 
allowances, as in Australia. Despite Mr Attlee's statement on the position 
33 
a short time later, the position in the United Kingdom was from the 
beginning more closely aligned with the Executive than with the Parliament 
as such, but, as shall be discussed, this alignment with the Executive did 
not develop as tightly as it was to in Australia, despite the legal 
separation. The amount fixed in Britain was the same as that payable to a 
former Prime Minister and has remained lower than the salary to which a 
Minister of the Crown is entitled. 
The second point of comparison is that the legislators felt 
bound, perhaps in remembrance of the three-party situation in the Commons 
during the period of Labour rise and Liberal decline, to provide a 
definition of who was Leader of the Opposition: 
That member of the House of Commons who is for the time being 
the Leader in that House of the party in opposition to His 
Majesty's Government having the greatest numerical strength in 
that House.34 
The third point of comparison with Australia is the nature 
of debate on the matter. Certainly the proposal was supported by work load 
32 
33 
34 
See Potter, A.M.: 'Great Britain: Opposition with a Capital "O" '; in 
Dahl, Robert A. (ed.): op.oit., at p.3ff. 
McHenry, Dean: 'Formal Recognition of the Leader of the Opposition in 
Parliaments of the British Commonwealth', Politioal Soienoe Quarterly, 
Vol.69 (1954), at p.438ff. 
Attlee,C.R.; cited above, at p.37. 
(U.K.) Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, s.lO. 
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arguments found in the Australian debate. And there were general arguments 
about his place in the scheme of politics. One Labour member considered, 
in the Holman tradition, whether or not payment of additional remuneration 
would affect the freedom with which the duties of Leader of the Opposition 
were carried out, and another pointed to the role of Opposition Leader in 
assisting in the arrangement of the business of the House. 
But there were objections to the proposals from a number of 
members from all parties on the grounds that Opposition should receive its 
recognition from the electors, not 'from the Government as a gift'. Some 
members thought the Opposition Leader's remuneration should come from his 
supporters. Another denied that the Opposition existed 'officially'. 
Another suggested that salaried recognition of the position would lead to 
a stereotyped alignment of the parties. The most potent criticism was that 
while a single leader of the Opposition might suit the Government, it was 
really for the Opposition to decide how it would organise itself. 
It is not my purpose immediately to consider the significance 
of these arguments. That is done elsewhere. What is significant is that 
while Australia reacted in a pragmatic manner to the problem of Opposition 
leadership, with emphasis on the work load carried by the occupant, time 
devoted to the position and the difficulty of combining the role with 
private pursuit of a profession, the Commons debate did examine some 
constitutional implications of the move. However, even at Westminster 
people considered only incidentally the anomaly pointed to by Porritt, 
namely that the Leader of the Opposition, although in receipt of a special 
allowance, is chosen by and responsible to, not the House, but his 
supporters, the minority. 
With some refinements in regard to particular, usually 
peripheral, matters the pragmatic approach to the remuneration of the 
Leader of the Opposition has persisted in Australia. The total allowances 
of Opposition leaders in the House and Senate remained as determined in 
1920, until 1947, subject to a number of percentage variations during the 
Depression and in the years of recovery. 
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The Parliamentary AllowancffiActs of 1947 brought no new 
considerations to bear upon the concept of the Leader of the Opposition. 
The first Act of 1947 increased the general allowance for members from 
£1,000 ro£1,500, the special allowance of the Leader of the Opposition 
in the House from £400 to £600, and that of the Leader of the Opposition 
in the Senate from £200 to £300. Relativities were thus preserved. 
(It may be noted, however, that the proviso in section 3 of the principal 
Act, limiting the extent to which office-bearers other than the Leaders of 
the Opposition could draw their parliamentary allowance, had been removed 
in 1938 - by section 7 of the Parliamentary Salaries Adjustment Act, 1938.) 
In moving the increased allowance for the Opposition 
leaders, an increase in proportion to that granted to members generally, 
the Prime Minister observed: 
Since, for a number of years, it has been obvious that the 
duties of those two leaders have become far more onerous 
and exacting than they were formerly, the present opportunity 
is being taken to increase their allowances to £300 and £600, 
respectively.35 
The Leader of the Opposition, Menzies, clearly agreed: 
••• I find myself in this year of grace in possession of the 
lowest income from all sources that I have ever had since 
I was a young man in the twenties.36 
And, as he recorded later in his memoirs: 
35 
36 
37 
As Leader of a depleted Opposition, I had to carry great 
burdens in the debating of measures introduced by the 
Government and in the working out of our own ideas. In 
the Parliamentary recesses I had to travel inter-state 
and address meetings, and 'keep the flag flying'. This 
was expensive, not only financially but in terms of 
nervous energy .••• I drew a private member's salary, 
plus an allowance of, I think, £300 a year .•.• For about 
a month in each year, I accepted a few briefs, partly to 
keep my hand in at my own profession, and partly to 
replenish the domestic larder. In the result, I drew 
heavily upon my limited private capital.37 
Chifley, J.B.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.3219; 30.5.1947. 
Menzies, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.3347, 4.6.1947. 
Menzies, R.G.: Afternoon Light, Pen&uin, Harmondsworth, 1967, at p.283. 
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The Prime Minister whose Government had introduced the 
initial allowance again indicated his interest. 'The Leader of the 
Opposition', Hughes said, 'devotes his time and his talents to the 
service of the Commonwealth•. 38 
Government spokesmen did, however, feel the need to rebut 
an allegation in the Press that the additional allowance for the Leader of 
the Opposition was designed to secure his support for legislation which, 
in the event, his party opposed. Chifley was quick to assert that this 
decision had not been discussed by the Caucus: 
The increase was never discussed by caucus. When the 
legislation was being drafted, I sought the approval of 
Cabinet to increase the allowance because of the increased 
duties of the Leader of the Opposition and the fact that 
he has worked very hard. I thought that he was entitled 
to a 'marginal increase'! I accept full responsibility 
for this provision in the bill ••.• I did not even mention 
the matter to the Leader of the Opposition .••• 39 
Evatt indicated that in his view not only should the Leader 
of the Opposition receive financial recognition, but so also should 'the 
leaders of parties which are substantially represented in this House•. 40 
Behind those comments of Chifley and Evatt is an explicit recognition of 
the particular function of leadership of a political party in Parliament, 
a recognition which accords with an approach to the study of Parliament 
which has regard not only to the vertical division of Government and 
Opposition but also the horizontal division of frontbench (leadership) and 
backbench (followers). As an aside, Chifley's reference to work load, 
actually performed, may also be noted. 
Party leadership of a different kind was, however, the new 
factor in the 1947 debates and was to assume an increasingly important role 
in the consideration of parliamentary allowances. Evatt, a number of 
Liberal Party spokesmen and the Country Party drew attention to the situation 
of the Leader of the Country Party, then consisting of twelve members. 
38 Hughes, W.M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.3378; 4.6.1947. 
39 Chifley, J.B.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.3432; 4/5.6.1947. 
40 Evatt, H.V.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.335lf; 4.6.1947. 
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Menzies regarded the question as 'one of substance' which 
did not seem 'to admit of a technical answer'. He, like the Government, 
was anxious to avoid a situation where the leader of 'some small or 
nominal party' would receive an allowance. The solution he proposed was 
a prescription in the legislation: 
••• that only the leader of a party which has not less than so 
many members .•• should be entitled to an extra allowance, 
having regard to the fact that his responsibilities to his 
party and to this Parliament are inevitably far greater than 
those of a private member. 
His own allowance was: 
••• perfectly proper •.• but the Leader of the Australian 
Country Party is, so far as allowances are concerned, 
regarded as a private member. He is not a private member, 
because he is the leader of a party which has twelve 
members in this House. My own party has seventeen members. 
The difference is not so very great, and his responsibilities 
in relation to his party and parliamentary work are no~1 different from those which I myself have to discharge. 
Thus Menzies explicitly endorsed the distinction between leadership and 
the led on the Opposition side which was implicit in the Chifley approach. 
And again there is an assertion of the work load pragmatic approach to the 
situation. 
In addition Menzies devoted some time to the theory 
underlying the then structure of the legislation and its inadequacy in 
practice. Political factors emerge and Australia should adjust the British 
practice to suit its own situation. He continued: 
41 
42 
The Prime Minister [Mr Chifley] has indicated that the matter 
has been considered by Cabinet and that Cabinet has taken the 
view that as there can be only one Opposition leader, there 
can be only one provision of this kind. But I point out to 
him that that theory proceeds from the older idea of a two-
party parliament. The fact is that the pattern of Australian 
politics has, for many years, embraced three large parties, 
the Labour party, the party to which I have the honour to 
belong, and the Australian Country party.42 
Menzies, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l92, at p.3434f; 4/5.6.1947. 
Ibid. 
McEwen, for the Country Party, had already made the same point: 
••• The original conception of our parliamentary system was 
that there should be only two entities in the parliament -
the government and the opposition. However, with the 
passage of time, there has developed in this legislature 
a powerful third party, the strength of which at present 
approximates that of the official Opposition party .••• 43 
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The point was taken and the necessary legislation carried later in the 
year. The operative clause was uncharacteristically precise: 
In addition to any other allowance payable under this Act, an 
allowance at the rate of Four hundred pounds a year shall be 
payable to the Leader in the House of Representatives (not 
being the Leader of the Opposition) of a recognised political 
party not less than ten members of which are members of the 
House of Representatives and of which no member is a Minister 
of State.44 
Two final comments: the allowance for the Leader of the 
third party was fixed at £400, £100 more than that provided for the Leader 
of the Opposition in the Senate and thus another instance of the House 
receiving superior treatment to the Upper House. No provision was made for 
the Leader of a third party in the Senate. As the Opposition in the Senate 
at the time that this legislation was assented to consisted of only three, 
the differential treatment of the two Houses in the legislation was not 
regarded as significant. 
Second, the Menzies and McEwen speeches cited above 
illustrate that although Australian Federal politics had had a three party 
form for all but ten years of its existence (1909 to 1919) this characteristic 
was still in the minds of men regarded as unusual and it was still necessary 
to point it out. Two parties were still considered to be the norm. 
Mr Menzies' forthright declaration that the leader of a 
political party with substantial members in Parliament, together with the 
terms of the legislation as it stood at the end of 1947, had great significance 
43 
44 
McEwen, J.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.) Vol.l92, at p.3434; 4/5.6.1947. 
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for future developments. Before passing on to these it is necessary to 
take note of some provisions of the Parliamentary Retiring Allowances Act 
1948, the first occasion on which Parliament provided a retirement benefit 
scheme for its members subject to certain qualifications in terms of years 
of service and age (interesting distinctions in themselves which will not 
be examined in this essay). The legislation was simply a retirement benefit 
and did not seek to distinguish betwen types of service rendered. Prime 
Ministers, Presidents, Speakers, Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition 
were treated in the same manner as private members, a dramatic assertion of 
the equalitarian principle. The legislation did, however, further recognise 
the role of the political party in the political process. For the purpose 
of determining eligibility for benefits under the legislation, in addition 
to distinctions based on age and length of service, the legislation sought 
to distinguish between those who had retired 'voluntarily' and others. 
Among those in the latter category, and accordingly eligible for benefits 
at an earlier stage, were members who failed to contest the election owing 
either to 'failure to secure the support of a political party from which 
45 he reasonably sought support' or to 'expulsion from a political party'. 
In the 1949 General Election the Chifley Government was 
defeated. It is appropriate that the comparative situation of private 
members and office-holders should be reviewed. The table at Attachment 
to this chapter 46 provides ap~e to this deliberation. 
In the first 48 years of Federal Government, the private 
member's position vis-a-vis office holders improved dramatically. 
1 
Ministers as ministers in fact lost ground: in 1901 the ministerial salary 
was £1,650; in 1949, £1,350. The Presiding Officers received remuneration 
at a rate exceeded only by the Prime Minister. The Leaders of the 
Opposition and the Leader of the Third Party in the Rouse each received 
more than private members and senators but less than other officers of the 
Parliament. A word of warning should perhaps be sounded, to be elaborated 
later in the text. The above observations are based on salary factors alone, 
45 
46 
See Parliamentary Retiring Allowances Act, 1948, s.l7, sub-s.4. 
At p.78. 
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and not on other privileges, including staff-support and allowances 
available. The contrast in the table is indicative rather than 
conclusive. 
In 1951 a Committee of Enquiry into the Salaries and 
Allowances of Members of the National Parliament was established. It had 
a membership of three including the Chairman, Mr Justice Nicholas, a Judge 
in Equity of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. A businessman, 
H.F. Richardson, and a chartered accountant, H.W. Buckley, were the other 
members. They reported in 1952 and new legislation based on the 
recommendations of the Report was passed by the Parliament at the beginning 
of the parliamentary year. 47 
The new structure was a revolution in remuneration for 
parliamentary service, in structure and content too extensive and detailed 
to be covered in this essay. For my purpose it is sufficient to note that 
office-holders received a dramatic boost in relation to private members 
and that party leaders (including Ministers) received remunerative 
recognition superior to that of those occupying what were clearly offices 
of the Parliament. 
The Report recommended special remunerative arrangements 
for the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Treasurer (not 
being the Deputy Prime Minister), Senior Ministers (who were not previously 
distinguished), and Ministers. The Leader of the Opposition in the House 
was to be equated with Ministers and accorded a comparable allowance of 
£1,750 in addition to his basic salary. A similar provision was made for 
the Presiding Officers. The Leader of the Opposition in the Senate slipped 
further behind his House counterpart although,ironically, the revised 
electoral procedure increased the likelihood that there would in future be 
an Opposition of substantial numbers in the Senate. His additional 
allowance was to be £750, less than half that of the Leader of the Opposition 
47 Ministers of State Act, 1952; Parliamentary Allowances Act, 1952; and 
Parliamentary Retiring Allowances Act, 1952. 
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in the House. The Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House, a position 
recognised for the first time for salary purposes although it had existed 
since 1901, was equated with the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. 
The Leader of a third party in the House lost his superiority over the 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. His new additional allowance would 
be £500, £250 less than that of the Senate Opposition Leader. He also fell 
behind the new position of Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House. 
It is indeed curious that the Menzies Government of the time accepted and 
implemented this recommendation. The Government was in coalition with the 
Country Party, in practice the most likely party to benefit from the 
provision. It is curious also in light of the views expressed by Menzies 
himself during the 1947 debate. 48 
The elevation of the Opposition Leader in the House was 
further evidenced by his expense allowance, at £1,000 per annum, comparable 
to that of all Ministers except the Prime Minister, and in sharp contrast 
to the £250 per annum recommended for and paid to the Presiding Officers, the 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, and his own deputy in the House. 
The Leader of the third party was not accorded an expense allowance. 
The Committee justified its recommendations concerning the 
Leader of the Opposition in the following terms: 
48 
49 
A Leader of the Opposition is an essential figure in parliamentary 
government. In most English-speaking countries he receives a 
salary as a private member. In Canada his salary is the same as 
that of a Cabinet Minister. His duties are arduous, for he has 
to be prepared to discuss every Bill introduced by the 
Government subject to his right of delegation, and to do this 
he has not the power to call on departmental officers for 
information or assistance. His responsibility is not equal to 
that of the Prime Minister but it is a responsibility to his 
Party, to the country which he informs and which he aspires to 
lead. His entertainment expenses are less but are by no means 
negligible, for overseas visitors frequently wish to interview 
one whom they regard as a possible head of a government.49 
See page 54 above. 
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Salaries of Members of 
the National Parliament, 1952, at p.l8. 
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The Report noted also that: 'The special responsibility for the policy 
of the Opposition lies with the Leader'. The emphasis of the Report was 
therefore upon the Leader of the Opposition as alternative Prime Minister. 
The usual work load argument is present. Surprisingly absent is any 
reference to a role as chief critic of the Government, except inasmuch as 
it is embraced by his duty 'to be prepared to discuss every Bill' and his 
responsibility to 'inform' the country. Nor did the Report comment on his 
function of ventilating grievances which figures so prominently in the 
earlier debates. 
Menzies, now the Prime Minister, said when he introduced the 
legislation: 
In particular, I refer to the office of the Leader of the 
Opposition. I told the committee •.• that in my opinion the 
allowance paid to the Leaderrr the Opposition was perfectly 
hopeless •••• An Opposition leader receives no travelling 
expenses, yet if he is attending to his job conscientiously, 
as Opposition leaders do, he will do as much work and carry 
as much responsibility in the course of a year as the 
average Minister •••• I have the most vivid recollection, 
and so have other honourable members, of the extent of the 
travelling I did in Australia when I was Leader of the 
Opposition. The committee said, in effect: ' ••• It is ,true 
that it is a party exercise, and arises out of the clash of 
parties, but the Leader of the Opposition is at all stages 
in the Parliament the leader of the alternative government, 
and, therefore, he has great responsibility. It is his duty 
to go round the country and be with people' . In the past, 
no provision has been made for that travelling. I am bound 
to say that I think it is a very satisfactory feature of 
this report that, at long last, the office of Leader of the 
Opposition should be recognised effectively, and also that 
there should be recognition of the post of Deputy Leader of 
the Opposition, whose Opposition responsibilities are only 
less than those of his leader.50 
Menzies, in this passage, not only reflects the view of the Committee but 
goes one step further, in linking the formal parliamentary structure with 
that of the only partially recognised party structure which underlies it. 
50 Menzies, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.) Vol.216, at p.216; 21.2.1952. 
The new approach to the Leader of the Opposition is probably attributable 
to Menzies. In addition to what he told the House, he took a great 
interest in the position as is evidenced by his references to it in his 
memoirs- Menzies R.G.: Afternoon Light, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967, 
at p.283ff. Furthermore, according to A.A. Calwell, Leader of the 
Opposition from 1960 to 1967, neither he nor his predecessor, H.V. Evatt 
made representations on the subject of the salary of the Leader of the 
Opposition. 
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Further, although the office of Leader of the Opposition in the House was 
technically parliamentary, it had now been firmly aligned in conception and 
for the purposes of remuneration with the executive offices of State. As 
the Prime Minister had said: ' ••• the Leader of the Opposition is at all 
stages in the Parliament the leader of the alternative government •••• •. 
The legislation did, however, attract some criticism which 
is relevant to the central theme. A former Speaker, Rosevear, lighted upon 
the comparative down-grading of the Presiding Officers in relation to 
Ministers and, therefore, the Leader of the Opposition: 
I was astonished, on reading the report of this committee, 
when I noted that not only had the Speaker been dropped from 
the position of a senior Minister so far as his remuneration 
was concerned, but also that he was to receive £750 less than 
a junior Minister as an entertainment allowance.... I can 
speak from experience of the obligations that fall upon the 
Speaker to spend the money in the entertainment, not only of 
his personal friends, but also very often of the friends of 
members of the House, distinguished visitors, or people from 
his electorate.51 
Rosevear had almost certainly been less than just to the cause he was 
espousing and he was easily deflected by the Prime Minister who reminded 
him that the Speaker would continue to receive, though Ministers would not, 
an allowance for days spent in Canberra. 52 The point, however, stands. 
Those office-holders associated with Parliament had suffered a loss of 
status vis-a-vis those aligned with the Executive branch of the State. 
In the Senate, the Leader of the Opposition commented upon 
the absence of any provision for the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in 
that House: 
51 
52 
Provision of a quite proper nature, in my view, has been made 
for the position of Leaders of the Opposition. However, I 
draw attention to the rather anomalous position that the 
committee has recommended a substantial payment to the Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, but 
has made no provision for the equivalent position in the 
Senate. I suggest that every honourable senator should be 
really concerned about that situation. I personally can see 
not the slightest justification for establishing that principle 
in relation to the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the 
Rosevear, S.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.),Vo1.216, at p.586; 28.2.1952. 
Menzies, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.216, at p.587, 28.2.1952. 
House of Representatives, but denying it in the 
case of the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate •••• 
As every member of the Senate knows, the Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition in this chamber carries a grave responsibility. 
He functions when the Leader of the Opposition is absent 
unavoidably •••• 53 
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The position was especially anomalous because the Opposition Whip in the 
Senate did receive an additional allowance and was from time to time subject 
to direction from the Deputy Leader. 
Senator O'Sullivan, Government Leader in the Senate, explained 
that the Government was simply following the Committee's recommendations: 
It has been established quite clearly that the omission of 
special provision for the Deputy Leader of the Opposition 
was not an oversight on the part of the committee.54 
The anomaly was corrected in the 1956 legislation which did not otherwise 
deal with office-bearers. 55 
In 1959 a further Committee composed of Sir Frank Richardson, 
who had been a member of the 1952 Committee and Chairman of the 1956 
Committee of Inquiry into the Salaries and Allowances of Members of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, as Chairman, and Messrs G.E. Fitzgerald and 
N.L. Cowper as members, examined salaries and allowances of Ministers and 
members of Parliament. 
This Committee successfully recommended that the Leader of 
the Opposition should thenceforward be aligned with the Senior Ministers of 
State, in terms both of salary and allowances. The Presiding Officers were 
aligned with junior Ministers for both salary and travelling allowance, but 
not for the special allowance. Other Opposition leaders received 
remuneration equal to or less than that of the Presiding Officers. For 
example, while the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate received a salary 
£750 less than that of the President of the Senate, he received a 
comparable special allowance but no travelling allowance. 56 
53 Senator McKenna: C.P.D. Senate (O.S.), Vol.216, at p.786; 5.3.1952. 
54 Senator O'Sullivan: C.P.D. Senate (O.S.), Vol.216, at p.792; 5.3.1952. 
55 Parliamentary Allowances Act, 1956. See section 7A of the principal Act. 
56 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Salaries and Allowances of 
Members of the Commonwealth Parliament, Canberra, 1959, at p.3lf. 
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The Committee's recommendation relating to the Leader of 
the Opposition was as follows: 
92. An effective Opposition is essential for the proper 
functioning of a democracy. Its Leader has possibly the 
most difficult job in the Parliament. A Minister must, 
of course, be thoroughly conversant with the details of 
Bills or other matters which affect his own department, 
but the advice and resources of the departmental staff are 
constantly at his call. The Leader of the Opposition has 
to make himself master of all the business which comes before 
the House (not merely that of one or two departments); he 
has to do this at times at short notice and under constant 
pressure; and he gets no help from permanent officials. At 
all times he is the spokesman for those who are critical of 
or opposed to the Government, and he must be unceasingly 
vigilant and active. He and the Prime Minister should be 
the most powerful agents in guiding and forming public 
opinion on issues of policy. 
93. We conclude that his salary, allowances and privileges, 
should be at least equal to those of a Senior Minister.57 
The legislation implementing the Committee's recommendations 
passed without a great deal of comment about the details. The Prime 
Minister took the opportunity to remind the House once again of the 
difficulties he had experienced as Leader of the Opposition. 
The alignment of the Leader of the Opposition in the House 
with Senior Ministers persisted until March 1973 when the Whitlam Labor 
Government introduced new legislation relating to ministerial and 
parliamentary allowances. 58 The position under the Liberal Government 
was summarised in the report on 'Salaries and Allowances of Members of the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth' submitted to the McMahon Government in 
December 1971 by Mr Justice Kerr in the following manner: 
57 
58 
191. The salary for the office of Leader of the Opposition 
and the special allowance payable for expenses of office have 
for some time been at the same levels as those payable to 
Senior Ministers. I think that basically this relationship 
should be preserved. The Leader of the Opposition has his own 
particular responsibilities of office and these are onerous. 
Expenditure from his special allowance will probably be of a 
different nature from that of Senior Ministers; he would not 
have the same need, for instance, to establish a home in 
Ibid., at p.31. 
Remuneration and Allowances Act, 1973. 
Canberra and to be in Canberra for lengthy periods when 
the Parliament is not sitting because of some departmental 
or administrative requirements. However, after adjustments 
for these differences are made, the amount of special 
allowance payable to the Leader of the Opposition seems to 
be appropriately set at the same figure as for Senior 
Ministers. The allowance should be payable on the same 
conditions as apply to Senior Ministers. Travelling 
allowance at the rate applicable for Senior Ministers would 
also be payable.59 
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The Kerr Report maintained an alignment between the Opposition 
Leader in the Senate and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House. 
Those of its recommendations which required legislation were not, for 
reasons which need not be expounded here, acted upon. 
In March 1973 the recently elected Whitlam Government enacted 
legislation to amend the salaries and allowances payable to members of 
Parliament and Ministers of the Crown. The new legislation reflected a 
certain equalitarian strain in the new Government's outlook in respect of 
salaries for the Ministry complementary to its decision to discontinue 
the two-tier structure of the Liberal-Country Party Government which had 
distinguished between Senior Ministers (the first 12 in seniority, who 
constituted the Cabinet) and junior Ministers. 
The structure of Opposition hierarchy remained unchanged. 
The Leader of the Opposition retained parity with Ministers in terms of 
salary and the allowances. His Deputy in the House likewise maintained 
parity with the Opposition Leader in the Senate. 
Three developments may, however be noted. First, the 
Presiding Officers who had previously been aligned with the now-abolished 
Junior Ministers retained parity with the Executive branch and were 
awarded salary comparable with the Leader of the Opposition. The special 
allowance payable to a Presiding Officer remained lower than that of the 
Leader of the Opposition, reflecting recommendations of the Kerr Inquiry. 
It would probably be erroneous to regard these alterations in relativities 
as an attempt to enhance the value and importance accorded the institution 
59 Salaries and Allowances of Members of the Parliament of the Commonwealth -
Report of Inquiry by Mr Justice Kerr, Canberra, 1971, at p.44. 
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of Parliament. It is rather a function of the arithmetic required by 
Labor's desire to apply the equalitarian principle. 
The second point to note is that although there was now in 
Opposition a significant second party the Government chose not to apply 
the principle of the Chifley Government in awarding its leader a salary 
superior to that of the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. In fact 
the Leader of the third party was awarded an additional salary of half the 
amount of the additional salary allowance paid to the Leader of the 
Opposition in the Senate. This was despite intimations received earlier 
from the Prime Minister which promised to align the Leader of the Third 
Party with the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House. 60 As noted 
above the relativities implicit in this salary structure were first 
proposed in the Nicholas Report of 1952 and accepted by the then Government, 
a Liberal-Country Party coalition. The decision is curious for another 
reason. The Whip of the third party in the House receives an additional 
allowance of $2000, comparable with that of all Whips except the 
Government Whip. He is also the only member of the second Opposition 
party in the House, apart from the Leader, to receive an additional salary. 
The third matter arises from the last. The 1973 salary 
and allowances, picking up the Kenrrecommendations, further acknowledged 
the role and work involved in party organisation in the Parliament. In 
addition to salaries already payable to the Whips of the principal parties 
in the House and the Senate, and the Whip of a substantial second Opposition 
party in the House, an extra salary of $500 is now also payable to the 
assistant Government and Opposition Whips in both Houses. 
A final aspect of the financial remuneration of the office 
of the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives is his 
entitlement to a benefit on retirement from the parliamentary service. 
60 See C.P.D. H. of R., 28.3.1973, at p.825. 
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A contributory retirement benefit scheme was introduced 
by the Chifley Government in 1948 and applied to all members and senators 
subject to a number of qualifications relating to age and to length of 
service regardless of offices held during service. As a result of a 
recommendation of the Nicholas Committee61 62 the Act was amended in 1952 
to provide an additional benefit for a person who had held the office of 
Prime Minister for a continuous period of two years or for periods 
amounting in the aggregate to not less than three years. 
The position of office-holders was further examined by 
the 1959 Richardson Committee which held the 1952 amendment to the 
legislation to be 'inadequate' and went on to recommend an increased 
benefit. It then stated: 
61 
62 
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120. The considerations relating to the Prime Minister 
mentioned [above] apply, though to a considerably smaller 
degree, to Ministers and Opposition Leaders and Deputy 
Leaders. When, after many years in Parliament, including 
a number of years of highly responsible, arduous and 
health-destroying service as Ministers or of equally 
exacting and scarcely less responsible service as 
Opposition Leaders, such men retire from politics, it 
will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to obtain 
other employment at all in keeping with their needs •••• 
121. We think it would be a reproach to the people of 
Australia if proper provision were not made so that 
ex-Ministers and Opposition Leaders who have served 
as such for at least six years will be able to keep 
themselves in modest dignity and meet the obligations 
which they will necessarily have; or if adequate 
provision were not made for their widows. 
122. Accordingly we propose the prov~s~on of non-
contributory retiring allowances for ex-Ministers, who 
have served, whether as Ministers or Leader or Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives 
or Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, for an 
aggregate period, in the case of service as Minister or 
Leader of the Opposition, of six years, and a longer 
period in the case of the Leader and Deputy Leader of 
the Opposition in the Senate and the Deputy Leader of 
the Opposition in the House of Representatives; also 
for pensions to the widows of such persons.63 
Report ofthe Committee of Enquiry into the Salaries and Allowances of 
Members of the National Parliament, Canberra, 1952, at p.l8. 
Parliamentary Retiring Allowances Act,l952, s.8. 
section 19A of the principal Act.) 
(This section became 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Salaries and Allowances of 
Members of the Commonwealth Parliament, Canberra, 1959, at p.45f. 
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The Menzies Government did not act on these recommendations 
until 1964. In the 1964 legislation64 the Leader of the Opposition in the 
House was equated for all purposes with a Minister. Other members of the 
Opposition hierarchy were subject to certain limitations, namely that in 
qualifying for a pension only a part of their service was to count. The 
effect was, for example, that only one quarter of time spent as Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate counted as service towards the basic 
qualifying period of eight years. To qualify he might have to serve for 
thirty-two years. In the case of the Senate leader and the House deputy 
one-half of time spent counted as service and to qualify they would need to 
serve for sixteen years. The holders of these three offices contributed 
at a lower rate than Ministers and the Leader of the Opposition. Senator 
McKenna commented on the apparent anomaly in the relevant debate in the 
Senate65 and the matter has been raised from time to time subsequently, 66 
b 1 1 . h H f R . 61 d h · · ut on y rare y 1n t e ouse o epresentat1ves, an on t at occas1on 1n 
response to an intimation from the then Treasurer that the matter was under 
. 68 
rev1ew. A remedy to the situation was proposed in a Bill presented in 
1970 by the Treasurer, who said in the Second Reading speech: 
In future these other office-holders [i.e., Leader of the 
Opposition in the Senate and Deputy Leaders of the Opposition 
in the House and Senate], while continuing to contribute at 
a reduced rate will qualify for pension from the Ministerial 
Fund after eight years' service.69 
Pensions would, under the proposed legislation, be paid at a reduced rate. 
The Bill was not debated and was withdrawn from the Notice Paper on 6 April 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Parliamentary Allowances Act, 1964, s.3. 
Senator McKenna: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol. 27, at p.l406; 29.10.1964. 
Senator McKenna: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol.28, at p.ll21; 24.5.1965; 
Senator Murphy: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol. 39, at p.2297; 21/22.11.1968. 
e.g., Whitlam, E.G.: 
21.11.1968. 
C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.61, at p.3109; 
McMahon, W.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.61, at p.3108; 21.11.1968. 
Bury, L.H.E.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.68, at p.2960; 4.6.1970. 
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1971. The Leader of the House said: (A) new Bill has been drafted. 
I expect it to be introduced into the House by the Treasurer tomorrow•. 70 
The proposed legislation was still pending when the McMahon Government 
relinquished office. 
While the retiring allowances legislation in some senses 
gives unexpected recognition to the existence and significance of political 
parties, it is in respect of party office-holders within the Parliament 
in a rudimentary state. Not only are the provisions for Opposition leaders 
other than the Leader of the Opposition in the House peculiar and largely 
impractical but no recognition is accorded to the leaders of second 
Opposition parties. 
One conspicuous failing in the history of this legislation 
does highlight a theme of this essay: the relative significance of salaries 
paid for parliamentary duties in comparison to those paid for duties in the 
Executive branch or aligned with salaries paid in the Executive branch. The 
ministerial pension fund was created in 1964 and Ministers and Opposition 
leaders were entitled to benefits. The Presiding Officers were not included. 
The anomaly is immediately apparent. For salary purposes the Presiding 
Officers were aligned with junior Ministers. On the other hand they do 
occupy a parliamentary office, as do, for legal purposes, the Opposition 
leaders. The legislation dramatically distinguished the difference between 
Government and Opposition by the extent of the benefit. The relative 
significance of the Executive and the Parliament was highlighted in .a 
different manner - the inclusion of those aligned with the first and the 
total exclusion of those connected exclusively with the Parliament. 
The deficiency was noticed in the Senate but, interestingly, 
not the House. Senator Cormack, later President of the Senate, said of the 
proposed legislation: 
70 
71 
••• [N]o provision is made for the Presiding Officers. I 
suggest that they have a higher constitutional responsibility 
to fulfil than has any Minister or the Leaders of the 
Opposition.71 
Swartz, R.C.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vo1.72, at p.l482; 6.4.1971. 
Senator Cormack: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vo1.27, at p.1424; 29.10.1964. 
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Senator Paltridge, handling the Bill for the Government, replied: 
The officers who were included in the scheme were those 
covered by the recommendations of the Richardson 
Committee •••• 72 
Senator Cormack protested further that: 
72 
73 
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••• [T]he Presiding Officers of the Parliament rank in the 
hierarchy of government at least equal to the junior 
Ministers •••• [I]n the table of precedence ••• the Presiding 
Officers rank next to the Prime Minister. Therefore, I 
consider that it is proper at this stage for the 
Parliament to be vigilant to maintain its own importance 
and to preserve the rights and privileges which it seeks 
always to sustain under the Constitution.73, 74 
Senator Paltridge: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol.27, at p.l424; 29.10.1964. 
Senator Cormack: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol.27, at p.l425; 29.10.1964. 
Senator Cormack's observation on this aspect is not without historic 
significance. In the Table of Precedence of 1950 the Ministers of 
State came fifth, before the President of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives who were at the sixth and seventh 
positions respectively (see Table of Precedence as set out in 
Alexander, Joseph A. (ed.): Who's Who in Australia, XIV ed., 
Melbourne, The Herald, 1950, at p.803). 
Mr Speaker Cameron raised the matter on the occasion of his 
re-election as Speaker following the 1951 General Election: 
The only other remark that I wish to make ••. has reference to 
the order of precedence of the presiding officers of the two 
houses of the Parliament of the Commonwealth •••• It has arisen, 
on this occasion, out of the visit which I was fortunate enough 
to be able to make to London last year in connexion with the 
opening of the new British House of Commons. With the new 
status accorded to the Dominions as a result of the passage of 
the Statute of Westminster, it seems to me completely wrong 
that the presiding officers of the two houses of the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth should rank lower than the junior Ministers 
of the Executive .••. I put it to the House that no man can become 
a member of the Executive unless he has first become a member 
of either of the two houses of the Parliament. In my view the 
person elected to preside over either of the two houses, 
however unworthy he may be ••• is in a position that warrants a 
higher status than that accorded to him in the present order of 
precedence. 
(Cameron, A.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.213, at p.26f; 12.6.1951.) 
The Table of Precedence was revised. As set out in 1955 (Alexander, 
Joseph A. (ed.): Who's Who in Australia, XV ed., Melbourne, The Herald, 
1955, at p.859) the Ministers of State dropped below not only the 
Presiding Officers but also the Chief Justice and Foreign Ambassadors 
and High Commissioners. The 1955 Table also included the Leader of 
the Opposition, an office it had not previously recognised. He ranked 
after the Ministers, Charges d'Affairs and Acting High Commissioners 
and, unless he was a member of the Privy Council, after the Privy 
Councillors. 
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Senator Wright supported Cormack: 
••• [T]he Presiding Officers are the special representatives 
of the Parliament, whereas Ministers are representatives 
of the Executive and of the Queen, owing responsibility to the 
Parliament as members of it •••• I believe that the scheme 
favours Ministers to too great an extent.75 
Cormack concluded: 
I can only assume that, in relation to the Bill we are now 
discussing, there has been a manifest oversight in the 
drafting and in the examination by Cabinet of the very 
special position that these officers occupy in the 
Parliament.76 
The matter was remedied in 196877 but the original omission is probably an 
accurate reflection of the real position of Parliament in relation to the 
Executive, in the minds of the members of the Richardson Committee, the 
Cabinet and most members and senators. 78 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Senator Wright: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol.27, at p.l426; 29.10.1964. 
Senator Cormack: C.P.D. Senate (N.S.), Vol.27, at p.l427; 29.10.1964. 
Parliamentary Retiring Allowances Act, 1968, s.3. 
amended s.22A of the principal Act.) 
(This section 
It may be noted that a similar salary distinction is drawn between the 
Permanent Heads of the ministerial departments and Permanent Heads of 
the parliamentary departments, in particular the Clerks of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives. The Clerks, whose salaries are fixed 
by Parliament, receive salaries aligned with the highest salary level 
(level 6) of the Second Division of the Australian Public Service. 
Further, although the Clerks are regarded as Permanent Heads, they do 
not receive the tax free allowance. In 1973, the tax free allowance 
paid to Permanent Heads of Ministerial departments was $1750. Some 
statutory officers such as the National Librarian and the Chairman 
of the Australian Broadcasting Control Board are also aligned for 
salary purposes with levels of the Second Division. They do not receive 
a tax free allowance. This occasioned some comment before a Senate 
Estimates Committee in 1971. Senator Douglas McClelland queried: 
••• whether the payment of an expense allowance to the 
heads of Government departments and not to the Clerk 
constitutes a writing down of the Parliament. 
The Clerk of the Senate observed: 
One should have thought that we would have retained our 
position [that is, parity with the Permanent Heads of 
ministerial departments] because, looking at Parliament 
as the highest authority in the land, any fall in the 
comparable position of our salaries and the salaries 
paid to Permanent Heads could be interpreted as a down-
grading of the institution of Parliament. 
(Odgers, J.R.: 'Senate Estimates Committee A', 7.10.1971, at p.27f.) 
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Thm incident in the history of parliamentary and ministerial 
pensions also prompts further comparison with Westminster practice. Apart 
from the pension scheme available to all members of the House of Commons, the 
only people entitled to special pensions are former occupants of the offices 
of Prime Minister, Speaker of the House of Commons and Lord Chancellor. 
It is appropriate in closing these remarks on financial 
emoluments of the office of Leader of the Opposition to refer again to the 
table attached to this chapter. It will be noted that since 1949 the 
Executive branch, and those aligned with it for salary purposes, have 
re-established a firm superiority over those clearly in the Legislative 
branch. While the Presiding Officers legally receive a salary commensurate 
with Ministers the remunerative advantage of Ministers is maintained by way 
of allowances. 
A Leader of the Opposition it will be noted from the foregoing 
enjoys a considerable financial advantage over his supporters, except for 
his immediate associates, the Deputy Leader in the House and the Leader and 
Deputy Leader in the Senate, and the leaders of any significant third parties. 
The remainder of this chapter will explore other material advantages enjoyed 
by party leaders with particular reference to the Leader of the Opposition in 
the House of Representatives. 
This is, however, a more difficult topic than what has 
preceded it for these other facilities accorded Opposition and party 
leadership are granted at the pleasure of the Government and are not subject 
to parliamentary approval. In the nature of such matters, the historical 
documentation available is at once less authoritative and less voluminous. 79 
It will be noted from the previous section that in 1911, 
Alfred Deakin, as Leader of the Opposition, declined an additional salary 
but did accept the services of a secretary. Deakin was not the first party 
leader outside the Government to secure secretarial assistance. 80 The first 
Labourleader, Mr J.C. Watson, preceded him by several years. 
79 
80 
See correspondence at Appendix~ to this thesis. 
See page ?i'f above. 
Watson's 
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secretary was, however, paid from a fund provided by members of the 
81 Parliamentary Labour Party. 
Provision of secretarial assistance for the leader of a 
parliamentary party of significant numbers may appear from present 
perspective to be axiomatic. It is accordingly important to note that 
when the first Parliament assembled not only was this not so, but even the 
provision of such a service to Ministers of the Crown was regarded as 
questionable. Following newspaper criticism in 1903, a question on the 
matter was directed to the Prime Minister who replied in guarded terms 
that: 
Ministers have no private secretaries. The official secretary 
to the Prime Minister and the official secretary to the 
representative of the Government in the Senate are both officers 
of the Commonwealth, under the Public Service Act, and their 
salaries as such are annually voted by Parliament.82 
Evidence suggests that for over forty years after the 
initial establishment of a position of secretary to the Leader of the 
Opposition, the situation remained unchanged. The advantage, in terms of 
processing work, to the Leader of the Opposition, came briefly under notice 
in 1916 at the time of the Labor split when a question as to whether Tudor, 
not yet Leader of the Opposition, would be accorded the services of a 
secretary, was asked. The basis of the request was that the Leader of the 
other non-government party, Cook, who, as has been described, successfully 
defended his title of Leader of the Opposition, was so provided. The 
83 
matter does not appear to have been resolved. 
The nature of work undertaken by the secretary seems, as may 
be expected, to have been largely stenographic and clerical. Shortly after 
Mr J.G. Latham, successor to Mr S.M. Bruce as Leader of the Nationalist Party, 
81 
82 
83 
I am indebted to Mr Germanus Pause, Research Scholar, Research School of 
SocialSciences, A.N.U., for this information. 
Barton, E.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l3, at p.ll86; 23.6.1903. 
Higgs, W.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.80, at p.9435; 6.12.1916. 
Higgs was Deputy Leader of the Labor Party. 
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became Leader of the Opposition he raised, during debate on the 1929-30 
Estimates for the Parliament, some domestic matters. The exchange between 
him and the Prime Minister, Mr J.H. Scullin, but lately Leader of the 
Opposition, is instructive of both the staff support of the Leader of the 
Opposition and the office conditions in which he operated. Latham said: 
I have found in the short time that I have occupied the 
position of Leader of the Opposition, that insufficient 
accommodation is available to enable certain officers to do 
their work properly •••• [T]he room set apart for my use is 
also used by the secretary to the Leader of the Opposition, 
who operates a typewriter in it. I feel sure that I shall 
have the sympathy of the Prime Minister in asking that 
provision be made for separate accommodation for the 
Secretary of the Leader of the Opposition in a conveniently 
situated room.... It frequently happens that honourable 
members desire to consult the Leader or Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition on important matters4 and they should be able to do so in proper circumstances.8 
Scullin replied: 
I have every sympathy with the Leader of the Opposition on 
this matter. I frequently had to work in the room which 
he now occupies while my secretary was operating a typewriter 
in it.85 
The matter was left for Latham to take up with the Speaker. 
In 1944 the Curtin Government by administrative action 
determined that all members of Parliament should be provided with, at 
86 public expense, a secretary. As a consequence of this decision the 
Leader of the Opposition acquired an additional member of staff, although 
the evidence is not clear as to whether it went from one to two, or two 
87 to three. By the time Dr Evatt was Leader of the Opposition the 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Latham, J.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l22, at p.203; 22.11.1929. 
Scullin, J.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l22, at p.203, 22.11.1929. 
See Odgers, J.R.: Australian Senate Practice, 4th Ed., Canberra, 
A.G.P.S., 1972, at p.96. 
Menzies, R.G.: Afternoon Light, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967, at p.284. 
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establishment seems to have crept up to four or five, including a Press 
88 Secretary. 
By this time the work of the staff of the Leader of the 
Opposition now included, to employ the Northcote-Trevelyan dichotomy of 
bureaucratic work, a component of 'intellectual' work, in addition to the 
'routine' work of earlier days. There is no more conspicuous illustration 
of this than Evatt's employment as private secretary of Dr J.W. Burton, 
formerly Secretary to the Department of External Affairs. 
At Arthur Calwell's succession to the leadership of the 
Opposition in 1960 the position was supported by an establishment of six or 
seven. This included a Private Secretary responsible for the general 
management of the office, a Press Secretary, an Assistant Private Secretary 
and several stenographers. His successors have been allowed small increases 
in staff, the current establishment being a Principal Private Secretary, 
two Private Secretaries, one of whom is responsible for research and advice 
on economic matters and was recruited specifically for these functions, a 
Press Secretary and five stenographers, one of whom acts as electorate 
89 
secretary. 
For the purposes of determining the establishment of the Leader 
of the Opposition alignments are, as in salary matters, made with the 
offices of Ministers. The Leader of the Opposition has been unable to keep 
pace with the Prime Minister in terms of staff. Since the departure of 
Sir Robert Menzies there has been an escalation in numbers in the Prime 
Minister's personal office. It has at least doubled in the past seven 
years. 
88 
89 
See Tennant, Kylie: 
at p.298; and 
EVATT, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970, p/b., 
Calwell, A.A.: Be Just and Fear Not, Melbourne, Lloyd O'Neill, 
1972, at p.l78 and p.l85. 
I am grateful to Race Matthews, M.P., formerly Private Secretary to 
Mr Whitlam when he was Leader of the Opposition and to members of 
Mr Snedden's staff for the information upon which this paragraph is 
based. 
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There has also been a marked change in the classification of 
staff in the office of both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the 
Opposition. Until 1966 the most senior of such staff were classified in the 
middle levels of the Third Division of the Commonwealth Public Service. 
Midway through his brief Prime Ministership Mr Harold Holt acquired a 
Principal Private Secretary, an officer classified at level 3 of the Second 
Division of the Public Service and a former Division Head in the Prime 
Minister's Department. With one exception, subsequent Prime Ministers have 
each had secretaries with a substantive Public Service classification in the 
Second Division. Remuneration in all cases has been within the Second 
Division salary range. This trend in the Prime Minister's private office 
has reflected itself in the office of the Leader of the Opposition where the 
Principal Private Secretary has received a salary in the range of the upper 
classes of the clerical/administrative structure of the Public Service. 90 
These recent developments in respect especially of the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have brought Australian practice 
closer to that of Britain. In Britain, Ministers' private secretaries 
have for many years been civil servants of considerable seniority, normally 
at the level of Principal in the old Administrative Class. The next step in 
their career has been to the rank of Under-Secretary within a Department. 
If it is difficult to document satisfactorily the development 
of staff of Ministers and the Leader of the Opposition, it is even more 
difficult to ascertain the position in respect of the subordinate officers 
of the Opposition, and of the leaders of minor parties. It seems that all 
Deputy Leaders of the Opposition since Arthur Calwell have had a private 
secretary, a Press secretary and a complement of one or two stenographers, 
in addition to their electorate secretary. Senate leaders and the leaders 
of third parties have received similar, if not quite so large, support. 
Whatever is the precise picture, it is clear that again the 
Leader of the Opposition's position vis-a-vis that of members is greatly 
strengthened by the alignment with the Ministry. Members are still 
supported by one electorate secretary, the position having remained unchanged 
since 1944. Appendix 4 contains a recent document on this matter, prepared 
90 See Appendix 6. 
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with the intention of securing a review of the situation. It is not the 
first occasion that representations have been made to the Government on the 
question of staff support for members. Mr Whitlam, as Leader of the 
Opposition, apparently pressed for additional support especially for members 
of his parliamentary executive. 91 
Leaders of the Opposition have, it appears, always been 
provided with a personal office within Parliament House. Yet, as Latham's 
protest cited above shows, they were required at least from time to time to 
share it with their own staff. Latham's request was presumably met, at 
least by the time Dr Evatt became Leader of the Opposition twenty years later. 
Mr Whitlam as Leader of the Opposition had the office, located across the 
corridor from the exits from the Opposition side of the House, redesigned, 
redecorated and extended by incorporating what was formerly a balcony 
overlooking a courtyard. It took the form of an executive suite and in 
style and contemporary furnishings rivalled that of the Prime Minister. 
The Leader of the Opposition is also provided with an office 
in his State capital city base. He also has the use, as required, of rooms 
in Sydney or Melbourne, and presumably both, if he comes from a State other 
than New South Wales or Victoria. 
In a country with the geography of Australia capacity to 
travel is an important political resource. Members were for many years 
entitled to travel anywhere by rail. This has recently been adjusted to 
take account of airline development. Nevertheless, costs of travel were 
for long a problem for Leaders of the Opposition. When the proposal to 
review parliamentary salaries was raised in 1920 the then Leader, Tudor, 
observed that travelling was one of, if not the principal, cost of office. 92 
91 
92 
Whitlam, E.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.73, at p.445; 20.8.1971. 
See above, at p.46. 
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Sir Robert Menzies, Leader of the Opposition from 1943 until 1949, 
reported in Afternoon Light that he had to do a considerable amount of 
travelling and 'except on rare official occasions, provided my own 
transport' • 93 
The Leader of the Opposition, since the time when Dr Evatt 
held the office and as a result of the three inquiries referred to above, 
now enjoys free air travel for himself, his wife and staff throughout 
Australia and to Papua New Guinea. Commonwealth motor cars are available 
upon request. The Leader of the Opposition may also use the facilities of 
the V.I.P. fleet of aircraft if there is no other means to enable him to 
keep an engagement. 
Until Mr Menzies vacated the office of Leader of the 
Opposition any travel abroad was at personal expense. The situation under 
Chifley and Evatt is not clear. Arthur Calwell travelled abroad at 
government expense in 1963. He was accompanied by his wife and daughter 
who travelled at his expense. 
Mr Holt changed this. As Mr Whitlam described it in his 
obituary speech: 
As Prime Minister he established thesystem by which my 
Deputy and I may travel abroad at regular intervals at 
public expense.94 
But Mr Whitlam under-stated Holt's generosity. The Leader of the Opposition 
95 
may also be accompanied by his wife and one member of his private staff. 
These additional privileges available to the Leader of the 
Opposition and reflected to a lesser degree in those open to other office-
holders and members may, of course, be justified in terms of keeping the 
people involved informed and allowing them to perform their (self-defined) 
duties properly in a country where distance is a fact of life, both internally 
and in its location in the world. 
93 Menzies, R.G. : Afternoon Light, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967, at p.283. 
94 Whitlam, E.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol. 58, at p.l4; 12.3.1968. 
95 See Appendix 3. 
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Haylen's complaint96 - that it smacks of 'collaboration' 
and looked like, in Whitlam's case, 'going soft' on the Liberal Government 
is, as he recognises 1hardly compatible with contemporary attitudes. 
Inasmuch as the privileges of the Leader of the Opposition are derived from 
those of Ministers there is a system and the privileges to that extent do 
not amount to instances of executive patronage, some of the implications of 
which are considered in the following chapter. 
Nonetheless, all these benefits, apart from those contained 
in the statutes, are at the grant of the executive government. And, in 
certain cases they have been used as such, and may be yet again. The field 
for exploitation in this way lies not so much in the House but in the Senate 
where the system of voting gives greater possibilities of election to minor 
parties. The possibilities were not lost on the Menzies Government at the 
97 time of the formation of the Democratic Labour Party. 
96 
97 
Haylen, Leslie C.: 
1969, at p.l30. 
Twenty Years' Hard Labour, Melbourne, Macmillan, 
See Peters, J. et al.: 
17.4.1956. 
C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.lO at p.l355ff; 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
SELECTED SALARIES: 1901-1973 
1901 1949 1968 1973 
£ £ -$- -$-
Prime Minister 2,500 3,400 30,750 41,000 
Ministers 2,050 2,850 20,000* 25,000 
Presiding Officers 1,500 3,100 17,000 25,000 
Chairman of Committee 900 2,400 12,625 18,500 
Leader of the Opposition (House) 400 2,100 20,000 25,000 
Leader of the Opposition (Senate) 400 1,800 14,500 22,000 
Leader of Third Party (House) 400 1,900 12,000 19,500 
Private members and senators 400 1,500 9,500 14,500 
(Note: All salaries include that payable to members and senators.) 
* Special rates for Deputy Prime Minister ($22,000), Treasurer ($20,750), 
Ministers not in Cabinet ($17,000). 
IV 
THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
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This essay has thus far been preoccupied with matters of 
title, style, salary and emoluments. These are significant elements in 
the fabric of the office of Leader of the Opposition. Yet they are perhaps 
only the visible forms of an institution whose significance lies elsewhere. 
Leadership of the Opposition is, as noted in the opening chapter, fundamentally 
a political role. And it is certain aspects of this political role that will 
be examined in this chapter. 
Reference has already been made to some of these matters. It 
will have been noted, for example, that a justification for payment of salary 
to the Leader of the Opposition was his role in the functioning of the House 
f R . 1 o epresentat1ves. 
Curiously, by thetime the role of the Leader of the Opposition 
in the detailed organisation of the House of Representatives was fully and 
publicly recognised the occupant of the office was seeking to delegate the 
function to his Deputy. The Leader of the Opposition for long played an 
important role in organising the business of the House, paralleling the work 
of the Prime Minister as Leader of the House. The historical origins of 
this function are obscure and, it may be assumed, comparatively simple in 
nature. Absence of business on a scale familiar in recent years combined 
with the longevity of parliamentary sittings made the now characteristic 
tight schedule unnecessary. There are even instances of sittings of the House 
d h fl b h P . M" . 2 being arrange on t e oor y t e r1me 1n1ster. 
John Curtin appears to have been the first Prime Minister 
to have relinquished the day to day responsibilities involved in the work 
of Leader of the House. These were delegated to the Treasurer, J.B. Chifley. 
1 See above, at p.48f. 
2 See, for example, C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.33; 10.5.1901. 
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Professor L.F. Crisp has written: 
It was in the work of Parliament, however, that Chifley most 
obviously helped Curtin. As the Prime Minister's 'G.O.C. 
House Strategy' - the phrase was Curtin's -he proved himself 
a masterly controller of business ••.• Chifley meticulously 
worked out a general schedule at the beginning of the session •••• 
Chifley organised a broad programme and timetable for himself. 
He kept a close personal watch on the progress of the 
preparation of Bills. Each morning at 9.15 when the House was 
sitting he would map out with Green (the Clerk of the House) 
the timing of the day's programme and technical details. 
Then he would let particular Ministers immediately concerned 
know what was expected of them, arranging for special support 
where necessary, ensuring that they kept him closely in touch 
with subsequent developments ••.. His private secretaries ••• 
were under instructions to give the Leader of the Opposition 
immediate access to Chifley both because his position merited 3 the courtesy and the proper working of Parliament required it. 
Chifley appears to have retained this role upon his assumption 
of the Prime Ministership in 1945. His successor Menzies finally dropped 
it. During the long term of office enjoyed by Menzies Governments after 1949 
the functions and title of Leader of the House devolved to the Deputy Leader 
of the Liberal Party - first, Sir Eric Harrison and then to Harold Holt. 
In subsequent governments the task has been performed by other Ministers, 
some of them comparatively junior in status and ministerial experience. 4 
A similar delegation has occurred on the Opposition benches. 
Dr Evatt, as Leader of the Opposition, seems to have eschewed the task and 
left it to his Deputy, Mr A.A. Calwell. In his turn Mr Calwell left the 
detail to his Deputy, Mr Whitlam, who similarly passedittnMrL.H. Barnard 
on their respective elections to the leadership and deputy leadership of the 
Opposition in 1967. The task is now performed by Mr P. Lynch, Deputy Leader 
of the Opposition. 5 
3 
4 
5 
Crisp,L.F.: Ben ChifZey, London, Longmans, 1960, at p.216. 
I am grateful to the late A.A. Calwell, formerly Leader of the Opposition, 
for this information. 
The matters covered in this paragraph probably underlie the amendment to 
House of Representatives Standing Order No.23 proposed by the then Leader 
of the House, Sir Eric Harrison, on 12.8.1954. The purpose of the 
amendment was to give membership of the House Standing Orders Committee 
to the Leader of the House and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, 
ex officio. 
Harrison, Sir Eric: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.4, at p.216; 12.8.1954. 
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The progressive delegation of matters relating to business 
in the House reflects a decline in the importance which the respective front 
benches attach to the institution of Parliament, justifiable as the move may 
be in terms of the work involved. The manner in which Opposition arrangements 
reflected those made within the Government is of interest in itself and also 
another instance of a situation already noted in which the duties and 
functions of the Leader of the Opposition derive from and parallel those of 
the Executive, particularly the Prime Minister. 
One fascinating area of organisation of the business of the 
House over which party leaders have ostensibly maintained control is in 
relation to personnel of committees. The traditional method by which such 
committees are constituted is set down in the statutes under which the Joint 
Committees on Public Accounts and Public Works are constituted. These 
provide, in the case of the Joint Committee on Public Accounts that: 
Three members of the Committee shall be members of, and 
shall be appointed by, the Senate, and seven members 
of the Committee shall be members of, and shall be 
appointed by, the House of Representatives.6 
The formal practices in appointing members of the statutory 
committees appears to have been followed in appointment of personnel of 
committees constituted by resolution of the particular House. 7 
Moves to change this mode of appointment were initially made 
by Dr Evatt when the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs was originally 
constituted. The proposed resolution stated: 
2. That twelve members of the House of Representatives 
be appointed to serve on such committee. 
The Leader of the Opposition in the House, Dr Evatt, announced: 
6 
7 
I intend to move that the paragraph be amended by the 
addition of the following words: 'six to be Government 
supporters and six Opposition supporters'. 
Public Accounts Committee Act, 1951, s.S(2.). 
See also Commonwealth Public Works Committee Act, 1913, s.3(2.). 
See, for example, the appointment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Apple and Pears; C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vo1.166, at p.654; 3.4.1941. 
What is the objection to that proposal? 
After all, this is supposed to be a joint committee ••.• 
The Labour party represents at present a little more 
than half of the electorate and should be represented 
on the committee accordingly •••• It is of no value for 
the Government to insist on having a majority on a 
non-party committee. I presume that the committee is 
intended to represent the views of persons other than 
Government supporters. Therefore we suggest that 
equality of representation should be established.8 
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Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, rejected the amendment: 
That would be grossly unfair to the two political parties 
that compose the Government •••• There are fifteen or 
twenty countries of consequence in the world that have 
committees on international affairs, yet not one of them 
does other than compose its committee on the basis of the 
relative strengths of the political parties.9 
Opposition representation on similar committees has 
subsequently been guaranteed by the insertion of a paragraph of the 
following type: 
(2) That the committee consist of two members of the House 
of Representatives appointed by the Prime Minister, two 
members of the House of Representatives appointed by 
the Leader ~f the O~bosition in the House of 
Representat~ves .••• 
The first occasion when this occurred seems to have been when the Joint 
Committee on the development of Canberra and the A.C.T. was initially 
constituted in November of 1956 and passed with little comment. The form 
has been altered recently to take account of the existence of a third party 
h H f R . 11 in t e ouse o epresentat~ves. 
A further recent element in the constitution of these non-
statutory committees which is of relevance to our deliberations is the 
paragraph: 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Evatt, H. V. : C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.}, Vol.214, at p.788; 17.10.1951. 
Casey, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.214, at p.906; 18.10.1951. 
Resolution to establish a Joint Committee on development of Canberra 
and the A.C.T. Moved by Fairhall, A.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.l3, 
at p.2135; 8.11.1956. 
See, for example, resolution establishing the Joint Committee on the 
A.C.T.: C.P.D. H. of R., (N.S.), Vol. , 27.3.1973; at p.687. 
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That the chairman be appointed by the Prime Minister. 12 
These developments each predicate an increasing recognition 
of the political party as a major component of the parliamentary institution. 
They reflect, also, a tendency of the House as a whole to delegate part of its 
powers to the leaders of substantial political parties. It matters not that 
the leaders do not apparently exercise their rights of nomination but leave 
it for their respective parties to fill vacancies by election by the 
parliamentary caucus. This practice is yet a further example of the pragmatic 
attitude which appears to be so characteristic of the Australian approach to 
the constitution of the State and of its central institutions, a matter to 
13 
which extended reference has been made elsewhere. 
The Leader of the Opposition enjoys special prerogatives in 
the conduct of business in the House. Some of these exist by force of 
convention. Others are now embodied in the Standing Orders. These 
prerogatives have evolved over time and stem from his role as the pre-eminent 
party leader in the House outside the Government. Although the role of 
Opposition leader was, in general terms, fairly clearly defined in Australian 
parliamentary practice before Federation it was nevertheless necessary for it 
to be clarified within the new national Parliament. 
An early instance of this process concerned the special role 
of the leader of the Opposition in respect to motions of want of confidence in 
the Government. During debate on the initial Address in Reply an amendment 
was moved by a prominent member of the Free Trade Party, Mr Joseph Cook. The 
amendment referred to the Government's attitude to 'what has been termed a 
white Australia' and recording that the 'proposals of the speech .•. are 
inadequate and not in accord with the views of the majority of the Australian 
14 people'. Watson, the Labourleader1 quickly noted the significance of the 
amendment which, if carried, he said: 
12 Resolution establishing Select Committee on Aircraft Noise: 
C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.66, at p.29; 4.3.1970. 
13 See above, at p.49f. 
14 Cook, J.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.l80; 22.5.1901. 
••• must mean the displacement of the Government on the 
question of Kanaka labour; and under the circumstances, 
we have a right to look at what is to follow the carrying 
of such an amendment.l5 
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However, Watson had in fact stated the ultimate but not the 
actual significance of the amendment. Reid had stated earlier in the same 
debate that he did not intend to test the feeling of the House toward the 
Government -
•.• until some great emergency calls for it, or until I 
have a rational prospect of being successful.l6 
When Cook moved his amendment, Reid assured the House that he was not aware 
of it. Cook was asked if the amendment was supported by his leader. 
'I should think not', he answered. He elaborated: 
I cannot help what my leader is going to do in this 
matter. I have regard only to the pledges which I 
have made to my constituents.l7 
In the light of this the amendment, as a Government supporter tersely 
interjected, meant 1nothing•. 18 And it was defeated by a substantial 
majority, Reid and most of his party supporting the Government. 
Reid's personal decision not to move or support an amendment 
was important. But the real issue was that his unwillingness to support 
the amendment meant that substantial numbers of his party would not. 
The situation was somewhat different in 1904 when Fisher 
moved an amendment to the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill which, having 
been carried, brought about the resignation of the Deakin Government. 
Fisher, although not leader of the Labar Party, was certainly speaking on 
behalf of the party, and in many ways acting as leader of the Opposition. 
15 Watson, J.C.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.l85; 22.5.1901. 
16 Reid, G.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.96; 21.5.1901. 
17 Cook, J.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.l80; 22.5.1901. 
18 McColl, J.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.l80; 22.5.1901. 
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On that occasion Reid also voted with the Government although many of his 
supporters voted with the Labar Party and thus provided the majority necessary 
to remove the Deakin Government. The consequence of Reid's action on this 
occasion was to undermine his claim to be regarded as the alternative Prime 
Minister. 19 
Underlying all that has been written upon this subject is an 
exaltation of party leadership. Cook acts as an individual and so his 
amendment means nothing. Fisher acts as a party spokesman. His amendment is 
successful and the leader of his party is called upon to form a new Government. 
The office of Leader of the Opposition inevitably gains stature as a 
consequence of these developments for he is normally the most important party 
leader in the House apart from the Prime Minister. 
As has been related,Hughes, as Prime Minister leading the 
National Labour Government, sought ironically to exalt the role of Leader of 
the Opposition further. When Tudor moved his initial want of confidence 
motion in the Hughes Government, Hughes attempted to argue that the right to 
move a want of confidence motion could not be left open to any member. 
h . d h . h h f h 0 . . 20 Hughes, in t e event, surv1ve t e vote w1t t e support o t e ppos1t1on. 
Moving a confidence motion is likely to be more a test of the 
organisation of the Opposition than the Government. The pre-eminence of the 
Leader of the Opposition, and of his control over the non-government members 
of the House will be clearly demonstrated by his capacity to monopolise the 
no confidence motion, either personally or by delegation, and to marshal the 
support of all non-government members against the Government. Assertion and 
exercise of his prerogative in respect of theconfidence motion is at once an 
important elevation and confirmation of his status and position within the 
House and in relation to members not supporting the Government. 
A similar prerogative of party leaders whose history parallels 
that of the want of confidence motion is that of responding to a Ministerial 
Statement. The present convention is that a Minister is granted leave to 
19 See above, at p.22ff. 
20 See above, at p.26ff. 
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make a statement to the House providing the Opposition is furnished with a 
copy of the statment at least two hours in advance. The convention has the 
form of a contract between the Government and the Opposition but it is a 
contract which the Opposition has few means to enforce. 
A Minister is granted leave to make a statement provided no one 
objects. If an objection is made the Minister has three courses open to him. 
He can decline to make the statement. He can make the statement in support of 
a motion that the House take note of the paper. Or, finally, he can use the 
Government's majority to suspend such Standing Orders as would prevent his 
making the statement. 
Although the undertaking to furnish the Leader of the Opposition 
with a copy of an intended statement two hours in advance appears to be more 
honoured in the breach, the Opposition has usually not attempted to prevent 
Ministers from making statements. 21 
As noted above) this convention was well-developed before 1901 
but, as the following account demonstrates, it was nevertheless necessary for 
its use in the Commonwealth Parliament to be confirmed. In the process of 
confirmation there is, as in respect of the moving of a confidence motion, 
an assertion of the role of the party leader and also yet another glimpse at 
the attempted application of Westminster principles to the Commonwealth 
Parliament. 
On 20 November 1901 Kingston, the Minister for Trade and 
Customs, made a statement while the House was in Committee. The Chairman of 
Committees reported that Sir William McMillan, 
21 
22 
••• the acting leader of the Opposition, desires to say 
a few words in reply, and I shall ask the concurrence of 
the committee to permit of his doing so.22 
I am grateful to the late A.A. Calwell and to Race Matthews, M.P., 
Private Secretary to Mr Whitlam, as Leader of the Opposition, for 
the information upon which the paragraphs on contemporary practice 
are based. 
Chanter, J .M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.6, at p.7513; 20.11.1901. 
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The member for the Queensland seat of Kennedy, McDonald, did not, however, 
concur: 
If the honourable member for Wentworth (McMillan) is to 
be allowed to reply, any honourable member ought to have 
the same privilege •••. I hope the House will not permit 
one honourable member to have a privilege which is not to 
be extended to other honourable members.23 
The Chair defended its request: 
It has been customary, according to the practice of the 
House of Commons, after a Minister has made a statement, 
to extend the courtesy of the House to the leader of the24 Opposition to enable him to make a few remarks in reply. 
The Prime Minister, Barton, intervened in the dispute with an 
eloquent contribution in which he highlighted the role of the leader of the 
Opposition as representative and spokesman of his party, a significant role 
in a system of government which relied upon political parties: 
The course of allowing the leader of the Opposition to make 
ordinary comment on a statement made by Ministerial authority 
is to permit the views of a party as a whole to be expressed, 
and as long as our system of government is by party, there 
ought to be some latitude allowed to leaders in this respect. 
It would be too rigid an adherence to old-time precedents to 
say that whilst a representative of the Ministry is to be 
allowed to make a statement, no other party representative, 
equally interested in the carrying on of the business of the 
country, should be allowed the privilege of reply.25 
Two members alluded to parliamentary practice as they understood 
it. McLean, member for the Victorian seat of Gippsland, said he could: 
••• not remember any occasion on which the courtesy now 
sought was refused to the leader of the Opposition.26 
Conroy, member for the New South Wales seat of Werriwa, placed the dispute in 
the context of the Government-Opposition dialectic which underlies the operation 
of Parliament: 
23 McDonald, c. : C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.7513f; 20.11.1901. 
24 Chanter, J .M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.7514; 20.11.1901. 
25 Barton, E. : C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vo1.6, at p.7514; 20.11.1901. 
26 McLean, A.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.7514; 20 .11.1901. 
I distinctly object to any Minister having the right 
to make a statement which cannot be replied to •••• 27 
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McDonald reluctantly withdrew his objection, registering 
his view that an acting leader of the Opposition should have 'no more 
rights than ••• other honourable members' and declaring that: 
••• we are establishing a practice that the leader of the 
Opposition, or whoever is acting for him, shall be in a 
position to reply to any Ministerial statement which may 
be made •••. 28 
McMillan concluded the incident by confirming the privileges 
of Ministers in respect of making statements to the House and underlining the 
corresponding privilege of the leader of the Opposition to reply to such 
statements: 
••• I also take it that there is a right on the part of the 
Minister to make a statement at any time. That is a privilege 
which ought not to be gainsaid. I quite agree that if any 
privilege, such as that of a reply by the leader or acting 
leader of the Opposition is in any way abused, the committee 
would have a perfect right to do away with the practice.29 
The dispute was not, however, ended. A few days later the 
Chair again found it necessary to defend the right of the Prime Minister and 
the leader of the Opposition to speak with greater latitude than members 
generally: 
In accordance with parliamentary practice, a certain 
privilege is at all times given, with the concurrence 
of the whole committee, to the Prime Minister and the 
leader of the Opposition.30 
The conflict between the general rules applied to members 
and the greater latitude permitted to Ministers and the leader of the 
Opposition was further aired on 3 December 1901. The ruling given on this 
occasion, in relation to a statement made by the Treasurer, was: 
27 Conroy, A. H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.7515; 20.11.1901. 
28 McDonald, c.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.7515; 20.11.1901. 
29 McMillan, w. : C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.7515; 20.11.1901. 
30 Chanter, J .M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vo1.6, at p.7844; 27.11.1901. 
There is no doubt as to our standing orders, which state 
that no honourable member shall digress from the subject 
before the Chair; but I take it that it would be most 
inconvenient if the committee were to request the Chairman 
to give a strict ruling on that point, so far as Ministers 
in charge of business are concerned. I have endeavoured 
in the past, with the concurrence of the committee, to allow 
the Minister in charge of the business to make a general 
statement, and I have also extended that latitude to the 
acting leader of the Opposition, to enable him to reply to 
statements by Ministers. • •• [I]t has been practice to allow 
a certain amount of latitude to the Minister in charge of 
business and the leader of the Opposition.31 
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It was at this point that the matter took a new, final turn. 
What would happen, the Chairman of Committees was asked, if the leader of a 
third party sought to make a statement also? The Chair took shelter behind 
Westminster precedent: 
I am bound by the practice of the House of Commons, which 
recognises only two parties, namely, the Government and 
the Opposition, and any general statement should be confined 
to the leaders of these parties.32 
Not unexpectedly the Labour Party took umbrage. Watson 
asserted: 'We will see that we are recognised•. 33 The Chairman replied: 
.•• I have not declined to recognise the labour party. I 
have always given to the leader of that party, whenever I 
could do so, the earliest opportunity of taking part in all 
debates; and beyond that I cannot go •••• If I departed 
from the usual parliamentary practice, I should have to 
deal with half-a-dozen different parties.34 
Fisher, the future Prime Minister, brought the debate back to 
the reality of the situation. He said: 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
I do not think, sir, that your ruling is well-founded, and 
I deny that it is practicable in a Parliament of this kind. 
When in Australia a member of the labour party has been 
called by the constitutional representative of the Crown 
to form a labour Government, it is rather too late in the 
day to give a decision of that kind.35 
Chanter, J .M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.8122; 
Chanter, J .M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.6, at p.8123; 
3.12.1901. 
3.12.1901. 
Watson, J. c.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.8123; 3.12.1901. 
Chanter, J .M.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. 6, at p.8123; 3.12 .1901. 
Fisher, A.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.6, at p.8124; 3.12.1901. 
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Watson himself explained the rationale of granting party 
leaders a latitude in making and replying to statements in terms of expediting 
the business of the House, although the implicit effect of his remarks would 
be to exalt the leaders at the expense of the private members: 
The whole idea underlying the granting of permission with 
concurrence, whether in committee or in the House, to a 
Minister or to the leader of the Opposition - or, for that 
matter, to any other representative person - is that the 
business may be facilitated - that we may ascertain, in a 
broad general statement, from one individual, what otherwise 
we should have to spend hours in ascertaining from individual 
speakers. That idea I do not think is derogated from in the 
slightest degree by the course suggested, whether the 
speaker represents the labour party, the country party, the 
Opposition or any other body of honourable members .••• 
As instancing my feeling in the matter, I may say that the 
other day, when it was suggested that the acting leader of 
the Opposition might be allowed to make a statement, I was 
very strongly in favour of permission being given, because, 
by that means, we were able approximately to ascertain the 
opinions of his party, and what their action would be in 
relation to certain matters. I believe that it will tend to 
the expedition of business if members, whoever they may be, 
who speak on behalf of any section of the House, are allowed 
a similar latitude •..• I certainly object to the leader of 
the Opposition speaking for the section of the House with which 
I am associated •••. 36 
The matter rested inconclusively. An incident in the 
following year, however, demonstrated that the leader of the Opposition 
had secured his point. Mr Speaker declined to allow discussion of a 
statement by the Prime Minister. The House immediately resolved that 
McMillan, as acting leader of the Opposition should 'have leave to discuss 
the matters referred to by the Prime Minister•. 37 
It is appropriate to bring together the issues at stake in 
this early controversy. First, it is clear that the prerogative of the 
leader of the Opposition derived from his alignment with the Government 
front bench. The latitude accorded the leader of the Opposition derived 
directly from similar latitude accorded Ministers. In this assertion of 
the role of leaders there is a common interest advanced by the two front 
benches to the disadvantage of the private members. Second, the intervention 
36 Watson, J .c.: c.p.v. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol. , at p.8124; 3.12.1901. 
37 See C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.9, at p.ll954; 24.4.1902. 
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of the Labour Party again demonstrated that Westminster practice was not 
readily accepted in Australian circumstances unless the practice suited 
the power situation in Australia. Finally, the Labour intervention also 
indicates an early recognition of the role and significance of party 
organisation in the operation of the Parliament. 
The courtesy allowed to the Leader of the Opposition in 
responding to Ministerial Statements has expanded. The present practices 
relating to the speaking rights of the Leader of the Opposition are set 
out in House of Representatives Standing Order No.91. 38 As these rights 
presently exist the alignment between the two front benches of the House 
is again evident. The entitlement of the Leader of the Opposition, or a 
member deputed by him, corresponds with that of the Minister in all cases. 
Similarly, where the Opposition Leader acts as proposer of a motion the 
first spokesman for the Government is entitled to speak for a corresponding 
period of time. In most cases the principal spokesmen for the Government 
and Opposition are allowed substantially more speaking time than that 
allowed to other members. Hence, both the mover of the 'Main Appropriation 
Bill for year' and the Leader of the Opposition, or a member deputed by 
him may speak without limitation of time. Other members are entitled to 
speak for a period not exceeding twenty minutes. In the case of other Bills, 
the principal Government and Opposition spokesmen are restricted to thirty 
minutes. Other speakers again have a limit of twenty minutes. It is 
interesting to note that an Opposition member moving a private Bill is 
allowed to speak for thirty minutes and the Prime Minister, or a member 
deputed by him, is allowed to speak for thirty minutes. The Leader of the 
Opposition may only speak for the normal twenty minutes. A private 
Government member who moves a Bill is also allowed thirty minutes. However, 
both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, or their delegates, 
are allowed to speak on such a Bill for thirty minutes. 
38 House of Representatives Standing Order No.91 is reproduced at 
Appendix 5. 
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The advantage of the two party leaders in this area is 
further augmented by the practice of moving, on certain occasions, that 
'so much of the Standing Orders should be suspended as would prevent the 
[Leader of the Opposition] from speaking without limitation of time•. 39 
The forerunner of the present Standing Order No.91 was 
introduced on 23 April 1931 following a Report of 21 April 1931 by the 
Standing Orders Committee of the House of Representatives. 40 This 
Committee consisted of seven members, including the Speaker, who later 
became a Minister in the Curtin and Chifley Labor Governments, the Prime 
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Treasurer and the Leader of 
the Country Party, a former Deputy Prime Minister. It was, as this 
Committee has so often been, dominated by front bench members of the House. 
The Standing Order, the details of which differed from those 
of current Standing Order No.91 in terms of the amount of time available, 
was adopted with comparatively little debate. Page, the Country Party 
leader, seconded adoption of the report. In doing so he noted that the new 
Standing Order did not take account of the presence of a third party but 
that certain forms of the House would be available for it to present its 
point of view if the time allowed was insufficient: 
.•• the Country party has difficulty in putting its case 
because of the fact that there is no official recognition 
of a third party in this House, and I take it that the 
additional time that will be at the disposal of this 
Parliament as the result of the adoption of the report 
will permit of such an exposition on the part of the 
Leader of the Country party by the general recognition 
of an extension of time being granted if desired.41 
The New South Wales Australian Labor Party objected to certain proposed 
limitations on the speaking time of members in the 42 Address in Reply and 
h Ad . 43 at t e Journment. 
39 See, for example, C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.45, at p.238, 23.3.1965. 
40 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia -House of Representatives: 
First Report from the Standing Committee on Standing Orders, Canberra, 1931. 
41 Page, E.C.G.: C .P .D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l28, at p.l229f: 23.4.1931. 
42 Eldridge, J. c.: c.p.v. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l28, at p.l232; 23.4 .1931. 
43 Ward, E.J.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l28, at p.l233; 23 .4.1931. 
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The pre-eminence of the Leader of the Opposition is no more 
evident than at Question Time in the House through the convention that he, 
on rising, should immediately receive the call. Extensive use of Question 
Time by the Leader of the Opposition is a comparatively recent development, 
Dr H.V. Evatt being the first Leader of the Opposition to do so. His Labor 
successors, in particular Mr E.G. Whitlam, continued this practice, as has 
Mr B.M. Snedden in the time since he became Leader of the Opposition. 
Mr Whitlam, indeed, paid special attention each day the House 
sat to the preparation of suitable questions without notice. He frequently 
asked more than one question. The chief restraint on his use of Question 
Time came, not from a Government source, but from his own back bench. 44 
Towards the end of Mr Whitlam's time as Opposition leader, Mr Allan Fraser, 
a Labor member of long standing,wrote in a Press article: 
The problem of Question Time is exacerbated today because 
the Opposition Leader now has absolute priority and can 
ask 28 questions while his backbencher jumps unavailingly 
for one. 45 
Mr Whitlam's problems with Question Time stemmed in part from 
the practice, equalitarian in concept, inequalitarian in effect, that 
questions should come alternately from the Government back bench and the 
Opposition. As the situation existed under the McMahon Government there 
were effectively 38 questioners on the Government side and 59 on the Opposition. 
The position was so serious that one of Mr Whitlam's supporters moved that 
the matter be considered by the Standing Orders Committee. 46 
Back bench members of the Liberal-Country Party Opposition 
will be at an even greater disadvantage as a joint statement issued by 
respective leaders of the parties prior to the convening of the Parliament 
indicated: 
44 
45 
46 
Keating, P.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.73, at p.511; 23.8.1971. 
Fraser, A.: 'The Dwindling Power of the M.P.', Canberra Times, 
5.4.1972, at p.2. 
Keating, P.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.73, at p.511; 23.8.1971. 
See also House of Representatives Standing Orders Committee, 
Report Together with Recommendations, 20 March Z972, Parliamentary 
Paper No.20, Appendix C, at p.23f. 
It is the intention of Mr Snedden to request the Speaker 
to give priorities in the call to Mr Snedden or Mr Lynch 
(his deputy) whenever there is a Liberal Party call (two 
out of three Opposition calls). 
It is the intention of Mr Anthony to request the Speaker 
to give priority in the call to Mr Anthony or Mr Sinclair 
(his deputy), whenever it is a Country Party call (one 
out of three Opposition calls).47, 48 
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The role of the Opposition front bench at Question Time is 
clearly dominant. This dominance has been reinforced since the Liberal 
Party became the Opposition after the General Election in 1972. 
The Standing Orders Committee 'decided that it would make 
no recommendation to vary the existing procedure' when it considered the 
matter in 1971. 49 Nor, it would seem, could there have been much hope 
that it would. Of its ten members, apart from the Chairman, Mr Speaker, 
five are front bench members of the Parliament. 
The pre-eminent role of the Leader of the Opposition in 
respect of questions without notice is paralleled by similar pre-eminence 
in respect of questions on the Notice Paper. It was in the use of questions 
on notice that Mr llliitlam was able to develop his interrogative skills fully. 
His predecessors were reticent in their use of the Notice Paper and at least 
one, Mr Calwell, publicly deplored its development. On one occasion he 
prefaced a question without notice with the following comment: 
47 
48 
49 
See 'Opposition Parties agree on debating procedures', 
Financial Review, 7.2.1973, at p.S. 
Australian 
Liberal back bench members will be at an even greater disadvantage than 
Labor members were previously for Mr Snedden has already indicated a 
willingness to use his prerogative in this area even more than Mr lfuitlam 
did formerly. lfuereas Mr lfuitlam usually confined himself to two 
questions without notice, Mr Snedden has on a number of occasions asked 
three. 
See C.P.D. H. of R. 17.9.1973, at p.l039,p.l040 and p. 1042. 
On this day, Mr Anthony also asked two questions, at p.l036 and p.l038, 
and Mr Lynch one question, at p.l034. A Labor back bench member also 
obtained the call on 3 occasions: at p.l034, at p.l038 and at p.l044. In 
total,l9 questions were asked, one of which, by Mr Keating, was ruled 
out of order. 
See also C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol. at p.2404, p.2405, and p.2407 
(Questions by Mr Snedden). 
House of Representatives Standing Orders Committee, 
Recommendations, 20 March 1972, Parliamentary Paper 
p.l3. 
Report Together with 
No.20, at paragraph 38, 
Mr Speaker, in view of the fact that quite a number of 
questions on the notice paper could never be answered 
in 7 days or even 7 months without a huge expenditure of 
public money; in view of the fact that many of them seek 
information that can be obtained by a little hard work 
on the part of honourable members; and also in view of 
the fact that over my long career I have never tried to 
disrupt the work of Government departments by asking 
questions at great length •••• 50 
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Ironically, Mr Calwell was seeking to have answered a question which he had 
placed on the Notice Paper early in the preceding year. 
The question on notice is yet another area of activity in 
which the Opposition back bencher's position is secondary to that of the 
Leader of the Opposition. Mr Malcolm Fraser, as Minister for Education and 
Science,gave some indication of policy in the Executive branch to answering 
questions on notice: 
The two people most concerned in asking questions relating 
to education are the Leader of the Opposition (Mr Whitlam) 
and the honourable member for Bendigo (Mr David Kennedy). 
I seek to give some precedence in terms of departmental time 
to questions asked by the Leader of the Opposition. When 
the Leader of the Opposition tells me that the questions 
asked by the honourable member for Bendigo are more important 
I shall give them precedence •••• [One] question asked by the 
honourable member for Bendigo .•• sought nine categories of 
information from 86 schools •••. My Department estimated that 
it would take two people working full time six months to 
answer that question. I say quite flatly that I am not 
prepared to give precedence to answering this question unless 
the Leader of the Opposition says that it is to have precedence 
over every other question on the notice paper so far as the 
Opposition is concerned.51 
If the parliamentary question is an increasingly important 
weapon in the Leader of the Opposition's armoury it is nevertheless one 
which the Government is well equipped to resist. Ministers cannot be 
compelled to answer a question, although few go as far in refusing as a 
former Prime Minister, William McMahon, did in response to a question 
without notice from the Leader of the Opposition relating to lowering of 
the voting age: 
50 Calwell, A.A.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol. 71, at p.891; 16.3.1971. 
51 Fraser, J.M.: C.P.D. H. of R., 17.8.1972, at p.435f. 
First of all, I am not prepared at question time, on 
an occasion like this, to give reasons for Government 
decisions. It is not appropriate. The honourable 
gentleman is continually probing in a nit-picking 
fashion to try to find divergences of views between 
members on this side of the House, but he will not 
be accommodated.52 
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Ministers normally prefer less direct language. Verbosity, 
circumlocution and verbiage are the normal weapons used to deflect the 
offensive question. A Minister may seek protection in the Standing Orders 
governing questions, the full force of which is obscured by the infrequency 
of their use. 
In recent years, Prime Ministers in particular have refused 
to answer certain questions of a general nature on grounds of cost, or on 
grounds that they are reluctant to authorise the time involved. Mr Whitlam 
recently summed up this practice in answer to a question on notice: 
To compile the information would involve time and expense 
that I am reluctant to authorise, as were my predecessors 
in relation to similar questions. [Hansard, 10 March 1971, 
pages 810-11 and 7 September, page 888].53 
Questions on notice may simply be ignored. At the conclusion 
of the session, and on prorogation, all questions are removed from the 
Notice Paper. 
The parliamentary question is highly symbolic of a practice 
of government which is, if not passing, at least increasingly subject to 
review and to amendment. This is the convention that all contact between 
a member of Parliament and the Executive should be through the responsible 
Minister. Mr Malcolm Fraser stated it thus: 
52 
53 
54 
The general rule is that if the inquiry involves some work 
in the sense of looking up files, the inquiry should be put 
in writing to make sure that the Department has got it straight. 
If the inquiry comes from a member of Parliament, courtesy 
requires that the request for information should come through 54 the Minister and that the reply should go through the Minister. 
McMahon, w.: C.P.D. H. of R., 2.3.1972, at p.472. 
Whit lam, E. G. : C.P.D. H. of R., 19.9.1973, at p.l307. 
Fraser, J .M. : C.P.D. H. of R.' 24.8.1972, at p.746. 
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The whole matter gives rise to a vigorous expression of doctrines about 
the responsibilities of the individual Minister. But it also encompasses 
wider issues of greater relevance to the subject of this essay. 
Tbese wider issues relate to the access of the Opposition 
generally and the Leader of the Opposition in particular to information 
which might not otherwise be available. Access to information has been an 
important issue in Australian politics in recent years and has in fact been 
55 the subject of a book. It has special relevance to a study of Opposition 
for debate about the role and function of the institution, a topic not 
directly explored in this essay, often concludes that to be effective it 
should be 'sensible, constructive and informed•. 56 
Reid, in his opening address in 1901, spoke of the role of 
Opposition in terms which have been echoed throughout the history of the 
Parliament: 
Our object should be, when Bills framed on sound principles 
are introduced, to help the Government as far as we can to 
make them as perfect as they can be made .••. Where Bills 
are framed on sound principles, it is the duty of the 
Opposition to help the Government to improve and pass them •••• 
No Opposition should waste time in the way of attacks on a 57 Government when the situation does not call for that action .••• 
Informed, constructive, sensible Opposition is an 
unattainable goal. Whether an Opposition makes a useful contribution to 
government will always be a subject of debate dependent on the values and 
expectations of those concerned. What will be to some 'constructive' will 
be to others 'destructive'. 
Governments have generally been reluctant to facilitate 
means whereby an Opposition can inform itself on the issues of the day. 
Library and research facilities at the disposal of members have been of a 
limited nature, although, as noted in the previous chapter, the Leader of 
58 the Opposition has a number of advantages over members by way of staff. 
55 Spigelman, J.J.: Secrecy, Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1972. 
56 Killen, D.J.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.26, at p.ll5, 10.3.1960. 
57 Reid, G.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l, at p.l05; 21.5.1901. 
58 See above, at P·7lff. 
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The essential problem does not, however, lie in the 
facilities. It rests in the nature of information. Information is not 
a neutral, objective component in the policy-making process. It is an 
active resource which politicians employ to buttress and advance the causes 
which they espouse and to thwart and defeat those of others. From the 
Government point of view it is to its advantage to promote circulation of 
some information and to suppress, by means explicit or implicit, that of 
other information. In the eyes of a Minister there is a conflict. On the 
one hand, he might feel that if others knew what he knew they would agree 
with him; on the other, there is the worry that such information if 
disclosed might be employed for 'party political purposes'. The remainder 
of this section will be devoted to exploring some aspects of this issue. 
A notable case which illustrates many of these aspects occurred 
in the last eventful days of the McMahon Government and concerned, as so many 
cases in this matter do, defence policy. 
In October of 1972 there was some criticism of a visit made 
by the Deputy Leader of the Opposition to the Netherlands in his capacity as 
Labor spokesman in defence matters, in order to examine at first hand the 
proposal of the then Government to purchase warships from the Netherlands, 
at a cost of $A335 million. Mr Barnard's interest was simply that 
' ..•. members of the Opposition and indeed everyone in Australia have every 
59 
reason to be concerned about the possibility of escalation of costs'. 
He outlined the Government's erratic approach to the matter - that is, of 
ensuring that the Opposition was informed: 
59 
60 
The Minister for the Navy [Dr Mackay] is probably the first 
Minister who has been prepared to provide me with some 
information in relation to the DDL programme.... The 
Minister for Defence [Mr Fairbairn] himself has had no 60 discussions with me in relation to any matters of defence ••.• 
Barnard, L.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1972, at p.2511. 
Barnard, L.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1972, at p.2509. 
Of the particular problem under discussion: 
I acknowledge ••• that the Royal Australian Navy will need 
destroyers. The provision of three destroyers has been 
suggested by the Government, but the Minister for Defence 
is well aware that the final order will not be for three 
destroyers. Indeed, the Royal Australian Navy has 
indicated that it will need no fewer than nine destroyers. 
If the Minister wants to know where my information came 
from in relation to this matter, let me assure him that 
I have been in the fortunate position of being able to have 
discussions with senior members of the Royal Australian 
Navy. I acknowledge that I had these discussions with the 
full knowledge of the Minister for the Navy ••.. I regret 
that I cannot fully divulge to this House the nature of 
those discussions because I must acknowledge that they were 
largely confidential •••• 61 
Of the visit to the Netherlands itself: 
I wrote to the Prime Minister and asked him whether, since 
I would be going overseas on a matter of parliamentary 
business in relation to the Opposition, he would agree to 
allow me the normal travelling expenses to which I would 
be entitled in Australia as Deputy Leader of the Opposition. 
The answer that came back from the Prime Minister was: 
'Emphatically no'. Quite frankly, I was pleased because 
it meant in effect that I had no obligation at all to this 
Government.62 
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In his reply the Minister for Defence, Mr David Fairbairn, 
emphasised several factors. The first was that Mr Barnard's presence 
would prejudice the negotiations with the Dutch Government because of 
Mr Barnard's position in the Australian Labor Party and because of the 
proximity of a general election. He said it would have been 'normal 
courtesy' for Mr Barnard to have informed him (the Minister) and the 
Department of Defence of the visit. 'Not only would we have been able 
to assist in the arrangements for the visit but we would also have been 
63 
able to assist with briefing notes'. 
The nub of Mr Fairbairn's objection was: 
••• the Deputy Leader of the Opposition did not even go through 
what I would regard as the very normal process for any senior 
61 Barnard, L.H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1972, at p.2510. 
62 Barnard, L. H.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1972, at p.2511. 
63 Fairbairn, D. : C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1972, at p.2513. 
persons when travelling overseas, and that is that when 
they go along to inspect anything they take with them a 
person from the Australian embassy. The honourable 
member for St George did this during the entire time he 
was in South East Asia. As a result, the embassy had 
records of the discussions. Important parts were sent 
back to Australia. In this case we have no knowledge 
of any sort.64 
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The two sides of the problem are juxtaposed. Mr Barnard 
is relieved that he is not under obligation to the Government. Mr Fairbairn 
is grieved that he has no information of what Mr Barnard did whilst in the 
Netherlands. And he seems to regard it as normal that the Government should 
be fully informed of what Opposition members do whilst they are abroad. 
The incident is a powerful illustration of the advantages to Opposition 
leaders making their own arrangements and of the advantages accruing to a 
Government where it uses its patronage to assist Opposition fact-finding. 
Another important issue arising from the above case is the 
extent to which Mr Barnard's confidential discussions with senior naval 
officers inhibited, knowingly or otherwise, his capacity to criticise and, 
if necessary, oppose the Government on this matter. Before exploring 
Australian experience in this field it is useful to look at some of the 
consideration which has been given in the United Kingdom. 
In 1958 the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Macmillan, approached 
Mr Gaitskell, the Leader of the Opposition, with a proposal that they should 
hold joint talks on defence matters. The suggestion was declined on the 
basis that such an arrangement was incompatible with the Opposition's 
constitutional function of criticism. Possession of confidential information 
could in certain instances place the Opposition Leader in 'an inhibiting and 
embarrassing position in relation to back-bench members of the Opposition 
65 party'. 
The argument to the contrary was advanced by Professor Max 
Beloff and focused upon the Leader of the Opposition's role as alternative 
64 Fairbairn, D.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1972, at p.2514. 
65 This paragraph is based upon: 
Marshall, G. & Moodie, G.C.: Some Problems of the Constitution, 
4th (rev.) ed., London, Hutchinson University Library, 1967, at p.l50f. 
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Prime Minister. Beloff wrote: 
[I)n considering his duties and obligations, a Leader of 
the Opposition has to take into account not only what he 
is today but what he hopes to be tomorrow •... If the 
Leader of the Opposition is to be put in full possession 
of the facts, he will have knowledge which security or 
policy reasons may make it impossible to share with his 
colleagues. It may be an implied condition of such 
knowledge being imparted to him that he does not use it 
in political debate. In other words, his position as the 
next Prime Minister will have got in the way of the 
immediate performance of his own duties to his party. He 
may well feel happier not to be placed in a special 
position and to retain a free hand. But since ••. his own 
words in opposition will also be listened to abroad and 
in countries where the traditions and conventions or 
democratic opposition are not always understood, such 
freedom for the Leader of the Opposition may be detrimental 
to the national interest.... All one can say in conclusion 
here is that the Leader of the Opposition cannot simply be 
regarded as a private member with particularly arduous and 
full-time duties in relation to the actual business of the 
House of Commons, he is also and inevitably in a special 
political position, and his interpretation of his duties 
in this wider sense are a test not so much of his understanding 
of constitutional proprieties as of his patriotism and his 
political good sense.66 
Beloff's argument is similar in some ways to the Fairbairn 
argument on the Barnard visit to the Netherlands which was partly based on 
Barnard's position as a 'very senior person in the Opposition who, with a 
f ld h . i . 1 f 1" ' 67 change o government, cou expect to ave a m~n ster~a porto ~o ••••• 
Both have an implicit faith in the bona fides of the Government of the day 
in defence matters, an assumption which at least needs to be demonstrated. 
Current United Kingdom practice was described in general terms 
by Mr Harold Wilson shortly before the 1970 General Election in which his 
Government was defeated: 
66 
67 
It has always been the case, and no change has been made 
by this administration, that members of Parliament, including 
Opposition leaders, are given normal facilities for briefing 
when going abroad. There have always been special arrange-
ments in force so far as defence briefing is concerned and 
these have continued. Indeed on more than one occasion I 
Beloff, M.: 'The Leader of the Opposition', Parliamentary Affairs, 
XI(2), at p.l6lf. 
Fairbairn, D.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 12.10.1973, at p.2513. 
proposed that right honourable gentlemen opposite should 
be given the fullest possible briefing on defence matters 
including many questions on which we as an Opposition had 
been refused facilities.68 
An important Australian experience in this field of 
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Government/Opposition liaison occurred during World War II. Both the 
Menzies and Fadden Governments maintained very close relations with John 
Curtin, Leader of the Australian Labor Party Opposition, a relationship 
which was eventually institutionalised in the Advisory War Council. 
Curtin co-operated willingly with the Government but nonetheless persisted 
in his belief that the war effort could best be served by the maintenance 
of an official Opposition. 
His co-operation and respect for the confidences reposed in 
him, however, were not without a cost. Mr A.A. Calwell, who did not always 
enjoy amicable relations with Curtin, has criticised his approach to 
Opposition after the 1940 General Election when the Menzies Government was 
maintained in office by the votes of two independent members. 69 Kylie 
Tennant, biographer of Dr Evatt, records his (Evatt's) discontent with 
Curtin's apparent reluctance to bring down the Menzies Government. She has 
written: 
68 
69 
John Curtin made it a virtue that he did not 'seek power' •••• 
Evatt was trying to persuade Curtin to challenge the 
Government on the Budget, which had raised a storm, not only 
in Parliament. The Treasury avoided the use of central 
bank credit, relying upon a gentleman's agreement with the 
trading banks, and the gentleman's agreement meant taxation 
of low incomes. Evatt narrowly missed convincing Caucus 
that a challenge would be successful. Instead the United 
Australia Party decided to buy Labour off by concessions. 
The key points of attack on the tax programme were the 
reduction of the exemption limit of £150 and the details of 
the wartime company tax. The expenditure plans were under 
heavy fire, the main points being allowances to servicemen's 
dependants and drought relief to wheat farmers.... It was 
apparent, particularly on this last, that the Government's 
tenuous majority would not withstand the formal attack moved 
by the Opposition, and the Government hastily sought a 
compromise through the Advisory War Council. 
Wilson, J.H.: Parliamentary Debates- House of Commons, 5th Series, 
Vol.800, at p.246; 21.4.1970. 
Calwell, A.A.: Be Just and Fear Not, 
Chapters 5 and 10, passim. 
Hawthorn, Lloyd O'Neil, 1972, 
In return for the raLsLng of the tax exemption limit from 
£150 to £200, increase in service allowance, drought relief, 
increase in old age and invalid pensions and a conference on 
credit, the Opposition called off the attack. 
Evatt was, of course, furious. He was certain that the 70 crumbling Government would fall as soon as it was pushed •••• 
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It was not only through the Leader of the Opposition that 
the war-time Menzies Government tried to contain opposition. In the first 
half of 1941 a joint secret session of both Houses of Parliament was held 
to inform members of the state of defences, especially in relation to a 
possible Japanese invasion. Sir Percy Spender, the Minister for the Army, 
read a prepared statement. He has written: 
I was to learn how low politics, as played by a few, could 
get. 
I believed it was my duty to state the facts as I 
understood them. We all assumed - foolishly I confess -
that the secrecy of our discussions would be preserved. 
So I revealed our unreadiness, in terms of men and equip-
ment, to repel an enemy attack on the mainland •••• My 
purpose was twofold: first to speak the unpalatable 
truth, ••• secondly, by so doing, to restrain 
unresponsible and captious criticism, in the hope that 
greater unity might be achieved in Parliament and among 
the people to meet the danger of a war with Japan which 
I regarded as a distinct possibility. 
The secrecy of our discussions was not, however, 
observed by more than one member of His Majesty's 
Opposition. What I said was used, later on, and 
distorted to attack the Menzies administration... 71 indeed to accuse the Government of recreant defeatism. 
As noted previously, Government/Opposition liaison during 
the war found institutional form in the Advisory War Council. This Council 
was established after Menzies' overtures to Curtin for a National Government 
had failed. The Australian Labor Party refused to participate in a 
National Government on the basis that it would be held responsible for the 
deficiencies of the United Australia Party Government. The Government 
parties considered, in the words of the official historian, that: 
70 
71 
Tennant, K.: EVATT, revised edition, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, at p.l30. 
The internal citation is from: Butlin, S.J.: War Economy 1939-42, 
Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1955, at p.367. 
Spender, Percy: 
at p.l49f. 
Politics and a Man, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 
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' •••• only "a full national government" could produce a full measure of 
Co 0 e t . d h . f "b "li ' 72 - p ra 1on an as ar1ng o respons1 1 ty ••.• 
The Advisory War Council was a highly political institution, 
the nature of which has been cogently described by Hasluck: 
This novel institution had been devised to meet the 
particular situation presented by an almost equal division 
of the parties in Parliament at a time so critical that 
dissolution could not be lightly considered, and in the 
circumstances that the minority refused to join an all-
party government. Once that particular situation ended the 
Council would lose the merits claimed for it. Those 
merits were, first, that information regarding the war, 
which for reasons of state or the requirements of security 
could not be given to the whole Parliament, might be given 
in confidence to party leaders and that advice and opinion 
which might not be proffered formally on the floor of the 
House could be given confidentially; and, second, that as 
a consequence of that exchange of information, opinion, 
a loose agreement might be reached to ensure that executive 
action or legislative measures on questions vital to the 
prosecution of the war did not become a matter of open 
controversy, or, more to the point, did not lead to the 
outvoting of the Government and consequent political 
confusion during crises in which national unity and 
stability were essential to national survival. In addition, 
at an early stage in the Council's existence, it was 
realised that the Opposition members of the Council, being 
Labour members, might be able to render a special service 
to the nation in helping to overcome industrial 
dissatisfaction or unrest, both on the one hand by the 
value of their advice to the Government, restraining it 
from blunders and helping it to perfect the machinery of 
industrial peace and, on the other hand, by their influence 
on the trade unions, restraining them from precipitate 
action. 73 
Even Hasluck's careful prose does not conceal that in the 
national interest the Advisory War Council was designed to de-fuse political 
controversy. On the one hand it was a channel through which Opposition 
leaders could influence the Government, on the other it was a device by which 
the Government, by taking Opposition leaders into its confidence, could 
contain certain criticism, not only in Parliament, but in the community as 
well. 
72 
73 
Hasluck, Paul: The Government and the People 1939-41, 
Australian War Memorial, 1952, at p.270. 
Ibid., at p.272f. 
Canberra, 
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No one was more aware of this effect of the Advisory War 
Council than Menzies, under whose auspices as Prime Minister it had been 
established. As soon as he had established himself as Leader of the 
Opposition after the 1943 General Election he organised the withdrawal 
of his party from the council. Hasluck has written: 
In February 1944, however, Menzies and Hughes tendered their 
resignations after a U.A.P. meeting at which it was decided 
that 'having regard to present political circumstances' its 
members should no longer participate, and that, in the absence 
of any all-party administration, the essential war and 
reconstruction effort could best be served by the party 
'resuming full freedom to express its views on the floor of 
the Parliament•.74 
Spender, a member of the Advisory War Council at the time, 
has described the United Australia Party attitude thus: 
The argument put forward was that because of its membership 
of the Council, the Opposition's hands were tied, thus 
leaving the Government substantially free from criticism, 
especially on matters of policy.75 
He himself defied the Party and remained a member of the Council. Menzies' 
attitude was clear. To the Press he said: 
It is not possible for the U.A.P. to fulfil its prime 
function of searching criticism and presentation of 
alternative views, if its relations to the formation 
of Government policy is made ambiguous by its continued 
membership of the War Council.... It is now clear that 
the Government is resuming normal activity, and on these 
my colleagues, in the interests of the people, must be 
free to speak without embarrassment or reservation.76 
To Spender he wrote (in April 1945): 
74 
75 
76 
77 
My own personal advice to you would be to get off the 
War Council right away. It is clear that your own 
freedom to criticise is affected, and the Government 
is losing no opportunity to put you in what will appear 
to the public to be an ambiguous position.77 
Hasluck, Paul: The Government and the People 1942-45, Canberra, 
Australian War Memorial, 1970, at p.382. 
Spender, Percy: op. cit., at p.228. 
Cited in Spender, Percy: op. cit., at p. 231. 
Cited in Spender, Percy: op. cit.~ at p.253. 
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Spender's own assessment was: 
The Council was, of course, not consulted on a number of 
questions, some of which were important, since from the 
beginning its field was confined to questions of policy 
concerned with the direct prosecution of the war and 
associated consequences. Accordingly there was a large 
area of governmental activity, highly political in 
character, which fell outside its activities, such as 
social services, control of the coal industry, economic 
problems, taxation, methods of financing the war, welfare 
projects, revision of the Constitution, governmental rule 
by regulation, censorship, soldiers' pensions, and so on. 
Upon these and similar subjects I was never aware of any 
restriction imposed upon me by my membership of the Council 
to criticize the Government, and I constantly did so. 
I also find it hard to believe that any other Opposition 
member of the Council experienced any such difficulty or 
embarrassment.78 
A parallel case in peace time was the Australian Labor 
Party's long standing refusal to participate on the Joint Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, set up by the Menzies Government 
as a result of a promise made in the 1949 Policy Speech. Without 
traversing the history of this committee it is sufficient to note the 
essence of the party's objection, namely: 
.•• the motion [to establish the Committee] has been drafted in 
the narrowest terms ••.. [T]he committee will be useless unless 
it possesses some substantial degree of autonomy and is more 79 than a mere instrument of the Department of External Affairs. 
It would not, however, be accurate to suggest that all contact 
between Government and Opposition is inevitably fruitless or compromising. 
During the Suez crisis of 1956, when the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, was 
absent abroad, the Acting Prime Minister, Sir Arthur Fadden, and the Minister 
for External Affairs, Mr Casey, briefed the Leader and Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition on the course of the crisis. 80 Menzies,on his return, is reported 
81 by a not disinterested observer to have 'winced' on learning what had occurred. 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Spender, Percy: op. cit., at p. 230£. 
Evatt, H. V.: C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.214, at p. 786£., 17.10.1951. 
Evatt, H. V.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vol.l8, at p.70; 27.2.1958. 
Whitlam, E.G. in Wilkes, J. (ed.): Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy, 
Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1964, at p.l56. 
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And, it seems, Mr A.G. Townley, Minister for Defence from 1958 until 1963, 
'fully and freely allowed his Service chiefs and Departmental heads to 
brief the Opposition's Defence Committee•. 82 
The highly variable nature of these contacts between 
Government and Opposition is, however, illustrated by the effect of a major 
crisis on an established contact between the Leader of the Opposition and 
the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. 
The Australian Security Intelligence Service (as it was 
originally known) was established by the Chifley Government. Arrangements 
were made for the Director-General of Security to call upon the Leader of 
the Opposition from time to time. Mr Menzies, Leader of the Opposition 
when A.S.I.O. was created, has observed of his relations with it: 
I was always treated with the utmost frankness on these 
matters by the then Prime Minister.83 
According to Sir Charles Spry, who became Director-General of 
Security in 1950, similar arrangements persisted under the Menzies Government 
which had come into office after the General Election of December 1949: 
82 
83 
84 
It was purely upon my initiative, and with the approval of 
Mr Menzies, that I commenced this practice when I called 
upon the Leader of the Opposition soon after my appointment. 
I continued this practice when Dr Evatt succeeded Mr Chifley. 
The discussions were of a general nature. 
After Petrov had defected and before the Prime Minister 
made his statement to the House of Representatives on April 
13, 1954, I asked him what action should I take if asked by 
interested ministers about matters relative to Petrov. He 
instructed that I should confine my discussions to himself, 
the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, and that I 
should refer any enquiries from other ministers to him. I 
raised the question of Dr Evatt. He said the same 
instruction should apply. Dr Evatt did ring me on the 
morning of April 4, 19[5)4 and asked me to come to his office 
to discuss the Petrov affair. I told him of the Prime 
Minister's instruction. I do not know whether he did 
communicate with the latter.84 
Ibid. 
Menzies, R.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), Vo1.2, at p.811; 2.12.1953. 
Spry, Sir Charles: quoted in the NationaL Times, 3-8.9.1973, at p.34. 
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Nor would it be accurate to imply that the only purpose, 
from a Government's position, of meeting an Opposition's desire for greater 
information was to contain possible criticism. It had other uses as was 
amply shown during the course of the Parliament elected in the 1961 General 
Election, when the Menzies Government, having provided a Speaker, had a 
majority of one. Leslie Haylen, a member of the Executive of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party at the time has recorded in his memoirs that in 
response to Britain's decision to seek membership of the European Economic 
Community: 
••• [I]t was suggested that a group of prominent Labor men 
should go to London, at the expense of the Liberal 
Government and look at the situation first hand. They 
would travel with the status of Ministers and, if desired, 
could take their wives. They could again, if they so 
desired, return home via the various glamour spots of the 
world and in due course submit a report. Menzies>ruralist 
himself,must have been astonished at the avidity in which 
Labor accepted this colossal sack of corn on the cob. 
To me it seemed a disastrous proposition. With one vote 
to win the government it certainly did not look like 
mortal combat.85 
This extended treatment of access to information has 
inevitably highlighted the delicate nature of Government/Opposition relations. 
These relations are very personal and seem to hang on the attitudes of 
particular Ministers and the degree of cordiality between party leaders. 
Both Government and Opposition are caught in a dilemma. For the Government 
there is the choice of monopolising information weighed against the 
possibility that disclosure of information will mitigate or remove 
likely controversy. For the Opposition there is a desire to be better 
informed weighed against the possibility that it will in some way be 
compromised. 
It will also be noted that in most cases contacts are at the 
political level. In this aspect, practice followed is similar to that of the 
British Government, although it has been of a less institutionalised nature. 
Indeed, the British have, it appears, been likewise reticent about granting 
85 Haylen, Leslie: 
at p.l34. 
Twenty Years Hard Labour, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1969, 
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Opposition access to officials for purposes related to the day to day 
practice of politics. Indicative of prevailing attitude was the response 
of a former Permanent Secretary to the United Kingdom Housing Ministry, 
Baroness Sharp, to a suggestion that civil servants should ' ••• to some 
extent, ••• brief the Opposition'. Her answer was at- once informative of a 
politician'sprobable views and indicative of a civil servant's own disposition 
on the matter: 
Is any government really going to feel happy if its civil 
servants are also briefing the Opposition? I can't conceive it. 86 
The British have recently, however, made a significant 
departure from this rule in respect of machinery of government issues at a 
time when a General Election is in the offing. In the months prior to the 
1964 General Election the then Leader of the Opposition, Mr Harold Wilson, 
was allowed access to officials for discussions on certain matters. These 
discussions, as he later told the House of Commons: 
••• related solely to machinery of Government and did not 
take place on my initiative or at my request. The 
arrangements were, of course, approved by rhe then Prime 
Minister, who attached perfectly reasonable conditions 
to the meeting. It was around the same time, considerably 
less than six months from the statutory end of that 
Parliament, and only then, that the right honourable 
Gentleman authorised facilities for one or two of my 
senior colleagues to have other discussions on government 
machinery questions.87 
Mr George Brown, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party at the 
time, has also described in some detail his discussions with officials on 
the proposed establishment of a Department of Economic Affairs in the event 
of a Labour victory: 
86 
87 
With the approval, or at any rate with the knowledge of, 
the then Conservative Ministers, I began to discuss things 
informally with senior Civil Servants - not only to help us, 
See The Listener, 15.3.1973, at p.335. 
Wilson, J.H.: Parliamentary Debates- House of Commons, 5th Series, 
Vol.800, at p·.246; 21.4.1970. 
but also because of the obvious value to them in making 
their contingency plans against the possible return of a 
new Government. I tried to work out how a Department 
of Economic Affairs, such as I envisaged, might be 
established and staffed, what its relationships with the 
Treasury should be, what should be the lines of 
communication, and so on .... 
One of the great problems was who was to be the Civil 
Service head of the new department, its Permanent Secretary, 
and here I probably made a grave misjudgment. 
Among the people with whom I discussed the question was 
Sir William Armstrong, then Joint Permanent Secretary to 
the Treasury. I spent some time with Sir William, going 
over with him the potential work of the new department, and 
discussing the personalities to be reckoned with in making 
it work. What I failed to consider was whether Sir 
William might have been interested in heading the D.E.A. 
himself ••••• 
But I didn't ask Sir William, and instead considered all 
the other names that he and other people .•• suggested. In 
the end the decision was settled by a fortuitous meeting 
whilst visiting New York. I saw walking towards me along 
Fifth Avenue our then recently appointed Economic Minister 
to Washington, Sir Eric Roll. He was one of those whose 
names we were considering, and I thought, 'Given his 
experience, here is the very man for the D.E.A.!' 
We talked there and then, and later in London. With all 
the appropriate proprieties observed towards the then 
Conservative Government, Sir Eric became very much involved 
in our planning. Sir Donald MacDougall, who had been 
Economic Director of the National Economic Development 
Council since 1962, had already agreed to join us as 
Director-General.88 
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Opposition contact with officials in Australia has not, 
for various reasons, been at the same level of intimacy as that reported in 
Britain. Prior to the 1972 General Election there appears to have been a 
certain amount of liaison89 but the situation was not satisfactory to the 
then Opposition and Mr Whitlam has since announced that while he is Prime 
Minister provision will in future be made in the period preceding a General 
Election for the Opposition to consult with officials. In tabling the 
Fiftieth Annual Report of the Australian Public Service Board in Parliament 
he said: 
88 Brown, G.: In My Way, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, at p.89f. 
89 See Frank Browne: Things I Hear, 12.7.1972, at p.4. 
The loyalty and impartiality of the Australian Public Service 
in serving the Government of the day irrespective of political 
complexion have been demonstrated beyond any doubt. 
Nevertheless it remains true that some difficulties were 
encountered and that to an extent these difficulties could be 
attributed to some lack of understanding on the part of the 
Government and the Public Service of each other's purposes 
and processes. I believe that some of these difficulties 
could have been avoided. 
There is a convention in Britain that before a general 
election members of the Opposition may meet with senior 
officials and discuss such matters as the structure and 
working of departments and the problems of personnel and 
administration. These meetings are held with the full 
knowledge and approval of Ministers. This convention has 
not been adopted by any previous Australian Government 
including that which immediately preceded the present one. 
However, in the interests of good government I intend that 
as long as I am Prime Minister the opportunity for such 
discussions will be made available to the Opposition in the 
periods before general elections. Naturally they will not 
embrace matters of a Party political nature. My object is 
simply to ensure that should there ever be another change 
of government the changeover as it affects the nation's 
administration will take place as smoothly as possible.90 
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Information will continue to be an important weapon in the 
political battle. The sounder the case that is made for having an 
'informed' Opposition the sounder is the case for according the Opposition 
some independent autonomous source for data. As the situation exists at 
present the capacity to grant or withhold information is an important 
element of Government patronage and will, irrespective of any institutional 
arrangements, remain so. 
The position of the Leader of the Opposition in this area is 
of special importance. For whatever compromises and conflicts of interest 
which arise in respect of transmission of information from Government to 
Opposition he above all must be and be seen to be able to criticise the 
Government freely. Yet his is an especially vulnerable position. As 
foregoing sections of this chapter show, he is in a paramount position to 
attack the Government. Because his position is salaried he is subject to 
argument that he should behave 'responsibly', an argument buttressed by 
others deriving from perception of his role as alternate head of Government. 
90 Whitlam, E.G.: C.P.D. H. of R. (N.S.), 11.9.1973, at p.738. 
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CONCLUSION 
Australian national politics has a strong tradition of 
Opposition. From the earnest declarations of Reid and Deakin in the 
1 first decade and the Australian Labor Party's determined effort to recover 
2 the Opposition benches after the conscription split to the resistance of 
Scullin3 and Curtin4 to the idea of a national government in depression and 
war, Australian parliamentary politics have continually been conducted on 
the basis of a Government/Opposition division. The quest for majority 
government in the first decade of the Commonwealth reflected a belief in 
a Government and Opposition division as the normal framework of political 
conflict. 5 With equal force the Liberal Party (or its various forerunners) 
and the Country Party have, except in most unusual circumstances, sought to 
govern jointly. Since 1909 minority government has been a short-lived 
phenomenon in Australian politics. 
In this respect Australia has a singular parliamentary history. 
Britain, the home of Parliament, has frequently, in times of great national 
crisis, resorted to 'national' governments, and accounted such occasions to 
be a sign of strength in the party system. Canada has, on the other hand, 
a long history of minority government. 
One may speculate on the causes of this feature of Australian 
political practice. Unlike so many features of our politics referred to in 
this essay, where the rationale has been of a conspicuously pragmatic 
character, Australian politicians have espoused ideas about Opposition with 
conviction and eloquence. An early important instance was Deakin's famous 
6 
speech on the 'three elevens'. 
1 See above, at p. 22ff. 
2 See above, at p.26ff. 
Later significant statements were made by 
3 See, for example, C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l32, at p.215ff; 24.9.1931. 
4 See below, at p.l13. 
5 See above, at p.22ff. 
6 See above, at p.25. 
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Scullin on the eve of his Government's demise in 19317 and Curtin nearly 
a decade later, with his party ascendant: 
And any government, even if it has the best policies, would 
do far better service to the nation if there were arrayed 
against it in Parliament an Opposition, courageous, intelligent, 
and patriotic. It is not a good thing for democracies to have 
governments that are unchecked by criticism or by honest 
opposition. We have to preserve the reality of democracy, and, 
therefore, all this talk about an all-party government is not 
really a contribution to the safety of the nation •••• 8 
The constitutional theory of Deakin and Reid is buttressed in history by 
the democratic ideology of Labor leaders. 
Analysis and exposition of this curious feature of 
Australian politics lie beyond the scope of this essay. It might 
tentatively be proposed that the source lies somewhere in the sublime 
nature of the Australian Labor Party which has resolutely insisted on 
holding office alone or not at all. Curtin expressed this side of 
political Labor's approach: 
So long as the people of Australia give to Labour in this 
Parliament a minority of members we shall accept the duty 
cast upon us, that of opposition. But, when the people 
of Australia, as I hope and think they will, cast on us 
the responsibility of government, then we shall accept the 
responsibility on our own policy, a policy which the 
people first have approved, and we shall not be involved 
in struggles for portfolios and leadership.9 
This question is, however, a particular case of the more 
general feature of politics in Westminster-type parliaments: their 
tendency to divide into two broadly defined groups, one supporting the 
7 
8 
9 
Scullin's response to a proposal by Page that a national government 
should be established 'to handle with confidence, certainty, and 
swiftness ••• the constantly changing emergencies of [the depression]': 
As an individual, I have given consideration to the 
subject for more than half a century, and during 
that time I have had only one view, which is that 
coalition governments are a mistake. They cannot 
succeed and they cannot restore confidence. They 
actually destroy the confidence and faith of the 
very people into whom it is desired to put confidence. 
C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l32, at p.219; 24.9.1973. 
Curtin, J. : C.P.D. H. of R. (O.S.), Vol.l59, at p.21; 20.4.1939. 
Ibid. 
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Government and the other striving to displace it. This issue underlies 
and predicates the whole subject matter of the project of which this 
essay is a product. 
The consequences of control of a Westminster-type legislature 
are considerable and unique in terms of parliaments in general. Control of 
a Westminster-type legislature is not only an end in itself but also the 
great objective of political life - control of the Government. Control, 
for example, of the Assembly in France, or of the Congress in the United 
States brings no such reward. The legislature of the Westminster-type is 
a unique political organ for it embodies the ultimate political conflict. 
As the Republican Party has found in the United States, failure to win 
control of Congress is not the end of political activity. There are other 
arenas, most notably the quadrennial battle for the Presidency, through 
which access to the fruits of political activity can be and is won. The 
disorganisation and fragmentation characteristic of political behaviour 
in legislatures which are divorced from the executive government could only 
occur at enormous cost in a Westminster-type legislature. 10 
A doctrine of Opposition, whether espoused in the 
constitutional language of Deakin and Reid, 11 the ideological oratory 
of Scullin and Curtin, 12 or even the pragmatic partisanship of Menzies some 
13 
aspects of which were discussed in the previous chapter is, inter alia, 
a legitimisation of the vigorous quest for political power at the highest 
and most consequential level. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
It may be argued that the two Houses of the United States Congress 
have Minority Leaders. However, a study of these offices shows 
they are but a pale shadow of the office of Leader of the Opposition 
in the House of Commons or in the Australian House of Representatives. 
See Galloway, George G.: History of the House of Representatives, New 
York, Crowell, 1962, at p.108, p.llOf. and p.l18; and Ripley, Randall B.: 
Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, Washington, Brookings 
Institution, 1967, at p.28ff~ p.66f., and p.l02f. 
The Leader of the Opposition takes a measure from the Prime Minister. 
The Minority Leaders of the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives may take their measure from the respective Majority 
Leaders but hardly from the President. 
See above, at p.22f. 
See above, at p.l13. 
See above, at p.l05f. 
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It is a doctrine and an ideology which justifies, legitimizes 
and sustains the growth, development and exaltation of the political 
institution which has been the central focus of this study in Australian 
politics. 
The Australian Opposition tradition, embodied and institutional-
ised in the manner described in this essay, is highly oriented towards 
leadership, a strange commentary upon a people who boast equalitarianism as a 
national cultural trait. Yet this is a strain which perseveres from its 
14 
origins to the present day. The Leader of the Opposition in the Australian 
House of Representatives has no counterpart outside the Parliaments based on 
Westminster. He enjoys salary and conditions of services comparable to those of 
Ministers. The only other parliamentary personage rivalling his status in 
these respects is the Leader of the Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons, 
who in fact enjoys a privilege not available to Ministers, provision of a rent-
15 free house. 
The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives 
also has privileges, as described in Chapter IV, which facilitate the 
performance of his political duties in the House. The Opposition, as an 
institution, on the other hand, does not have any special access to the time 
of the House. It must make do with the forms of the House. Convention demands 
that not only should the Government party have a majority on all parliamentary 
committees but that the Chairman should be drawn from that majority. 
A description of the office of Leader of the Opposition in the 
British House of Commons would provide a much less formidible picture than 
that outlined in this essay. Yet there the Opposition has special control 
16 
over debate on certain days in the House. The Opposition may provide 
committee chairmen and, by tradition, does so in the case of the very 
significant Public Accounts Committee. Opposition leadership in the 
14 
15 
16 
See above, at p.l5 
See Review of Top Salaries - First Report - Ministers of the Crown and 
Members of Parliament, London, H.M.S.O., 1971, (Cmnd. 4836), Appendix B. 
Cocks, Sir Barnett (ed.): Erskine May's Treatise on The Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 18th ed., London, Butterworth, 1971, 
at p.279 and p.284, especially. 
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House of Commons is more collegiate, less hierarchical than in the Australian 
House of Representatives. 
The exaltation and augmentation of the office of Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives, in which he resembles in so many 
respects a member of the executive rather than of the legislature may be 
regarded as a triumph of executive infiltration of the legislative branch 
by the executive. With all the accoutrements of executive office there will 
always be a suspicion that the occupant of the office will act more in his 
role as alternative Prime Minister than as chief critic of the Government, 
aided in so doing by notions about 'responsible' opposition. The compromises, 
so feared by Menzies as Leader of the Opposition and so exploited by him as 
Prime Minister, could become a dangerous reality. This paradox, espied by 
17 Bagehot over a century ago, pervades the literature embraced by this project. 
It is endemic in the office itself for few politicians deem Opposition to be 
the pinnacle of a political career. It is embedded in the nature of 
politicians themselves. As Professor Crisp said of Chifley as Leader of the 
Opposition: 
Temperamentally and in his abilities Chifley was perhaps less 
well-suited to lead an Opposition than a Government. His 
instincts were constructive •••• He did not relish speaking 
simply for opposition's sake.l8 
19 It has been said that 'the duty of the Opposition is to oppose'. 
That may be regarded as a cliche. Yet, one suspects, oppositions in 
particular and parliaments in general would function better if this were an 
accurate description of the political activity of Opposition. The root of 
the problems associated with the business of Opposition lies more in its own 
quest for political office and the associated spoils, the glory and the 
patronage. For few, as Menzies wrote, desire'to be permanently on the left 
k ' 20 hand side of the Spea er •.••• 
17 See above, at p.2. 
18 Crisp, L. F. : Ben Chifley, London, Longmans, 1960, at p.375. 
19 Attributed to Lord Randolph Churchill. 
20 Menzies, R.G.: The Measux>e of the Years, Melbourne, Cassell, 1970, at p.l5. 
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Parliamentary Opposition Leader Opposition Leader 
Parliament Date Government (House) (Senate) 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
9 May 1901 
24 September 
1903 
2 March 1904 
27 April 1904 
18 August 1904 
7 July 1905 
20 February 
1907 
17 November 
1908 
27 May 1909 
2 June 1909 
Barton 
(Protection-
ist) 
Deakin 
(Protection-
ist) 
Deakin 
(Protection-
ist) 
Watson 
(Labour) 
Reid-McLean 
Deakin 
(Protection-
ist) 
Deakin 
(Protection-
ist) 
Fisher 
(Labour) 
Fisher 
(Labour) 
Deakin 
(Fusion) 
G.H. Reid 
(Free Trade) 
1:23 
G.H. Reid 
(Free Trade) 
G.H. Reid 
(Free Trade) 
18:13 
G.H. Reid 
(Free Trade) 
19:1247-8 
J.C. Watson 
(Labour) 
21:4266 
G.H. Reid 
(Free Trade) 
25:153 
G.H. Reid 
(Free Trade) 
36:23 
Sen.Sir Josiah Symon 
(But see Sen. 
McGregor's speech of 
22 May 1901 - 1:131) 
Sen. Sir Josiah Symon 
Sen. Sir Josiah Symon 
Sen. Sir Josiah Symon 
Sen. Gregor McGregor 
21:4284 
Sen. Sir Josiah Symon 
Sen. Sir Josiah Symon 
(Note: Symon resigned 
on 20 November 1907 
and was succeeded by 
Sen. Millen - 41:6293) 
Joseph Cook Sen. Millen 
(Free Trade) 
(Reid announced 
his resignation 
at Yass, NSW, on 
16 November 
1908.) 
48: 2924ff. 
Alfred Deakin Sen. Millen 
(Fusion) 
49:114 
Andrew Fisher Sen. McGregor 
(Labour) 
49:243-5 
Parliament 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
Parliamentary 
Date 
1 July 1910 
9 July 1913 
8 October 1914 
27 October 
1915 
29 November 
1916 
22 February 
1917 
14 June 1917 
Government 
Fisher 
(Labour) 
Cook 
(Liberal) 
Fisher 
(Labour) 
Hughes 
(Labour) 
Hughes 
(National 
Labour) 
Hughes 
(Common-
wealth War 
Ministry) 
Hughes 
(Common-
wealth War 
Ministry) 
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Opposition Leader 
(House) 
Alfred Deakin 
(Liberal) 
58:5010 
Andrew Fisher 
(Labour) 
70:23 
Joseph Cook 
(Liberal) 
75:28-9 
Joseph Cook 
(Liberal) 
79:6947 
Joseph Cook 
(Liberal) 
(Note: Tudor 
announced that 
he had been 
elected Leader 
of the ALP -
80: 9240) 
F.G. Tudor 
(ALP) 
81:10574 
F.G. Tudor 
(ALP) 
82:23 
Opposition Leader 
(Senate) 
Sen. Millen 
Sen. Gregor McGregor 
Sen. Millen 
Sen. Millen 
Sen. Millen 
(Note: Sen. A. 
Gardiner announced 
that he had been 
elected as Leader 
of the ALP - 80:9236) 
Sen. Gardiner 
Sen. Gardiner 
(Note: On 8 January 1918 Hughes resigned following the defeat 
of the Government's proposals on military conscription 
at the referendum held on 20 December 1917. Tudor was 
consulted on the formation of a ministry but indicated 
he could not form one which would be supported in the 
House. Hughes was re-commissioned on 10 January 1918.) 
26 February 
1920 
28 June 1922 
Hughes 
(National-
ist) 
Hughes 
(National-
ist) 
F.G. Tudor 
(ALP) 
91:47 
M. Charlton 
(ALP) 
99:15 
(Note: Tudor 
died in 
January 1922) 
Sen. Gardiner 
(The only member of 
the Senate who was 
not a supporter of 
the Government.) 
Sen. Gardiner 
Parliament 
9th 
lOth 
11th 
12th 
13th 
14th 
Parliamentary 
Date 
28 February 
1923 
13 January 
1926 
26 April 1928 
6 February 
1929 
20 November 
1929 
7 May 1931 
17 February 
1932 
23 October 
1934 
Government 
Bruce-Page 
(National-
ist-Country 
Party) 
Bruce-Page 
(National-
ist-Country 
Party) 
Bruce-Page 
(National-
ist-Country 
Party) 
Bruce-Page 
(National-
ist-Country 
Party) 
Scullin 
(ALP) 
Scullin 
(ALP) 
Lyons 
(UAP) 
Lyons 
(UAP) 
(Note: The 
coalition 
with the 
Country 
Party and 
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Opposition Leader 
(House) 
Opposition Leader 
(Senate) 
M. Charlton 
(ALP) 
102:23 
Sen. Gardiner 
M. Charlton 
(ALP) 
112:23 
Sen. Gardiner 
(Sen. Needham 
from 1 July 1926) 
J. H. Scullin 
(ALP) 
118:4380 
(Note: Charlton 
resigned on 29 
March 1928 -
118:4306-4308) 
J .H. Scullin 
(ALP) 
120:23 
Sen. Needham 
Sen. Needham 
Sen. Daly from 14 
August 1929 - 121:4 
J.G. Latham Sen. Pearce 
(National- 122:9 
ist) 122:19 
J.A. Lyons Sen. Pearce 
(UAP) 
129:1690-9 
J.H. Scullin 
(ALP) 
133:24 
(Note: The Country 
Party was the 
largest party in 
the House of 
Representatives 
which did not have 
a member in the 
Ministry. It sat 
Sen. Barnes 
113:10 
on the cross-benches~ 
J.H. Scullin 
(ALP) 
145:33 
Sen. Barnes 
the recon-
struction of 
the Ministry 
were annamced 
on 14 Noventer 
1934 - 145:243) 
Parliamentary 
Parliament Date Government 
14th(cont) 1 October 1935 Lyons 
(UAP-CP) 
15th 
16th 
17th 
18th 
19th 
30 November 
1937 
Lyons 
(UAP-CP) 
7 April 1939 Page 
(UAP-CP) 
26 April 1939 Menzies 
(UAP) 
17 April 1940 Menzies 
(UAP-CP) 
20 November 
1940 
Menzies 
(UAP-CP) 
27 August 1941 Fadden 
(UAP-CP) 
7 October 1941 Curtin 
(ALP) 
23 September 
1943 
6 July 1945 
13 July 1945 
7 November 
1946 
22 February 
1950 
Curtin 
(ALP) 
Forde 
(ALP) 
Chifley 
(ALP) 
Chifley 
(ALP) 
Menzies 
(Liberal-
Country 
Party) 
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Opposition Leader 
(House) 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
147 :335f. 
(Scullin retired 
from the leader-
ship owing to 
ill-health) 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
155:15 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
165:25 
John Curtin 
(ALP) 
A.W. Fadden 
(UAP-CP) 
168:731 
R.G. Menzies 
(UAP) 
176:19 
R.G. Menzies 
(Liberal) 
R.G. Menzies 
(Liberal) 
183:4165 
R.G. Menzies 
(Liberal) 
189:20 
J.B. Chifley 
(ALP) 
206:22 
Opposition Leader 
(Senate) 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. Collings 
Sen. McLeay 
168:723 
Sen. McLeay 
Sen. McLeay 
Sen. McLeay 
Sen. McLeay 
(Sen. Cooper, 
Country Party, 
from 1 July 1947) 
Sen. Ashley 
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Parliamentary Opposition Leader Opposition Leader 
Parliament Date Government (House) (Senate) 
20th 12 June 1951 Menzies J.B. Chifley Sen. McKenna 
(Liberal- (ALP) 
Country 213:23 
Party) 
20 June 1951 Menzies H.V. Evatt Sen. McKenna 
(Liberal- (ALP) 
Country 213:67 
Party) 
21st 4 August 1954 Menzies H.v. Evatt Sen. McKenna 
(Liberal- (ALP) 
Country H. 4: 10* 
Party) 
22nd 15 February Menzies H.V. Evatt Sen. McKenna 
1956 (Liberal- (ALP) 
Country H.9:17 
Party) 
23rd 9 February Menzies H.V. Evatt Sen. McKenna 
1959 (Liberal- (ALP) 
Country H.22:9f. 
Party) 
8 March 1960 Menzies A.A. Cal well Sen. McKenna 
(Liberal- (ALP) 
Country H.26:lf. 
Party) 
24th 20 February Menzies A.A. Calwell Sen. McKenna 
1962 (Liberal- (ALP) 
Country H.34:10 
Party) 
25th 25 February Menzies A.A. Cal well Sen. McKenna 
1964 (Liberal- {ALP) 
Country H.41:10 
Party) 
8 March 1966 Holt A.A. Calwell Sen. McKenna 
(Liberal- {ALP) (Sen. Willessee became 
Country Leader on 24 August 
Party) 1966 when Sen. 
McKenna retired.) 
26th 21 February Holt E.G. Whitlam Sen. Murphy 
1967 (Liberal- (ALP) 
Country H.67 :17ff. 
Party) 
McEwen E.G. Whitlam Sen. Murphy 
(Liberal- (ALP) 
Country 
Party) 
* References hereafter refer to the New Series of Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, issue of which commenced on 8 September 1953. 
Parliamentary 
Parliament Date Government 
26th(cont) 12 March 1968 Gorton 
(Liberal-
Country 
Party) 
27th 
28th 
25 November 
1969 
J5 March 1971 
27 February 
1973 
Gorton 
(Liberal-
Country 
Party) 
McMahon 
(Liberal-
Country 
Party) 
Whit lam 
(ALP) 
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Opposition Leader 
(House) 
E.G. Whitlam 
(ALP) 
E.G. Whitlam 
(ALP) 
H.66:14 
E.G. Whitlam 
(ALP) 
B.M. Snedden 
(Liberal) 
H. 27.2.1973 
Opposition Leader 
(Senate) 
Sen. Murphy 
Sen. Murphy 
Sen. Murphy 
Sen. R. Withers 
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LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
in the 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Salary History 
Expense 
Salary as M.P. Additional Salary Allowance 
1901 £400 
1907 £600 
1920 £1,000 £400 
1947 £1,500 £600 
1952 £1,750 £1,750 £1,000 
1956 £2,350 £1,750 £1,000 
1959 £2,750 £3,250 £1,500 
1964 £3,500 £4,250 £1,800 
1968 $9,500 $10,500 $4,600 
1973 $14,500 $10,500 $4,875 
Note: The salary payable to the Leader of the Opposition was reduced 
in the aftermath of the depression, along with all other 
Commonwealth salaries, parliamentary and governmental. The 
rates fixed in 1920 were restored in 1938. 
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(copy) 
Dear Sir, 
APPENDIX 3 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER 
AND CABINET CONCERNING ACCESS TO PAPERS RELATING 
TO STAFFING AND OTHER MATTERS OF 
LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION 
P.O. Box E 113 
CANBERRA ACT 
1.2.73 
I am a part-time Master of Arts student at the 
Australian National University. I am currently doing research, 
under the supervision of Professor L.F. Crisp, on both the historical 
and political aspects of Opposition leadership in the House of 
Representatives. 
My purpose in writing to you is to seek access to 
material held by your Department relating to Opposition leadership 
in Parliament. In particular I refer to the salary, allowances, 
facilities and privileges of the Opposition leaders, as well as to 
representations which have been made with regard to privileges, staff 
and facilities for the 'Shadow Cabinet'. 
2600 
In making this request I should mention that I am an 
officer of the Commonwealth Service. I have worked in the Office of 
the Public Service Board for the past three years. My course has been 
approved by the Board's Office and I understand that the use I would 
make of the material would be subject both to any stipulations you 
place on it and to the usual Public Service rules. 
I have previously attempted to obtain data from the 
Commonwealth Archives Office but they do not appear to hold the necessary 
documents. The Clerk of the House of Representatives has also accorded 
to me access to the records of the House which are relevant to my 
research. 
I hope this request will be considered favourably. 
Yours faithfully, 
The Secretary, 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
West Block, 
CANBERRA ACT 2600 
(Sgd) 
(J.R. NETHERCOTE) 
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•
* 
. 
v 
. 
• 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET 
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600 
i' ~ FEB 1973 
Dear Mr. Nethercote, 
I refer to your letter of 1 February seeking 
access to material held by this Department in relation 
to Opposition leadership. 
I regret that I am unable to grant you 
access to Departmental files, but I hope that the 
attached details of salaries, allowances, facilities 
and privileges received by the former Opposition 
leaders, will be of assistance to you. These leaders 
were the only members of the "Shadow Cabinet" to 
receive facilities etc. other than those provided for 
private members. 
The question of any variation of these 
entitlements for the present Opposition leaders is 
currently under review. 
I am unable to provide any information about 
representations, if any, that may have been made by 
the Opposition for facilities for the ''Shadow Cabinet''· 
Mr. J.R. Nethercote, 
P.O. Box E113, 
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600. 
Yours sincerely, 
f t, ' 
(E. J. Bunti~), 
Secretary'/~ 
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LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
(Additional to Private Member Entitlements) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
$10,500 per annum salary 
$4,600 per annum special allowance 
Travel facilities within Australia and the 
Territories for self and wife 
Use of V.I.P. aircraft - subject to approval 
One official overseas visit allowable per year 
$36 per day Travel Allowance when absent from 
home base on official business - excluding days 
spent in Canberra 
Telephone at residence as an official charge 
Postage as required for official correspondence 
at official expense 
DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
(Additional to Private Member Entitlements) 
• 
• 
• 
$5,000 per annum salary 
$1,500 per annum special allowance 
Travel facilities within Australia 
Travel for wife at official expense when 
representing the Leader of the party at his 
request 
Four trips per year for wife to Canberra 
(substitution may be made along the lines of one 
interstate trip in lieu of two trips to Canberra) 
Use of V.I.P. aircraft - subject to approval 
One visit allowable per year to South East Asian 
countries 
$33 per day Travel Allowance when absent from 
home base on official business but $22 per day 
for visits to Canberra on sitting days 
Residence telephone rental and 20% of local 
calls, official trunk calls and phonograms as an 
official charge 
Postage stamps to an amount not exceeding $32 
per year 
••• 2/. 
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LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE SENATE 
(Additional to Private Member Entitlements) 
Identical to Deputy Leader of the Opposition except 
No travel for wife at official expense 
No use of V.I.P. aircraft 
No official overseas visit allowed 
• Postage stamps to a value of $150 per annum 
DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE SENATE 
(Additional to Private Member Entitlements) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
$1,625 per annum salary 
$750 per annum special allowance 
Four trips per year for wife to Canberra 
(substitution may be made along the lines of one 
interstate trip in lieu of two trips to Canberra) 
$28 per day Travel Allowance when absent from 
home base on official business but $22 per day 
for visits to Canberra on sitting days 
Residence telephone rental and 20% of local 
calls, official trunk calls and phonograms as 
an official charge 
Postage stamps to an amount not exceeding $32 
per year 
APPENDIX 4 
PAPER PREPARED BY JOHN KERIN, M.P., ON 
STAFFING NEEDS OF PRIVATE MEMBERS 
The Case for Greater Staff 
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In 1944 the then Government, a Labor Government, gave 
approval for each private member of the Parliament to employ a stenographer-
secretary to assist him in the performance of his duties as a member. 
Twentynine years later each private member is still entitled to only one 
stenographer-secretary. In that time, notwithstanding the expansion of 
the Parliament in 1949, the work of the member has expanded in many ways. 
The population which he serves has grown. The business of the Parliament 
has grown and developed. The range of matters for which the Australian 
Government is responsible has expanded beyond the imagination of earlier 
years. In 1944 the role of the Australian Government in education was 
negligible. The social services power had not yet been transferred to the 
Australian Government. The great post-war immigration program had barely 
been conceived. The Government had taken only a few tentative steps in 
economic management. The vast administrative machinery behind modern 
Australian Government, which affects all citizens in so many ways, was yet 
in its infancy. 
In so many respects, in so many directions there has been 
a revolution in the activities and responsibilities of Australian Government, 
and yet the private member hobbles along with the aid of one, in most cases, 
very devoted stenographer-secretary. 
It is clearly time for another Government, another Labor 
Government, to remedy this situation, to enable the private member to filfil 
more satisfactorily his wide duties. 
In the past 30 years the staffsof all Ministers and 
Opposition Leaders have at least doubled and in some cases trebled and 
quadrupled. In the case of Ministers, they may also call upon the aid and 
facilities of the Departmentsof State. They are not only aided in the 
performance of routine work - filing, typing, corre~ence - they also 
receive aid in the policy making aspects of their work. No matter how great 
the skills and talents of a stenographer-secretary the volume of work passing 
through his office will ensure that she is engaged almost exclusively on 
routine matters. 
In the course of his duties a private member is expected to 
handle a wide range of individual problems brought to him by constituents. 
He is also required, as a member of the legislature, to participate in the 
law making function of the Australian Parliament. He also participates in 
debates on general policy issues. 
Open government is a proud plank of the Labor Government's 
policy. But a policy of open government, of greater dissemination of 
information, will simply go over the heads of many private members for want 
of sufficient time to read properly, let alone to analyse the information 
which becomes available. A subtle bureaucracy will be able to protect itself, 
not by secrecy as of old, but by flooding members with an indigestible 
amount of information. 
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I believe that members have to handle a greater amount of 
work with respect to publicity than previously. The advent of talk-back-
radio and T.V. means that I have to prepare for four sessions a week as 
well as the servicing of Press releases to fourteen local newspapers. 
Speeches given at functions in the electorate invariably have to be 
carefully written for distribution. Schoolchildren are being made far more 
aware of the processes of government and increasingly one has to prepare 
speeches and cassette recordings for visits to schools and when they visit 
Parliament House. 
The number of Committees has increased in recent years 
(particularly in the Senate) and the Twenty-eighth Parliament has seen 
more created in the House of Representatives. The Caucus Committees 
(and those of the Opposition) are engaged in more work than previously 
and it is essential for members to brief themselves well before discussion 
with the Minister. References to Standing Committees are voluminous and 
require careful reading. Most Committees require travel to parts of 
the nation other than Canberra but even when meeting in Canberra the travel 
requirements for some State members (e.g. W.A.) are considerable. 
The question is, will the private member be given adequate 
resources under his own control to handle the vast amount of correspondence 
and information which comes his way, or will he be swamped by it. Will the 
sheer size of contemporary Australian Government be allowed to further 
subdue the private member as he strives to fulfil his duties as a member 
of the legislature? These are potent questions, questions of considerable 
constitutional significance. 
It has long been said that Parliament is a rubber-stamp. 
Under a Labor Government, there is a chance for change. No matter how 
open the Government, the more the private member is compelled by dint of 
the sheer volume of correspondence and business before the House to be 
little more than a clerk sifting letters. If he is to be able to 
participate fully in the fundamental functions of the House - legislation 
and oversight of the Executive branch of the State - he must be allowed the 
time and the resources to devote himself to these vital matters. He must 
not be allowed to suffocate in a mound of paper. 
The advantage enjoyed by Ministers and the Opposition 
Leaders is already considerable. They have responsibilities of their own 
which must be met. They have large staffuto assist them, not only in 
routine matters but in the broader aspects as well. 
It's time for the plight of private members to be recognised 
and remedied. It's time to realise that they too have been affected by the 
growth in size and complexity of Australian Government in general and in the 
business of the House in particular. It's time for them to be allowed to 
push not only the parish but also the national pump. 
This is a significant issue. In an organizational society 
we expect the individual parliamentarian to play an effective and 
constructive role. Yet we deprive him of the tools to allow him to do so. 
How long can it last? 
Canberra, 1973. 
APPENDIX 5 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING ORDER N0.91 
as at 18 April 1972 
Time Limits for De!mtes and Speech€9 
91. The maximum period for which a Member may 
speak on any subject indicated in this standing order, 
and the maximum period for any debate, shall not, unless 
otherwise ordered, exceed tiw period specified opposite 
to that subject in the following schedule: 
Subject Tlmo 
In the House-
Election of Speaker or Chair-
man-
Each Member 
Address in Reply-
Each Member 
Discussion of definite matter of 
public importance (under stand-
ing order 107)-
Whole debate 
Proposer 
Member next speaking 
Any other Member 
Motion for adjournment of House 
to terminate the sitting-
Each Member 
Censure or want of confidence 
motion accepted by a Minister 
as provided under standing 
order 110-
Mover 
Prime Minister or one Minis-
ter deputed by him 
Any other Member 
5 minutes 
20 minutes 
2 hours 
15 minutes 
15 minutes 
10 minutes 
10 minutes 
30 minutes 
30 minutes 
20 minutes 
135 
Subject 
Limitation of debate--Motion for 
allotment of time (under stand-
ing order 92)-
Whole debate 
Each Ivl:ember 
Second reading of a bill-
Main Appropriation Bill for 
year-
Mover 
Leader of Opposition 
or one Member de-
puted by him 
Any other Member 
Other bills (Government)-
Mover 
Leader of Opposition 
or one Member de-
puted by him 
Any other Member 
Other bills (Private Govern-
ment Member)-
Mover 
Prime Minister or one 
Member deputed by 
him 
Leader of Opposition 
or one Member de-
puted by him 
Any other Member 
Other bills (Opposition Mem-
ber)-
Mover 
Prime Minister or one 
Member deputed by 
him 
Any other Member 
Question " That grievances be 
noted" (under standing order 
106)-
Each Member 
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Time 
20 minutes 
5 minutes 
not specified 
not specified 
20 minutes 
30 minutes 
30 minutes 
20 minutes 
30 minutes 
30 minutes 
30 minutes 
20 minutes 
30 minutes 
30 minutes 
20 minutes 
10 minutes 
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Subject 
Proposed resolution relating to tax 
or duty-
Mover 
Leader of Opposition or one 
Member deputed by him .. 
Any other Member 
Suspension of standing orders 
(under standing order 399)-
Whole debate 
Mover 
Seconder (if any) 
Member next speaking 
Any other Member 
Debates not otherwise provided 
for-
Mover of a motion 
Any other Member 
In committee-
Time 
20 minutes 
20 minutes 
10 minutes 
25 minutes 
10 minutes 
5 minutes 
10 minutes 
5 minutes 
20 minutes 
15 minutes 
Minister in charge periods not specified 
Limitation of debate--Motion for 
allotment of time (under stand-
ing order 92 )-
Whole debate 
Each Member 
Each question before the Chair on 
the main Appropriation Bill for 
year or on a Tariff Bill-
20 minutes 
5 minutes 
Minister in charge . . periods not specified 
Any other Member-two 
periods each not exceed-
ing . . 10 minutes 
Debates not otherwise provided 
for-
Each Member-two periods 
each not exceeding 10 minutes 
Subject Time 
In the House or in committee-
Extension of time-with the con-
sent of a majority of the House 
or of the committee, to be deter-
mined without debate, a Mem-
ber may be allowed to con-
tinue a speech interrupted under 
the foregoing provisions of this 
standing order (except a first 
speech in committee) for one 
period not exceeding 1 0 minute5 
Provided that no extension of 
time shall exceed half of the 
original period allotted. 
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WJ-!IIITER FOR 0\!BRSEAS TRADE 
THE HONOURAllLE .liM CAfRNS, Ml'; 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr P. J. Cairns, 
(Private Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mrs J. Child (Research 
Officer). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr B. Headland 
(Adviser). 
Press Secretary-Mr A. D. Kennedy. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss M. Burgess. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss K. N. Murray. 
Secretary-Typist-Miss M. Taylor.** 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Mrs G. M. Goedecke. 
** Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR SOCIAL SECU!liTY 
MR BILL HAYDEN, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-P. McGuiness 
(Adviser). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Miss G. Raby** 
(Research Officer). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mrs N. Bums (Private 
Secretary), 
Press Secretary-Ms M. Stoyles. 
Secretary-Typist-Ms M. Ma}'lhew.** 
Secretary-Typist-Miss L. D. Holgate.** 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Ms C. G. Gleeson.** 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss A. C. Baker.** 
""' Seconded Departmental Officer. 
TREASU!lER 
THE HONOURABLE FRANK OREAN, M.P. 
Classification and: Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, . Grade 3-Mr R. Q. Freney** 
(Private Secretary). 
Clerk, Class 5-Miss Helen Scott. 
Press Secretary-Mr D. A. Reeves. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss J. Fisher. 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs M. Purtell. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss J. Ayres.** 
•• Seconded Departmental Officer. 
ATTORNEY·GENERAL AND MINISTER FOR 
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE 
SENATOR THE HONOURABLE LIONEL 
MURPHY, Q.C. 
Classificatioo and <kcupant: 
Scientific Adviser (Part time)-Professor H. 
Messel 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Miss M. Barron 
(Private Secretary). 
Press Secret£.ry-Mr G. Negus 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss P. Mullins. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss M. Minter. 
Secretary-Typist-Ms K .. - J. Scott. 
Steno-Secretary'j Grade -·1-MisS·'lt:, Y. ·Shields. 
Steno-Secretary, Gr.a~J~or-M~sA~-.- J>, ,SI;lee.dy.*.* 
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MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SPlilC!NL 
MINISTER ,@F STATE, VICE-PRESIDENT OF 
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND MINISTER 
ASSISTING THE PRIME MINISTER 
SENATOR THE HON. DON WILLESEE, M.P. 
Classification and Oecupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr G. T. Briot 
(Senior Private Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer. Grade 2-Mr J. Tiiemann** 
(Private Secretary) {Class 9). 
Ministerial Oflice:r, Grade 1-Mr D. J. Mitchell** 
(Private Secretary). 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss G. Hurditch**· 
Assistant Private' Secretary-Miss S. Cochrane. 
Steno-Socretary, Grade 1-Miss S. Radici. 
•• Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR THE MBDIA 
SENATOR THE HON. DOUGLAS M<CLELLAND 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial OfficeT, Grade 3-Mr P. Martin 
{Adviser). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr B. Stewart 
{Private Secretary). . 
Press Secretary-Miss H. Styles (Media se·cretary). 
Assistant Private SecTetary-Miss J. Beckett**· 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs P. Baker. 
Steno*Secretary, Grade 1-Miss C .. Burkhardt. 
Steno~Secretary, Grade 1-Miss H. -M-cGill. 
u Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR N@RTHERN DEVELOPMENT 
AND MINISTER FOR NORTHERN TERRITORY 
THE HON. RillX PA'ITllRSON, M.P. 
Classificatioo and· Occupant: 
Ministeria:l Officer, GTade 2-Mr J. H. Keily. 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Miss B. McLennan 
{Private Secretary). 
Press Secretary_:_Mr D. A. Falconer. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss K. Baker. 
Assistant Private Secretary-~Miss G .. L. Meredith. 
Secretary-Typist-Miss S. Pym. 
MINISTER FOR REPATRIATION AND 
MINISTER ASSISTING THE MINISTER 
FOR DEFENCE 
SENATOR THE HON. R. BISIIOP 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr B. B. Coburn** 
{Private Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr C. Sumner 
{Research Officer). 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss J. M. Sutherland. 
Assistant PTivate Secretary......,Miss E. M. Molloy**· 
Assistant Private .Secretary-Mrs A. Pass_low. 
Secretary·Tycpis~'"-"-Mrs -A, ·N., Willemse. 
•• Seconded Ded~n·tm(:'tital _Officer. 
MliN~$TSR FQ!t $ER'Y:ICES A.NiD PR!OI'ERTY 
ntE :lfoN.>'Fc l\L l>A.LY, M.P. 
Classification and Oc~upant: 
MinisteriM Officer, Grade 3-Miss P. M. Larkey** 
(Private Secretary). 
Assistant .Private Secretary-Ms B. A. Williams. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Ms D. B. Brown. 
Secretary Typist-Ms M. Thompson. 
Steno-secretazy, Grade 1-Ms R. I. Mildwater. 
** Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR LABOUR 
THE HON. CLYDE R. CAMERON, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr J. C. Bannon 
{Class 9) {Resea-rch Officer). 
S,pecial Adviser-Mr G. W. Ford. 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr M. R. Cockburn 
(Private Secretary) . 
. Press Secretary-Mrs D. S. Dowse. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs P. T. Wright. 
Assistant Private Secretary.....,...Mrs H. M. Lea. 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs N. I. Rau. 
Steno-secretary, Grade ·1-Miss A. Davoli**· 
**Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
THE HON. TOM UltEN, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr R. Dempsey 
'(Adviser). 
MinisteTial Officer, Grade 1-Mr H. O'Neill 
(Private Secretary). 
'Press Secretary-Mr H. Stein. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss V. James. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss J. Gill**. 
Secretary-Typist-Miss D. Talty. 
Steno-secretary, Grade 1-Mrs M. Hardin**. 
**Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND MINISTER 
FOR CIVIL AVIATION 
THE HON. C. K. JONES, M.P. 
Classificattou and' Occupant: 
Ministerial Offioer, Grade 2-Mr P. Garrad** 
(Private Secretary). 
Press Secretary-Mr J. C. Ford. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss R Hogan. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs S. Barrett. 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs Jones. 
Steno-secretary, Grade 1-Mrs L.A. Johnson. 
**Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR EDUCATION 
THE HONOURABLE KIM E. BEAZLEY~ M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr D. Sligar** 
(Research Adviser). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr F. Kirwan 
(Private Secretary)~ 
Press Secretit~Mfc' I(-: M:- Hebirick; 
Assistant Private SeCJ:ietary-Mi$-:P .• -·!Long, 
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Assistaliit -'BtiVate: .Hemtaf¥~ Hl !BUgb.M:. 
Secr«f.~Y-TJflli~;"'"""¥~;-S. ·"~b,rf:;,~~­
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss G. Henderson.** 
*"' Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR TOURISM AND RECREATION 
AND MINISTER ASSISTING Tiffi TREASURER 
THE HONOURABLE F. E. STEWART, M.P. 
Classification and 0£cupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3.-:.Mr A. P. Dettre. 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr K. I. McDowall** 
(Private Secretary). 
Assistant Private Secretary.....;.Miss M. V. Almond.** 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss A Hasney, 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs V. N. Monk. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss A. M. Coady. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss A. L. Harley. 
"""Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS 
SENATOR THE HONOURABLE 1. L. CAVANAGH 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr D. R. Cavanagh 
(Private Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr R. F. Whiddon 
(Research Officer). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mrs L. J. Thomas 
(Personal Secretary). 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss C. D. Olszak.** 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs J. Jordan.** 
Secretary-Typist-Miss L. l)rury. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss P. Rutter. 
**Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRY 
SENATOR THE HONOURABLE K. S. WRIEDT 
Classification and Occupant; 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr D. J. Thomas 
(Research Officer). 
Ministerial Officer, Gr.ade 3-Mr B. Nof!Wood** 
(Private Secretary). 
Press Secretary-:-'Mr T. Connors. 
Assistant Priv.ate Secretary-Miss J. M. Cooper. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss J. Saunders. 
** Seconded bepartmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR THE CAPITAL TERRITORY 
'l1ICE HON. GORDON BRYANT, E.D., JILl'. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr W. J. King** 
(Adviser). · 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mrs G. King (Private 
Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1- Mr R. White. 
Press Secretary-Mr I. Higgins. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs P. Kruger. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs L. Silvester. 
Secretazy-Typist-:Mr R. Scott. 
Steno·.$0-r)'i G!tafi>Ji.....'Mll$ S. l'¢1Uilal!> 
"'* ·s~cOhaed,·-~~hil ·Oftkter~ 
MOOSl'llil ,I'Oll' MfN'Bl!!AliS. Afi>ID IENER"Y 
THE HON. R. F. X. CONNOR, M.P. 
ClaSsification 11nd Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-M:r J. Ryan'** (Pri~ 
vate Secretary) (Class 9). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1--Mr C. Bell~ 
:chambers * * (Research Officer) {Class 7). 
Fuel Technologist-Mr N. Jennings.** 
Press Secretary-Mr R. Sorby. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss J. Pettifer:** 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs J. White. 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs J. O'Shea. 
Steno-secretary~ Grade .1-Miss R. s~ Kennedy. 
n Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION 
THE HON. A. J. GRASSBY, M;P. 
'Classification and Oecupan:t: 
Ministeiial Officer. Grade 3-Mr W. J. Gibbons** 
(Private Secretary). 
Assistant Private Secretary--'Miss J. Moore.** 
Assistant Private Se-cretary-Miss ,C. Ridgwell.** 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss J. Garnock.** 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs E. C. Valetti. 
Typist, Grade 2-Mrs E. Preis. 
** Seconded Departmental Officer, 
M!NIS'IER FOR HOUSING AND MINISTER FOR 
WORK'S 
THE HON. LES JOHNSON, MP. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mrs L. Scott 
(Research Officer). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr J. Enders** {Pri-
vate Secretary). 
'Press Secretary-Mr D. A. Halpin. 
Asiiistant Private Secretary-Mrs P. E. Storrie. 
Assist-ant Private Secretary-Miss Y. L. Camilleri.** 
Secretary-Typist-Mrs P. Trott. 
Steno·Secretary, Grade 1-Mrs A. Carmody. 
,Steno·!Secretary, Grade 1-Miss C. J. Walsh.** 
"'* Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER.FOR SECONDARY INDUSTRY 
AND MINISTER FOR SUPPLY 
THE HONOURABLE KEP ENDERBY, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-Mr J. W. A. Ire-
monger (ReseaTch Adviser). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mrs V. A. Lavington 
!(Private Secretary.). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Ms H. E. Shepherd 
(Research Adviser). 
-Pi:ess SecretaTy-Mr P. W. Dougherty. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Mrs K. M. O'-Connor. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss B. A. Bender. 
·Clerical Assistant, Grade 4-Miss J. L. Orr.** 
Secretary·Typist-Mrs B. H-iggs. 
Secretary.Typist-Mrs M. Charchalis. 
Seci:eQcy--TyPis.r·Mf;s,s_ ;J. F-ly_qn, 
'**-Sec-onded Departniel:ifirl' Qftice:r. 
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POOTMA\STE!t'O!l!!>!ilRAL , 
THE HON. LIONEL F. BOWEN 
Classification and Ottupant: 
Ministetial Officer, Grade 3-Mr W. A. Br-ooker.** 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr V. W. Ry,an ** 
!(Private Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mi N. Pittnlan. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss M. Kerwick. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss B. L. Kilby. 
Secretazy-Typist-Miss H. M. McPherson. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Mrs G. A. Goode, 
* *- Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINIS'IER FOR HEALTH 
THE HON. D. N. EVERJNGHAM, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr C. J. B-ailey** 
{Private Secretary). 
Press Secretary,-Mr P. J. Gurry. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss P. -J. Watson. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss G. M. -Palmer.** 
Secretary-Typist-Mi-ss G. Tarlington. 
Steno-Secretary, GTade 1-Miss M. A. Hoey. 
**Seconded Departmental Officer. 
MINISTER FOR ENVIRONMENT AND 
CONSERVATION 
THE HON. MOSS CASS, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Minilstetial Officer, Grade 3--Dr -P. Ellyard** 
(Resea:rch Adviser). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr H. Rosenbloom 
'(Private Secretary). 
Press Secretary-Mr P. Blazey. 
Assistant Private Se-cretary---Miss C. Barton. 
Ass-istant P'rivate Secretary-Mrs E. Bird. 
Secretary-Typist-Miss D. Brown. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Miss C. J. Eaves 
**SeConded Departmental Offi-cer. 
MINISTER FOR SCIENCE AND MINISTER 
FOR EXTERNAL TERRnORIES 
THE RON. W, L MORRISON, M.P. 
-Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Dr T. J. Conlon, 
(Class 9) -(Research Officer). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Miss P. P. Warn 
{Private Secretary), 
Assistant Private Secretary_;Mrs M. A .. Finch. 
Assistant Private Secretary-MTS J. M. MacLean. 
Steno·Secretary, Grade 1-Miss D. T. Baxter. ' 
Secretary-Typist___.Miss S. Pearce. 
DEPARTMENTAL LIAISON OFFICERS 
AS AT I NOVEMBER, 1973 
.Minister to whom attached, Departmental· .Officer -and 
Classification: 
Deputy Prime Minister, :Mr. J. P. Wagner**-.: .... :-Min-
isterial Officer, Grade 2. 
Overseas Trade, Mr_J. Douglas**-qass 7, __ 
Customs ·antt ·ExCise, Mr ·y, 'Wtight**-'-'M"Ihtsterial 
OfficeT, Grade 2. ' 
Media, ·Mr ·W;· 'Rigby.*•_.,;Ministerial·!Officer, Grade 
2. ·. .. < .· .. ·· , •. ·' ; Urban and '·Regi-onal 1JeVelopm.~rit~ Mr 1. 
Mant**-Ministerial Officer, GraDe 3. 
Transport and Civil Aviation, Mr G. Spenoe**-
M.inisterial Officer, Grade 3; Mr I. Richard~ 
son*.*-Ministerial Officer, Grade 3. 
Education, Mr G. C. Hirst**-Ministerial Officer, 
Grade 2. 
Capital Territory, Mr G. Monaghan**-Ministerial 
Officer, Grade 1. 
Immigration, Mr P. Job**-Ministeria1 Officer, 
Grade 1. 
Postmaster~General, Mr W. K. C. Daly**-Minis--
terial Officer, Grade 3. 
Environment and Conservation, Mr G .. McAlpine** 
-Ministerial Officer, Grade 2. 
Science & External Territories, Mr M. Bourke**-
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2. 
*"' Seconded Departmental Officer 
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE B. M. SNEDDEN, 
Q.C., M~P. 
Classification and occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3-.0r J. Best (Class 11) 
(Senior Private SecTetary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr J. Knight** {PriN 
vate Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Mr W. R. Shepherd. 
Press Secretazy-Mr J. Fraser. 
Assistant Private Secretary~ Miss J. Thompson. 
Assistant Private Secretary-Miss A. Fox. 
Secretary-Typist-Miss Helen Trucano. 
:Steno-5ecretary, Grade 1-Miss J. Gubbins. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1--:Vacant. Mr J. Good-
fellow** (Class 7) (Supernumerary)_ 
**Seconded Departmental Officer 
DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
THE HONOURABLE P.R. LYNCH, M.P. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr A. 0. Hay (Pri-
vate Secretary). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Miss R M. Anderson 
(ReseaTch Officer). 
Press Secretary-Mr K. Randell. 
Assistant Private Secretary----'Miss D. McCarthy. 
Assistant Private Secretary,~Miss E. Seller. 
Steno,S.Ccretary, Grade 1-Miss S. Moloney. 
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE 
SENATE 
SENAl'OR R. G. WITHERS 
CJassificati0111 and OccUpant: 
Ministerial OfficeT, Grade 2-Mr R. Maher (Pri-
vate Secretary) 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1-Miss J_ Longmuir**-
Press 'Secretary-Mrs N. Driver. 
AssisJant_)~:~iyate .-.S~_cr~.;-~~Nl·p;, M, :T,a;ylor. 
, :at~;.$,eff-eta.l(Y., Grade l~Misi K. Porter.:"* 
** Second·ed Departmental Officer 
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DEPUTY !:EADER cQF . THE. DPPOSITI<ill!l IN 
,~!'( ~El'!fAT!'( 
SENATOR THE HON. L J. GREENWOOD, Q.C. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr J. Shier (Ad--
visor). 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1__:Miss P. o~Connor­
(Private Secretary). 
Assistant 'Private Secretary-Miss D. Stafford. 
Steno-secretary, Grade l~Mrs V. Williams.** 
** Seconded Departmental Officer 
LEADER OF THE COUNTRY PARTY 
THE RT. HON. J. D. ANTHONY, M.Pc 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Offi-cer. Grade 2-Mr R. B. Coombs 
(Reseavch Officer). 
Ministerial Officer. Grade 1-Mrs B. Carroll (Pri-
vate Secreta-ry). 
,Press Secretary~Mr B. Virtue. 
Assistant Private ,Secretary-Miss A. P. Daly. 
Steno~secretary, Grade 1-Miss B. Melv-ille.** 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Mrs J. Wein. 
"'*Seconded Departmental Officer 
DEPUTY LEADER OF WE COUNTRY PARTY 
THE HON. I. M. SINCLAIR, M.P. 
CI$Sification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr A-. Lynch (Private 
Secretary). 
Steno-secretary, Grade 1-Miss Betty Shelton. 
LEADER OF THE COUNTRY PARTY IN THE 
SENATE 
SENATOR THE HON. T. C. DRAKE-BROCK· 
MAN, D.F.C. 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministedal Officer, Grade 2-Mr E. J. Clark (PrlN 
vate Secretary). 
Steno~secretary., Grade 1-Miss B. Daly, 
LEADER OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATIC 
LABOR PARTY 
SENATOR F. P. McMANUS 
Classification and Occupant: 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2-Mr D. W. Strang· 
man** {Private Secretary). 
Press Secretary-Mr K. C. Davis. 
:Secretary~Typist-Miss B. BaTry. 
*"' Seconded Departmental Officer 
LIBERAL PARTY EXECUTIVE 
Classification and Occupant: 
Steno-secretary, Grade 1-Miss C. Hill. 
Steno-Secretary, Grade 1-Mrs C. Lusher. 
Steno-secretary, Grade 1-Miss Kellock. 
COUNTRY PARTY EXECUTIVE 
Classification and. Occupant: 
\S-teno~Secretary. Gt;i-<fe l.:....Mi's5 P. ·o.·connor· (Ii'-er~ 
sonal classifi-cation :$560'7); 
:FA!'S.LE :4 
SALARY RANGES-MtNISTEidAt~ ·AN». 
STAFi? OF OFFICE-HOLDERS 
Classification 
Ministerial Officer, Grade S 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 4 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 3 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 2 
Ministerial Officer, Grade 1 . . • . 
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister • , 
Publ!c Relations Officer to the Prime Minister I 
Med1a Secretary to the Prime Minister .. ~ 
Press Secretary, Journalist, Grade At . ) 
Assistant Private Secretary · 
Secretary(Typist , . . . 
Steno-secretary, Grade 1 
Typist, Grade 2 •. 
Typist, Grade 1 . . • • • . • . 
Clerk to Government Whips • • , , 
Clerk to Secretary, Parliamentary Labor Party 
Clerk/Stenographer .. 
Clerical Assistant, Grade 4 
Overseer, Telephones . . . . 
Special Adviser to the Minister for Labour .. 
Scientific Adviser (Part-time) to the Minister 
for Customs and Excise. 
Fuel Technologist 
Clerk, Class 11 
Clerk, Class 9 
Clerk, Class 7 
Clerk, Class 5 
Clerk, Class 4 
Range-Actual 
$per annum 
19,085* 
17,300* 
13,004-13,498"' 
1!,032-11,525* 
8,886- 9,548* 
12,549+3,ooot 
10,524-10,942:t 
5,434- 6,040 
5,077- 5,281 
4,618- 4,()24 
4,113- 4,378 
3,675- 3,981 
5.434- 6,046 
5,434-- 5,638 
5,434- 5,638 
4, 736- 4,989 
4,456- 4,731 
16,765 
7,500 
8,102- 9,521 * 
13,991-14,484* 
12,019-12,510* 
9,876-10,538* 
7,899- 8,639 
6,912- 7,652 
* An allowance of $2,860 per annum in lieu of overtime, may 
be payable. 
t Special allowance. 
t An allowance of $2,860 per annum or overtime payments is 
payable. All other O:!ltegories of staff, except the Press Secretary to 
the Prime Minister, Special Advisers to the Minister for Labour 
and Minister for Customs and Excise, are entitled to overtime 
p~~~ts o_n_ ag __ ll:qyrly ~-
NOte! Some MlniStetiat-Offi~-ers a~ ~gtted- 'wHh PUbliC-:s'ei'VIOO 
clerk classifications. Th:e' -appropria::UH~lass- is shown --against the 
~divi4w.Ys co.q~_ed. 
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Parliamentary Sflltlf Estai>~ts: 
, Non-Gov~ P'arties 
(Question No. 874) 
Mr SCJwles .asked- the Prime Minister, upon 
notice: 
{1) Has his attention been drawn to Teports that 
the Deputy Leader of -the Opposition requires a 
female adviser who can type :and that the Deputy 
Leader hiS' Stated that the Government has refused 
to provide the ·opposition with adequate st-aff. 
(2) What staff were provided to Opposition Party 
Members. under the GOvernment of which the 
present Deputy Leader was a Minister, and what 
was the classification in ·each case. 
(3) ·wrrat Siaff' are available to Members of the 
present· OppoSition, and what is the classification in 
each case. 
'( 4) What requestS bY the Opposition for additional 
staff have 1been rejected. 
Mr Wbitlam-The answer to the honour-
able Member's questi!>n,, is as foll4ws: 
(1) Ye~ 
(~) Details of staff approved by the fotmet 
Gov:ernment for the non-Government parties as at 
f December 1972 are shown in Tah-le 1 below. 
(3) The present Government, following representa-
tions from the non-Government parties, approved a 
major increase and upgrading in the staff available 
to them. A total number of positions was approved 
viz. nine clerical. three Press Secretaries and fourteen 
stenographic positions for the Liberal Party and four 
clerical, one Press Secretary and six stenographic 
positions for the Countr}'j Party leaving each Leader 
to allocate the positions within his party. The 
Government also approved three stenographic posi, 
tions for use by the Liberal Party Executive and one 
far use by the Country Party Executive. It upgraded 
the top position on the staff of the Leader of the 
Democratic Labor Party. 
The end result has been that the staff available to 
non-government parties has been increased from 
29 under the previous Government to 45 under the 
present Government. Within these totals the number 
of senior positions (i.e. third- division) has been 
increased from 10 to 19. 
The classification of staff available to the non-
Government parties has also been ungraded. In 
addition to the .positions listed on the attached -table, 
six· positions are available to the Rt. Honourable 
William McMahon and the Rt. Honourable J. G. 
Gorton, as former Prime Ministers. 
The approved 
Government parties 
shown in Table 2. 
staff establishments for non-
as at 1 November 1973 are as 
{4) Requests for staff, in addition to the total 
positions allocated, that have been rejected are: 
Requested b)' the Leader of the Opposition: One 
extra Sessional Clerk position fox each Opposition 
Whip {allowance for these positions had been made 
in the total positions allocated); one extra steno-
grapher position f.or each Office-holder; 
One extra Electorate Secretary for each Opposition 
Whip to orelease two stenographic positions for 
re-allocation within the party; one Research Officer 
position at Clerk, Class- 11 salary ('$13991-14484) in 
lieu of one Ministerial Officer Grade 1 {$8886-9548) 
position for the Leader's staff. 
The Leader also- -suggested that the top position 
on his own staff should be at the same classification, 
Ministerial Officer Grade 5 ($19085), as the top posi-
tion on my own staff and that the top position on 
the staff of the Deputy .Leader shoul-d be at 
Ministerial Officer Grade 4 ($17300) in line with 
that on the Deputy Prime Minister's staff. 
Requested <by the Leader of the Country Party: 
One extra Sessional Clerk position for the Country 
Party Whip. At the time this request was refuse<I, I 
appioved a full time stenographic position for use 
by the Party Executive. 
Requested b}'j the former Leader of the Democoratlc 
L.abor Party: One Research Officer position fm the 
)i:.eader's staff; one ex:tta Steno..Secretary position for 
;the Le-adet's staff. 
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TABLE I 
APPROVED STAFF ESTABLISHMENTS FOR OFFICE-HOLDERS OF NON-GOVERNMENT PARTIES AS AT 1 DECEMBER 1972 
Press 
Secretary@ 
Private $9338-9715 Clerk to 
Secretary@ per annum Secretary, 
$7651-8230 plus $1900 Assistant Steno- Parliamentary 
per annum special Private secretary, Clerk to Labor Secretary 
plus $1900 allowance Secretary@ Grade 1@ Whip@ Party@ Typist@ 
special or overtime $4385-4755 $3739-3984 $4385·4507 $4385-4507 $4138-4261 Toll\1 
Ofti.ce-holder allowance payments per annum per annum per annum per annum per annum positJ9ri'S 
Leader of the Opposition (Representatives) 2 1 1 4 .. .. 8 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition (Representatives) I 1 1 2 .. .. 5 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate .. 1 1 1 2 .. .. .. 5 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate .. 1 1 1 .. .. 3 
Opposition Whip in tbe House of Representatives .. .. .. . . 1* .. 1 2 
Opposition Whip in the Senate .. .. .. .. 1* I .;2 
Secretary, Federal Parliamentary Labor Party .. It .. '~ 
Leader of the Democratic Labor Party I 1 u .. '3 
Total positions .. .. 6 4 5 9 2 1 2 2\1 
* Available in Ses,'iion only. 
occupancy), 
t In lieu of position of Electorate Secretary. t Personal classification (to be replaced by Secretary/Typist position on change~ 
TABLE 2 
APPROVED STAFF ESTABliSHMENTS FOR OFFICE-HOLDERS OF NON-GOVERNMENT PARTIES AS AT 1 NOVEMBER 1973 
Press 
Ministerial Ministerial Secretary @ 
Officer, Officer, $10524-10524 
Grade2@ Grade 1@ per annum 
$11032-11525 $8886-9548 plus $2860 Assistant Steno~ 
Ministerial per annum per annum special Private Secretary/ secretary 
Grade3@ plus $2860 plus $2860 allowance Secretary@ Typist@ Grade 1@ 
$13004-13498 special special or overtime $5434-6046 $5077-5281 $4618-4924 1\0~ 
qtiice·holder per annum allowance allowance payments per annum per annum per annum p~ttoils 
~....,. 
Uader of the Opposition (Representatives) 1* 1 1 I 2 1 2 ~ 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition (Representatives) 1 1 I 2 1 6 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate .. 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate .. .. 1 I I 1 4 
Leader of the Country Party (Representatives) I 1 I 1 I I 6 
Deputy Leader of the Country Party (Representa~ 
tives) . . . . .. 1 .. 1 2 
Leader of the Country Party in the Senate I I 2 
Leader of the Democratic Labor Party .. I l .. 1 3 
Opposition Whip in the House of Representatives .. I 1 
Opposition Whip in the Senate.. . • .. 1 1 
Country Party Whip .. .. .. . . I I 
Democratic Labor Party Whip .. .. I j 
Liberal Party Executive 3 3 
Country Party Executive 1 C! 
Total positions 1 8 5 5 7 7 12 4"$ .. .. .. 
* Paid as Oet'k, Class 11 ($13991-14484) plus $2860 Special Allowance. 
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